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This work advances the use of nonclassical logics for developing 
qualitative models of real-world systems. Abstract mathematics is "quali-
tative" inasmuch as it relegates numerical considerations to the back-
ground and focuses explicitly on topological, algebraic, logical, or 
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other types of conceptual fonms. Mathematical logic, the present topic, 
serves to explicate alternative modes of reesoning for use in general 
research design and in model construction. 
The central thesis is that the theory of fonmal logical systems, 
and particularly, of logical systems based on nonclassical modes of 
reasoning, offers important new techniques for developing qualitative 
models of real-world systems. This thesis is supported in three major 
parts. 
Part I develops a semantically complete axiomatization of L. A. 
Zadeh's theory of approximate reasoning. This mode of reasoning is 
based on the conception of a "fuzzy set," by which means it yields a 
realistic representation of the "vagueness" ordinarily inherent in 
natural languages, such as English. 
All axiomatizations of this mode of reasoning to date have been. 
deficient in that their linguistic structures are adequate for expressing 
only the simplest fuzzy linguistic ideas. The axiomatization developed 
herein goes beyond these limitations in a two-leveled formal system, 
which, at the inner level, is a multivalent logic that accommodates 
fuzzy assertions, and at the outer level, is a bivalent formalization of 
segments of the metalanguage. This system is adequate for expressing 
most of the basic fuzzy linguistic ideas, including: linguistic terms, 
hedges, and connectives; semantic equivalence and entailment; possi-
bilistic reasoning; and linguistic truth. 
The final chapter of Part I applies the theory of approximate 
reasoning to a class of structural models for use in forecasting. The 
result is a direct mathematical link between the imprecision in a model 
and the uncertainty which that imprecision contributes to the model's 
forecasted events. 
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Part II studies the systems of logical "form" which have been 
developed by G. Spencer-Brown and F. J. Varela. Spencer-Brown's "laws 
of form" is here shown to be essentially isomorphic with the axiomatized 
propositional calculus, and Varela's "calculus for self-reference" is 
shown to be isomorphically translatable into a system which axiomatizes 
a three-valued logic developed by S. C. Kleene. No semantically complete 
axiomatization of Kleene's logic has heretofore been known. 
Following on Kleene's original interpretation of his logic in the 
theory of partial recursion, this leads to a proof that Varela's concept 
of logical "autonomy" is exactly isomorphic with the notion of a "to~ally 
undecidable" partial recursive set. In turn, this suggests using Kleene-
Varela type systems as formal tools for representing "mechanically 
unknowable" or empirically unverifiable system properties. 
Part III is an essay on the theoretical basis and methodological 
framework for implementing nonstandard logics in. the modeling exercise. 
The evolution of mathematical logic is considered from the standpoint of 
its providing the opportunity to "select" alternative modes of reasoning. 
These general theoretical considerations serve to motivate the methodo-
logical ones, which begin by addressing the discussions of P. Suppes and 
M. Bunge regarding the role of formal systems in providing "the semantics 
of science." Bunge's work extends that of Suppes and is herein extended 
in turn to a study of the manner in which formal systems (both classical 
and nonclassical) can be implemented for mediation between the observer 
and the observed, i.e., for modeling. Whether real-world systems in 
fact obey the laws of one logic versus another must remain moot, but 
models based on alternative modes of reasoning do satisfy Bunge's 
criteria for empirical testability, and therefore do provide viable 
systems perspectives and methods of research. 
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This work is dedicated with love and appreciation to 
GURU MAHARAJ JI, 
without whose grace I could not possibly have gained 
the presence to see it through. 
But if a man meditate on Me and Me alone, and will 
worship Me always and everywhere, I will take upon Myself 
the fulfillment of his aspiration, and I will safeguard 
whatsoever he shall attain. 
Lord Krishna 
From The Baghavad Gita (Swami 1977, p. 90) 
PREFACE 
The underlying theme of this work originated approximately ten 
years ago during my master's degree program in mathematics at Simon 
Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada. From a course in mathe-
matical logic came the idea that, if one could write all of the laws of 
physics in a semantically complete formal logical system, then the 
semantic models of that system would represent all and only those possible 
universes in which the given laws hold true. 
I mentioned this idea once to Professor R. Dass, an applied mathe-
matician working in relativity theory. He replied that any model of· the 
world is scientifically acceptable as long as it is internally consistent, 
agrees with the known data, and is explainable to other mathematicians. 
This was positive encouragement that the idea was worthy of development, 
but the opportunity for carrying it further did not arise at that time. 
During these same years came my first encounter with G. Spencer-
Brown's Laws of form, which I read with avid interest, but then put 
aside as being little more than an anomaly of logical studies and as 
having only peripheral significance. My main interests turned toward 
multivalued logics, modal logics and particularly, the subject of paradox. 
These studies bore out a speculation that, if a meaningful rendering of 
paradox could be developed, then Dr. Dass's requirement of consistency 
could be dispensed with, or at least, be replaced with a more general 
one. 
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These ideas remained foremost with me as a beginning student in 
systems science at Portland State University, 1975. There the quest 
began anew for a possible line of development. The first concrete idea 
arose serendipitously, in the office of my faculty advisor, Professor 
George Lendaris. While waiting for him to finish a telephone conversa-
tion, I took an issue of The International Journal of General Systems 
from his bookshelf and began turning pages. 
That issue contained Francisco Varela's paper, "A calculus for 
self-reference," in which I immediately recognized exactly the same 
notations as used in the book by Spencer-Brown. Curiosity quickly 
manifested in activity, and a thorough review of both Spencer-Brown's 
book and Varela's paper led to the next most natural question: What is 
the relationship of these systems to contemporary systems which use the 
standard linguistic forms? 
An exploration of this question was carried out under the tutelage 
of Professors Robert Rempfer and Robert Stanley of the Portland State 
University Department of Mathematics. This resulted in a paper which 
was ultimately accepted for publication (Schwartz 1981a) in the same 
journal as carried Varela's paper and which now appears in this disser-
tation as the essential content of Part II. Francisco Varela was one of 
the reviewers of the published version, and his remarks were most helpful 
in producing what appears here as Chapter 9. 
The work in Part I of this dissertation arose through a continued 
association with George Lendaris, who introduced me to Professor L. A. 
Zadeh's theory of fuzzy sets and approximate reasoning. By the time the 
work on Varela's calculus was complete, it had become clear that this 
calculus could be taken also as a formalization of a small collection of 
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Zadeh's basic ideas. This suggested expanding the language of the 
"isomorphic copy," of Varela's system into a richer language, adequate 
to express a more extensive portion of Zadeh's theory. This work began 
as a project for a systems research workshop, with both George Lendaris 
and Professor Martin Zwick, and culminated in a semantically complete 
axiomatization of the essential aspects of approximate reasoning. The 
proof of semantic completeness given here is patterned after a similar 
proof given for a somewhat simpler class of "free-variable theories" in 
my master's thesis (Schwartz 1973), and its success is due largely to 
some special algebraic techniques developed by myself and my master's 
thesis advisor, Professor S. K. Thomason. 
I was most fortunate in having the opportunity to present thes~ 
ideas to Lotfi Zadeh himself, in an informal seminar at Berkeley, 
California, 1980. It gave me a special inspiration when he said that.he 
was impressed with my work, and I am grateful for his comments which led 
to the correctin of several oversights in an earlier version. For the 
work in this part, Professor Stanley must also be credited for many 
helpful suggestions on improving the written presentation. 
The concluding chapter of Part I came out of some studies with 
Professor H. A. Linstone, in technology assessment. Dr. Linstone extended 
a challenge to show that fuzzy sets had a practical viability, and the 
reponse that has manifested here is an application of approximate reason-
ing to the problem of forecasting under uncertainty. This same chapter 
comprises a talk given at the 1981 meeting of the Society for General 
Systems Research, and a shorter version appears in that meeting's pro-
ceedings (Schwartz 1981b). 
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The work in Part III arose in an attempt to formulate earlier 
philosophical ideas and was intended originally as a short introduction 
to a dissertation consisting mainly of Parts I and II. When Martin 
Zwick introduced me to the works of Mario Bunge, however, the task 
quickly developed into a research project of its own. The outcome has 
been to provide the entire dissertation with a solid methodological 
base. 
Here I would like to formally express my sincerest appreciation to 
all of these fine gentlemen for the part they have played in ~y develop-
ment and in the production of this work. Their assistance and constant 
encouragement have obviously been essential to my success. And this 
applies especially to my advisor, George Lendaris, who helped see me. 
through more difficulties and setbacks than I could possibly document 
here. 
Also I wish to mention other mentors who in various ways have been 
invaluable sources of encouragement and inspiration. These are Professors 
Devendra Sahal, Magaroh Maruyama, and Ervin Laszlo. The latter in 
particular should be thanked for helping with my first professional 
p'ublication (Schwartz 1977) and thereby encouraging me that my ideas 
could be of interest. None of these, of course, should be held account-
able for any errors or inaccuracies that this dissertation might still 
contain. 
To Mary and Greg Valdez of the Word Rite Center, Tualatin, Oregon 
must go credit for their very elegant production of the typed draft. 
This was produced on their IBM OS/6 word processor, with a math-symbol 
attachment, and has gone through several editings and revisions. 
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Last, I must also express my recognition of Guru Maharaj Ji, to 
whom this work is dedicated. I was initiated into Guru Maharaj Ji's 
knowledge and meditation in Portland, Oregon on November 4, 1974, and it 
was in fact the experience of his knowledge which inspired me to return 
to the university. Through my efforts to practice his knowledge as he 
prescribes, I gained the requisite clarity to carefully distinguish 
between my studies and the ultimate purpose of my life. This has given 
me the very precious opportunity to engage in my mundane pursuits with a 
true sense of detachment, and oftentimes, an ineffable joy. Each person 
finds a purpose in the objects of his devotion, but it is only in 
devotion to the Truth that the true purpose is revealed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Each stage of society's advance bears forth its own requirements 
in the art of managing complexity. Systems science represents a contem-
porary answer to the complexity of the contemporary world. It overlays 
the multitude of academic disciplines and technical spe~ializations with 
a broad-based interdisciplinary (or transdisciplinary) approach to 
problem solving in a multifaceted environment (the systems approach). 
It studies systems as "whole entities" and strives to lay down princ~ples 
which describe their structures and dynamic behaviors more or less 
independently of their specific constituting parts (general systems 
theory). And it provides a technical language for cross-disciplinary 
communication among scientists, artists, engineers, economists, sociolo-
gists, etc., for pooling talents as required by a given problem setting. 
Mathematical systems theory represents that part of the systems 
research movement which provides mathematically succinct analytical 
tools for general systems analysis. Systems may be stable or adaptable; 
fragile or resilient; they might seek goals, oscillate, wander, or 
evolve; they may be hierarchical, or self-referential, or autopoietic 
(self-perpetuating); they may be deterministic or stochastic; our percep-
tions of them may be complete and precise, or only partial and fuzzy; 
and so on. This newly emergent plethora of "systemic" concepts presents 
the need for new mathematical techniques appropriate for providing them 
with rigorous formulation. As with traditional science, so also with 
systems science, mathematics remains the handmaiden of conceptual 
precision. 
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Qualitative mathematics may be defined as mathematics used to 
represent nonmeasurable system properties. Ill-defined problems such as 
arise in the so-called "soft" sciences like economics, policy research, 
and futures studies, are not always amenable to the traditional 
mathematics--e.g., differential equations and statistics--which rests on 
objective numerical measurement of system parameters. Important para-
meters of many systems are often difficult, or impossible, to.provide 
with accurate representation--e.g., corporate morale--yet they must be 
accounted for in any reasonable systems analysis. Recent developments 
in mathematical systems theory now show that several branches of abstract 
mathematics offer effective methods for meeting this requirement. The 
usefulness of abstract mathematical theories for providing a qualitative 
methodology stems from their ability to leave numerical considerations 
in the background and to focus explicitly on geometrical, algebraic, 
logical, or otherwise conceptual forms. As illustrations, consider the 
following: 
1) Topology studies geometrical shapes with respect to their 
properties that remain after stretching and bending. A contemporary 
example of quality representation coming out of this area is Thom's 
theory of "structural stability and morphogenesis" (catastrophe theory) 
which applies differential topology to the study of sudden, discrete 
transformations induced by the gradual application of a continuous force 
(Thom 1975). Another is "Q-analysis," Atkins topological "language of 
structure," which defines a system in terms of interdependencies existing 
among the system parameters (cf. Cavallo 1979). 
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2) Abstract algebra, topology's mathematical counterpart, studies 
the general properties of algebraic functions and relations. As examples 
in this area we have Petri's "general net theory," which combines graphi-
cal and computational tools for modeling systems in terms of infor-
mational flows (also cf. Cavallo 1979), Sahal's use of the algebraic 
theory of dimensions to define a concept of "self-similitude" for evolv-
ing systems (Sahal 1976 and 1978), and an application of category theory 
to the study of autonomy and self-organization in living systems (Varela 
and Goguen 1978). Another instance is the class of "structural models," 
which combines both algebraic and topological ideas. In general, a 
structural model is a collection of variables together with their inter-
relations (Lendaris 1980), and it is represented geometrically as a 
digraph in which the interrelations are exhibited in a visual display. 
3) Mathematical logic explicates various aspects of human reaso~­
ing within a precise formalism. The leading example of quality represen-
. tation in this area is L. A. Zadeh's theory of "fuzzy sets and approximate 
reasoning." This theory has an advantage over many forms of qualitative 
mathematics in that it formally represents "quality" as a property of 
the system observer's use of language and his manner of reasoning with 
linguistic ideas, rather than of the system being observed. Hence, it 
provides a convenient tool for modeling and manipulating linguistic 
evaluations. Moreover, approximate reasoning can capture some of the 
same properties as other modeling methods. For example, Zwick, Schwartz, 
and Lendaris (1978) show that Thom's "cusp" and "butterfly" catastrophes 
can be represented as properties of fuzzy sets; and where this disserta-
tion Part II discusses the formal representation of paradoxical system 
properties, Zadeh (1979) shows that analogous results are obtainable in 
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a "possibilistic logic" based on fuzzy sets. Such a methodology, more-
over, should not in any way be confused as one which is itself inexact 
or imprecise. While it is possible to develop a mathematics of imprecise 
ideas, precision at some explicit level is always inherent in the very 
nature of all mathematical methods. An "imprecise mathematics" would be 
a contradiction of terms. 
The work undertaken in this dissertation falls within the category 
of mathematical logic. Specifically, it addresses the application of 
nonclassical logics in systems research. The central thesis may be 
encapsulated as follows: that the theory of formal logical systems, and 
particularly, of logical systems based on nonclassical modes of reasoning, 
offers important new techniques for building qualitative models of 
real-world systems. The present work is here claimed to advance this 
thesis a further step beyond its current stage. Moreover, the work is 
in this respect largely foundational; other than the structural models 
discussed in Chapter 6, no new models are produced. ·The primary effort 
has mainly been to develop the basis for using nonclassical logics in 
systems analysis, and thereby, to indicate more clearly how models based 
on such logics may be designed. This is accomplished in three major 
parts. 
Part I develops a semantically complete formal axiomatization of 
the basic ideas appearing in Zadeh's theory of approximate reasoning. 
In particular, the development includes both a multivalent logic, which 
takes as its truth values the points in the interval [0,1], and a "fuzzy 
logic," which takes for its truth values certain fuzzy subsets of [0,1]. 
The primary motivation for this part of the work is the same as for the 
axiomatization of other mathematical theories. It lays down in concise 
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tenns exactly those ideas which the given theory entails, and it provides 
a means by which one can then examine that theory for its consistency, 
completeness, decidability, and other properties as a system of mathemati-
cal deduction. Semantic completeness, particularly, is in this respect 
essential, for establishing that the resulting formalization indeed 
represents the relevant aspects of the informal theory. Part I further-
more develops a new class of structural models for use in systems fore-
casting. In this case, approximate reasoning is used to provide a 
fonnal link between the "imprecision" of a structural model as a repre-
sentation of reality and the "uncertainty" of the model's forecasted 
results. 
Part II studies the logical systems developed by Spencer-Brown. 
(1969) and Varela (1975), which provide special symbolisms and rules of 
operation for the logical "forms" that underly both classical and self-
referential reasoning. The work in this dissertation establishes the 
exact relation of these systems to formal logical systems which employ 
the standard linguistic notations. Based on a connection with recursive 
function theory, this in turn yields insights into the potential use of 
self-referential reasoning for modeling "mechanically unknowable" or 
empirically unverifiable real-world system properties, such as the 
notion of a "perfect system" (Wienberg 1975), or certain formulations of 
"time" (Gale 1968). 
Part III explores the theoretical foundations and methodological 
framework for applying nonclassical logics in mathematical modeling. 
This includes a consideration of how the theory of formal logical systems 
is related to the "semantics of science" in the sense discussed by Bunge 
(1973). The principal conclusion is that, since nonclassical logics are 
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semantically "meaningful," they lead to empirically testable models of 
real-world systems and therefore yield methodologically correct approaches 
to model specification. 
The philosophical remarks on the use of formal systems (Part III) 
was initially what inspired an interest in the calculus for self-reference 
(Part II), and the results of Part II provided the technical insights 
which led to the axiomatization of approximate reasoning (Part I). Thus 
the above arrangement of the three parts is somewhat the reverse of the 
chronology in which the essential ideas evolved. The chosen order of 
presentation is appropriate, however, since the later developments have 
ultimately become the core of the work. 
Each part of the work is essentially self-contained in its concern 
with a specialized body of ideas, but all three parts are tied by a 
common purpose: the use of formal logics in improving our understanding 
of the world. Here follows a brief exposition of the context in which 
these studies arise and a summary of the main results. 
§l.l. Overview Of Part I 
During the last seventy or eighty years, the study of natural 
languages has developed more or less independently of mathematical 
logic, even though these studies have enjoyed common philosophical 
underpinnings. Linguistics has of course emulated mathematics to an 
extent, in striving for rigorous, analytically precise models of the 
verbal modes of human communication. But mathematics was not correspon-
dingly inspired to expand the expressive capabilities of formal languages 
beyond the requirements of a two-valued "true-false" level of discourse. 
This was due primarily to the interest in analyzing the foundations of 
mathematical thought, for which the two-valued logic was generally 
adequate. 
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It was in response to these shortcomings of conventional mathema-
tics that approximately fifteen years ago L. A. Zadeh proposed the idea 
of "fuzzy sets." The seminal paper (Zadeh 1965) described how impreci-
sion and value judgments in the use of natural languages can be modeled 
in a rigorously defined algorithmic semantics through a simple generali-
zation of the classical definition of a set of elements. Whereas a 
classical set S may be represented by a membership function Ps by letting 
PS(x)=1 if x is "in" the set S, and letting PS(x)=O if x is ·"not in" S, 
the idea of a "fuzzy set" is obtained by allowing Ps to range over the 
entire interval from 0 to 1. Thus one obtains the idea of a "degree~' or 
"grade" of membership in S. As an example: If T is a fuzzy set of 
"tall persons," then a person who is six feet in height might have .9.as 
a grade of membership in T, while a person who is five feet six inches 
in height might have a grade of membership of only .4 in T. The assign-
ment of such grades of membership is by and large the product of a 
subjective interpretation in the context of a given "universe of 
discourse"--e.g., a building which is only six feet in height in the 
fuzzy set of "tall buildings" would have a very low grade of membership. 
Usually the grades of membership are given in terms of an explicitly 
defined function on the interval [0,1]. 
Thus formulated, fuzzy sets lead naturally to an interpretation of 
"linguistic hedges"--Le., modifiers like "very," "more or less," "almost," 
and "quite"--as well as the Boolean connectives "not," "or," and "and," 
as operations on membership functions of fuzzy sets. The result is an 
intuitively plausible algorithmic interpretation for simple propositions 
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like "John is tall," "May has dark hair," and "May is much younger than 
John," as well as the somewhat more complex propositions such as "Most 
Frenchmen are not blond," "It is quite E.£ssible that many w~althy Americans 
have high blood pressure," and "It is probably quite true that most X's 
are much larger than most Y's" (from Zadeh 1978a). Further, by means of 
the fuzzy interpretations of the Boolean connectives, one obtains a 
well-defined and intuitively plausible logic for reasoning with fuzzy 
linguistic assertions. 
After several preliminary pioneering papers on this idea, there 
began a rapidly accelerating acceptance of fuzzy sets into a multitude 
of technical disciplines. After only one decade of research, Gaines and 
Kohout (1977) summarized the literature on fuzzy sets in a bibliography 
which listed some 1,150 entries with approximately 750 being specifically 
concerned with the theory and applications of this one idea. Now, a 
bibliography by Kandell ~nd Yager (1979) pushes the total to 1,800. 
entries. 
Applications of fuzzy sets have been investigated along such 
topics as pattern recognition (Zadeh's initial concern), cybernetic 
controls, automated production systems, quality control, multiple-
criteria decision making, fuzzy classification schemes, data base manage-
ment, dynamic systems modeling, and natural language processing. In 
general, the theory of fuzzy sets offers many opportunities for improv-
ing both the basic machine capability and the man-machine interface. 
Papers by Zadeh have focused primarily on the theoretical develop-
ments. The idea of linguistic hedges was explored (Zadeh 1972). The 
idea of a "fuzzy logic," which takes as its truth values the fuzzy 
subsets of [O,l]--rather than the points in [0,1] as is characteristic 
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of most multivalent logics--began to take shape in 1975 (Zadeh 1975a and 
1975b) and was later studied as a "fuzzification" of the Lukasiewicz 
infinitary logic L~ by Bellman and Zadeh (1977). Zadeh's more recent 
''''1 
works (1978a and 1978b) have developed the theory of "linguistic possi-
bility," or "possibilistic reasoning," which provides translation rules 
for transforming natural language expressions into a computable formalism 
(PRUF) . 
The philosophical aspects of "fuzzy reasoning" have been explored 
by Gaines (1976). Related books and edited collections of es~ays deserv-
ing of mention are: Kaufman (1975), Moisil (1975), Zadeh and Fu (1975), 
Gupta, Saridis, and Gaines (1977), Dubois and Prade (1978a), Kandel and 
Lee (1979), Gupta, Ragade, and Yager (1979), and Negoita (1980). 
Now that the theory of approximate reasoning has crystalized into 
an established body of knowledge, an obvious next step is to provide . 
this theory with a complete formal axiomatization. Giles (1976) took a 
preliminary step in this direction by showing that the axioms for 
Lukaseiwicz's infinitary logic L~ also serve as axioms for a multivalent 
''"1 
interpretation of the fuzzy Boolean connectives. The language of L~, is 
''"1 
essentially identical with the language of the classical propositional 
calculus, however, and therefore does not have the capability for 
expressing such concepts as "semantic equivalence," "semantic entailment," 
"linguistic variable," "hedge," "linguistic truth," and so on, which are 
essential to the theory of approximate reasoning. Axiomatizing these 
more complex ideas evidently requires a formalism with substantially 
richer linguistic capabilities. 
The work in Part I of this dissertation makes a further step in 
this direction. A class of formal logical systems is defined wherein 
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each system represents one or more linguistic variables over a single 
universe of discourse. These systems are unique in their use of a 
linguistic-axiomatic structure which operates simultaneously at two 
distinct but interrelated semantic levels. An "inner level" accommodates 
fuzzy linguistic assertions such as "John is young and very tall" in a 
multivalent interpretation, and an "outer level" accommodates composite 
expressions like "'John is young and very tall' is semantically equiva-
lent with 'John is not old and not at all short'" in a bivalent inter-
pretation. In effect the outer level is a formalization of part of the 
metalanguage that is used for discussing linguistic assertions, and 
bivalency stems from the tacit assumption that at the metalevel two 
linguistic assertions either are or are not semanticaIly equivalent. 
Once defined, the multivalent axiomatization of approximate reason-
ing is easily modified to become a semantically complete axiomatization 
of a "fuzzy logic" per se, which uses "fuzzy numbers" in [0,1] as truth 
values. There remain, however, many fuzzy-set theoretic ideas which are 
not represented in these formalisms. In particular should be mentioned 
the fuzzy quantifiers like "most," "almost all," and "few." Further, 
while the present axiomatization captures the abstract idea of a linguis-
tic hedge, it is still not sufficiently rich to provide hedges with 
explicit arithmetical definitions. Nevertheless, given the results of 
Part I, it is evident that many of these limitations can be dealt with 
through further extensions of these two-leveled systems. 
The principal accomplishments represented by this part of the 
dissertation may thus be summarized as follows: (i) a rigorous formaliza-
tion of the general concept of "linguistic variable" in the context of 
semantic equivalence between linguistic assertions, and (ii) a precise 
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axiomatization of how these linguistic ideas are interrelated under both 
multivalent and fuzzy-logical interpretations. Part I contains five 
chapters, as described below. 
Chapter 2 provides the basic terminology. This includes all the 
relevant concepts from the theory of formal logical systems, together 
with all needed ideas from the theory of fuzzy sets and approximate 
reasoning. In its treatment of formal systems, this chapter also serves 
the purposes of dissertation parts II and III. 
Chapter 3 gives an explicit definition of "linguistic t~eory" (or 
"theory of a linguistic variable"), which incorporates the abovementioned 
two-leveled linguistics into the form of a rigorously defined class of 
formal logical systems. Accompanying this is a definition of the se~~n­
tics for linguistic theories, amounting to a precise set~theoretic 
description of the concept of linguistic variable. 
The main result is established, in full detail, in Chapter 4~ The 
given class of linguistic theories is complete with respect to the given 
semantics. This result is what ensures that the axiomatization is 
indeed adequate to capture the essential characteristics of fuzzy lin-
guistic variables and the multivalent theory of approximate reasoning. 
In other words, semantic completeness ensures that all and only the 
semantically "true" fuzzy linguistic propositions are formally derivable 
from the axioms in question. 
Miscellaneous extensions and generalizations of the main results 
are considered in Chapter 5. These include: linguistic theories of 
mUltiple and interrelated linguistic variables; linguistic theories 
having multiple universes of discourse; the full fuzzy logic, as de-
scribed above; a formalization of possibilistic reasoning; and several 
alternative modes of fuzzy-logical inference. The most significant 
result of this chapter is the extension to an axiomatization of fuzzy 
logic, and the proof that this axiomatization also is semantically 
complete. 
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Chapter'6 concludes Part I with an application. The structural 
modeling package, SPIN (McLean, et. al. 1976), is enhanced by incor-
porating a fuzzy-reasoning approach to "certainty accounting." The 
result is an explicit formal connection between the certainty in a given 
model as a correct description of reality and the certainty o~ that 
model's forecasted results. Briefly stated, the less "fuzzy" the model, 
the more certain are the results, and the more "fuzzy" the model, the 
less certain are the results. Algorithms are developed for calculating 
"degrees of certainty" of forecasts as degrees of truth of fuzzy-logical 
propositions, and sample computations are provided for a simple model, 
with five parameters. 
Here it should be mentioned that, while such models as discussed 
above might be construed as an approach to the method of "future discount-
ing" discussed by Linstone (1973 and 1979), that author has pointed out 
to me in private communication that "uncertainty" is only one of several 
motivations for discounting, which in particular include matters of 
economics and of biological survival. Further, where Bellman (1977) 
suggests the "tremendous opportunities" offered by fuzzy systems theory, 
Linstone and Simmonds (1977 pp. 133-134) overlay this with the qualifi-
cation that one must also be watchful that adopting such tools do not 
constrain one's view in places where new modeling techniques need to be 
invented. Similar remarks apply, however, to all modeling techniques, 
be they fuzzy or not; it is nowdays commonly understood (although 
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perhaps not commonly put into practice) that one should only use modeling 
tools where they apply. Even given the above qualification, therefore, 
this author sides with Bellman, but only by putting more stress on the 
"opportunities." It is simply a matter of time before fuzzy systems 
prove their worth in forecasting as well as the other fields where they 
are now being applied. 
§1.2. Overview Of Part II 
Historically, paradox has been the bane of the mathematical disci-
plines. The reason? In any classical, Aristotelean logic, paradox 
inevitably leads to a completely trivial system in which all propositions 
become formally provable. Thus, if Aristotelean logic is to be vindicated, 
paradox must be eliminated. 
A case in point is Russell's discovery of a paradox in Frege's 
theory of sets (Russell 1902). Because both Frege and Rus.:;ell aimed to 
promote classical logic as the irrevocable basis of all math'~matical 
reasoning, including that employed in set theory, a resolution of the 
Russell paradox was required within this frame. Hence arose the theory 
of types (Russell 1908). 
Yet paradox itself is a naturally occurring form of human intellec-
tion. People oftentimes argue themselves in circles quite cheerfully--
and usually unwittingly--without showing the slightest signs of discom-
fort or remorse. One day a person might be a convinced optimist, and 
~he next day be the most cynical pessimist, or he might decide once to 
pursue a certain objective, and then suddenly begin moving in a completely 
different direction. It is nowdays a cliche that human behavior is 
largely "irrational." How one should characterize "rational" behavior 
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is, of course, a subject of debate. Yet it is in any case clear that, if 
there is any "logic" which would be appropriate as a basis for modeling 
such irrationality, it is evidently not the internally consistent 
Aristotelean logic of the exclusive "true or false." 
Bateson gave substance to this view in a study of schizophrenia 
(Bateson, et. al. 1956). Through internalizing a paradoxical "double 
bind," a person can entertain two contradictory beliefs simultaneously, 
with either one of them becoming available as a behavioral prescriptor. 
Based on this discovery, Bateson and his coworkers thus proposed that 
the capacity to entertain paradoxes is a factor in many psychological 
disorders. 
But paradoxical reasoning per se need not be characterized as 
exclusively pathological. Many philosophies, eastern and western, 
ancient and modern, openly acknowledge paradoxical assumptions (cf. Smith 
1976). For example, Hinduism conceptualizes Brahman as being "neither 
this nor that" but a fundamental reality resi~ing beyond the realm of 
intellectual comprehension. And Sartre's existentialist philosophy is 
founded on a belief that freedom of the will is simply a "fact," but 
that in its "facticity," it is "absurd"; we have freedom of choice, but 
we are bound to choose, lest we lapse into "nothingness" (Sartre 1956). 
Hence, Sartre's freedom is beyond reason, but is nevertheless real; 
Le., it is illogically "true." In such cases, paradox (or absurdity) 
plays the special role of defining limits for the human rationality, by 
pointing to--or at least suggesting--the existence of realities which 
are completely beyond the human abilities to comprehend. 
Given this "naturalness" of paradoxical reasoning, therefore, it 
might be expected that even the mathematical sciences should begin to 
introduce paradoxical ideas into their models of reality. Mathemati-
cally, paradox is distinguishable from an ordinary contradiction as 
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being an assertion to the effect that a certain proposition is equiva-
lent with its negation (P='P), whereas a contradiction asserts the 
simultaneous truth of a proposition and'its negation (P&'P). While no 
scientific theories to date have openly promoted paradoxical (or contra-
dictory) ideas, there are various instances which impinge on paradox in 
their use of semantic self-reference or other forms of logical circularity. 
Recent developments of, this genre include the following: the idea of 
mutual causality (Maruyama 1963); the interdependency of the observer 
and the observed (von Foerster 1973 and Howe and von Foerster 1975); 
systemic self-modeling (Sahal 1976, 1977, and 1978); and the "perfec~ 
systems law" (Weinberg 1975). Further, Maturana (1970) analyzes cogni-
tive self-reference as a function of circularity in the neural structure 
of the brain, Zwick (1978) suggests that the "measurement problem"'in 
quantum mechanics might be a result of a Godelian self-reference in the 
mathematical formalism; and Rescher (1973 and 1980) proposes a "logic of 
inconsistency" to fulfill an evident need for drawing meaningful conclu-
sions from inconsistent sets of data. 
On the other hand, while none of these--except perhaps Rescher--
openly promote the use of paradox, it appears that several of them could 
be construed as entailing paradox if one chose--notably Weinberg and 
von Foerster. In any case, these examples suggest that science is but a 
step away from implementing paradox in full force as a means of concep-
tualizing the world that it observes. But using paradox in this manner 
ultimately depends on developing logically sound modes of reasoning 
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which formally accommodate paradox without simultaneously degenerating 
into completely meaningless trivialities. 
Part II of this dissertation studies a contemporary approach to 
this issue. In the book Laws of form, Spencer-Brown showed how the 
classical bimodal logic could be reduced to a pair of simple rules 
governing the manipulation of some elementary conceptual forms. He 
furthermore studied these forms for their capacity to describe paradoxi-
cal reasoning (Spencer-Brown 1969). The result was a system of reason-
ing with two semantic "states": a "marked state" (denoted by -,) and an 
"unmarked state" (denoted by a blank space) in a calculus of equations 
between formal expressions, known as the "primary algebra." Paradox in 
the primary algebra has the form 
p = PI 
in contrast with the form 
p ::'p 
which uses the standard logical notations. Spencer-Brown was successful 
in showing that the propositional calculus is mirrored in the primary 
algebra in that every tautology P is representable as a formally deriv-
able equation of the form p=~ but the ability to deal with paradoxes 
went only as far as representing them outside the framework of his 
algebra as arising through "oscillation" between the two states. 
This limitation of the primary algebra was resolved by Varela 
(1975) in a "calculus for self-reference" which extends Spencer-Brown's 
conception of logical form. The marked state and the unmarked state are 
augmented by an "autonomous state" (denoted by iJ and an axiomatic 
system is developed which incorporates equations of the form 
p = 0 
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as abbreviations of the paradoxical forms 
p = Pl 
in a meaningfully nontrivial formalism. The title, "calculus for self-
reference," stems from the analysis of paradoxical equations P=PI as 
being linguistic representations of a situation in which the logical 
status of p is defined in terms of itself through "re-entry" into the 
"form of indication" t. Since it is a consequence of Varela's complete-
ness theorem that the above two equations are formally derivable from 
one another in the calculus, Varela's axiomatization captures the sense 
in which p is paradoxical if and only if p is logically autonomous. 
The aim of Part II of this dissertation is to ascertain exactly 
how the primary algebra and the calculus for self-reference correspo~d 
to logical systems which employ the standard notational conventions--i.e., 
the logical connectives " &, V , ~, and -. Steps in this direction 
which have already been taken by others include the following: 
(i) Orchard (1975) strengthened Spencer-Brown's results by showing that, 
not only tautologies, but also antitautologies and contingencies are 
representable in the primary algebra, (ii) Cull and Frank (1979) showed 
that the primary algebra is essentially just Boolean algebra, (iii) Varela 
(1979) points out how of his semantics of "marked," unmarked," and 
"autonomous" states corresponds to the semantics of Kleene's (1938 and 
1952) three-valued truth-table system which uses "true," "false," and 
"undefined" truth values, and (iv) Kohout and Pinkava (1980) have analyzed 
the algebraic structure of both the Spencer-Brown and the Varela calculi 
to what might well be the fullest possible extent, showing that the 
primary algebra may be isomorphically mapped into 8 distinct conventional 
systems of connectives and that the calculus for self-reference h~s 4380 
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possible interpretations, mostly as n-algebras. These works thus explore 
primarily the algebraic and semantic characteristics of the calculi and 
are concerned with isomorphisms of algebraic structures, whereas the 
present work shifts attention toward the formal proof-theoretic charac-
teristics and is concerned with isomorphisms of proof systems. 
It is worth noting that, while Kohout and Pinkava are correct in 
their observation that the Spencer-Brown and the Varela calculi contri-
bute essentially "nothing new" algebraically, this downplays the more 
significant feature of these calculi; namely, that they are semantically 
complete axiomatizations of those algebras. Studying these calculi as 
proof systems per se gives added insight into the relation of the primary 
algebra to the classical propositional calculus and of the relation of 
the calculus for self-reference to the Kleene system. This leads in 
turn to an extension of the study of paradox into the theory of recur~ive 
decidability--which formed the original basis for Kleene's truth-tables--
and it ultimately unveils an approach to using Kleene-Varela type systems 
as a framework for formalizing paradoxical general systems concepts. 
Part II contains three chapters as follows. 
Chapter 7 recasts Brown's primary algebra as a rigorously defined 
formal logical system PA, and shows that PA is "essentially isomorphic" 
with a standard axiomatization PC of the classical propositional calculus. 
Stated more precisely, PA is exactly isomorphic with an inessential 
extension PC* of PC that is obtained by adjoining a special symbol ~ and 
a defining axiom of the form F=P&,P. Isomorphism takes the form of a 
translation t between formal languages which preserves formal deriva-
bility. A consequence of this result is that equality of expressions in 
PA is isomorphic with logical equivalence of propositions in PC*. 
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Chapter 8 considers the calculus for self-reference, similarly 
recast as a rigorously defined formal logical system CSR. This system 
is translated isomorphically into a new system K which uses Kleene's 
notion of "strong equivalence" (denoted by ~) as the correspondent of 
equality in CSR. The aim is to show that K is a semantically complete 
axiomatization of the Kleene truth-table system mentioned above. No 
such formal axiomatization of Kleene's truth-table system has heretofore 
been known. Later sections of Chapter 7 show that, whereas PA is 
Aristotelean, CSR is non-Aristotelean and can be extended to include 
paradoxical expressions of the form P~'P, without degenerating into 
the trivial system in which all propositions become provable. Using 
terminology defined in §2.1, this is to say that CSR, although inconsis-
tent, is nevertheless a "coherent" formal logical system.. In this 
respect, "coherence," rather than consistency, is seen to be the essential 
condition for a nonclassical logic to be meaningful. 
Chapter 9 explores some consequences of Chapt~r 8, showing in 
particular that, under Kleene's original interpretation of the three-
valued logic in the theory of partial recursion, Varela's "autonomous 
state" becomes isomorphic with the idea of a "totally undecideable 
partial recursive set." The concluding section interprets this result 
in several contexts, showing the potential use of formally paradoxical 
assertions for discussing "mechanically (Le., recursively) unknowable" 
system properties from within a logically coherent frame. 
The views expressed in the latter chapter happen to closely resemble 
those of Zwick (1978), who argues that the mathematics of physical 
measurement theory is such that phenomena could occur which would 
be unexplainable in that they would be represented by undecidable 
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propositions. The position taken in this dissertation is at first sight 
weaker, since it addresses mainly the question of how the conceptualiza-
tion of such phenomena is possible (i.e., it attributes unexplainability 
to the observer). On the other hand, Zwick's view attributes unexplaina-
bility to the mathematics and does not rule out the possibility that 
there might be another mathematics in which the phenomena become explain-
able. On this count, the present view is actually stronger in suggesting 
that certain things are intrinsically unexplainable, regardless of the 
mathematics, and therefore require an alternate logic in order to be 
conceived and discussed. 
The results of this part are what led to the two-leveled systems 
developed in Part I. It is easily verified that all the axioms and 
inference rules of the system K remain valid when that system is rein-
terpreted in the theory of fuzzy sets--with Kleene's strong equivalence 
here being reinterpreted as semantic equivalence of linguistic assertions. 
Thus, in a sense, the systems defined in Part I are extensions of K. 
§1.3. Overview Of Part III 
Lukasiewicz, one of the chief developers of the theory of multi-
valued logics, prophesied over fifty years ago that science would even-
tually incorporate nonclassical modes of reasoning into its models of 
the observable world (cf. Gaines 1976). It is easy to see that this is 
in principle a completely reasonable proposition. 
There is no truly compelling reason why the naturally occurring 
systems--taking this to include societies and economies as well as the 
traditional objects of scientific research--should be assumed to obey 
the laws of classical logic. On the contrary, in much the same way as 
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the discovery of non-Euclidian geometries led to new conceptions of time 
and space, the discovery of meaningfully coherent nonclassical logics 
has revealed classical logic as being only one of the many possible 
frameworks for organizing ideas. Logic, after all, is a property of the 
observer, and alternative modes of reasoning may be regarded as alterna-
tive templates, or sets of spectacles, through which the world can be 
viewed. While it is true that a model of some aspect of reality must 
conform to the known data, there does not appear to be anything in the 
empirical realm which insists that one form of logic should take prece-
dence over another. 
The first notable instance of Lukasiewicz's idea came to fruition 
during the early forties, in the form of "quantum logics" (Reichenbach 
1944). Today, there exists a rapidly growing plethora of multiple-valued 
logics, modal logics, temporal logics, interrogative logics, and so on, 
all of which contribute to this theme. For specific examples cf. Rescher 
(1969) and the bibliographies of Gaines and Kohout (1977) and of Dunn 
and Epstein (1977). Fuzzy logic and the logic for self-reference, 
studied in this dissertation, are topics which have gained special 
attention in recent years. 
Incumbent with the development of such logics there arise founda-
tional and methodological issues concerning their implementation for 
real-world systems analysis. These include the significance of formal 
logic as a means of generating new perspectives on the observable world, 
through "selecting" alternative modes of reasoning, together with the 
manner in which formalized nonstandard modes of reasoning enter into the 
relationship of the observer to the observed. Of special importance is 
the issue of the meaningfulness and empirical testability of models 
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based on nonclassical reasoning. At the heart of this is a somewhat 
deeper issue concerning the status of "model theory" (i.e., the theory 
of formal logical systems and their semantics) as providing the "seman-
tics of science." Apparently conflicting views on this subject have 
been put forth by Suppes (1961), a logician, and Bunge (1973), a 
philosopher of science, and a careful treatment of their discussions is 
imperative for placing the use of nonstandard reasoning on a solid 
foundation. 
Chapter 10 begins with a historical overview of the development of 
mathematical logic, which illust·rates a particular view regarding the 
process by which logical studies have evolved. Then, the special nature 
of mathematical logic as providing a means of "selecting" one's logic is 
studied from within this frame. The formal distinction between a "symbol" 
and its "meaning" is seen as that which lends mathematical logic its 
analytical power. Chapter 10 continues with some remarks on formal 
logic as a form of qualitative mathematics--specifically, as a tool for 
"quality representation" in situations where numerical techniques do not 
apply. The concluding section of Chapter 10 provides a general introduc-
tion to the theory of formal logical systems and their semantics, at a 
level which is appropriate for the discussion that follows. 
Chapter 11 then proceeds to methodological issues. Bunge's theory 
of modeling for the sciences is reviewed. Then follows an analysis of 
the abovementioned contrast between the views of Bunge and Suppes. We 
ultimately concur with Bunge in that an extramathematical "semantic 
assumption" is essential. Bunge's work is then built upon to show how, 
together with his semantic assumption, concepts froln the theory of 
formal systems provide all the necessary means for a rigorous formulation 
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of Bunge's basic notions of "general theory," "model object," "theoretical 
model," and empirical "testability." This leads to a representation of 
the manner in which nonclassical logics may be invoked for model construc-
tion, and the manner in which such nonstandard models enter into the 
relation of the observer to the observed. The concluding section shows 
that the models thus produced are always empirically testable, as long 
as the underlying logic is "coherent" in the sense discussed in Part II. 
This seals in the affirmative the question of whether models based on 
nonclassical modes of reasoning can have methodological viability. 
PART I 
AXIOMS FOR APPROXIMATE REASONING 
CHAPTER 2 
BASIC TERMINOLOGY 
Concepts from the theory of formal systems, as needed for all 
three parts of this dissertation are laid down in §2.1. Most of these 
are straightforward adaptations of standard ideas, with one notable 
exception being the property of "coherence" which is defined herein 
(§2.1.5.2) specifically for use in Parts II and III. The principal 
references have been Shoenfield (1967) and Mendelson (1964), while 
secondary sources of information were Smullyan (1961) and Robinson 
(1963). The reader who is unfamiliar with the principles of mathe-
matical logic may find it helpful to supplement §2.1 with a reading of 
§10.4, which gives a more thorough explanation of the same underlying 
ideas, together with some examples. 
Needed concepts from the theory of fuzzy sets and approximate 
reasoning are given in §2.2. These have been taken from two papers by 
Zadeh (1975b and 1978a) and as such provide groundwork for the develop-
ment in Part I. A general introduction to the subject is provided by 
Gaines (1976). 
§2.1. Formal Logical Systems And Their Semantics 
We may begin with a preview of the main definitions. A formal 
logical system (§2.1.4) consists of a language, a set of axioms, some 
inference rules, and a set of theorems, where the theorems are comprised 
of all expressions of the language which can be generated (derived) from 
the axioms by means of the inference rules. For each language there is 
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defined the companion notion of a semantics (§2.1.2), consisting of a 
collection of interpretations in which expressions in the language may 
obtain meanings. An interpretation generally consists of a universe of 
discourse, assignments of meanings from within that universe for the 
expressions of the language, a concept of truth or validity for expres-
sions, and a set of valuation mappings by which one determines the truth 
value, or validity, of expressions in terms of their meanings. The 
general concept of a formal logic (§2.1.3) is embodied in the definition 
of semantic interpretation. 
The basic components of a formal logical system and its semantics 
are illustrated in Figure 2-1. The details follow below. 
§2.1.1. Languages 
Let ~ be any uncountably infinite collection of objects (e.g., the 
ordinal numbers). The objects in this collection will be used as symbols 
and as such will be the essential building blocks for all the formal 
languages discussed in this dissertation. Formal symbols do not strictly 
speaking "symbolize" anything. Rather, they are just abstract, indepen-
dently existing objects which may be "assigned" various meanings within 
the context of different semantic interpretations (cf. §2.1.2). 
A string is a finite sequence of symbols. The length of a string 
is its number of symbol occurrences. To indicate that a sequence of 
symbols is being regarded as a string, the elements of the sequence are 
written as concatenated, i.e., without separating commas. Thus, if sl' 
s2' and s3 are symbols, the notation sl,s2,s3 denotes an ordinary se-
quence, while sls2s3 denotes a string. Concatenation is used similarly 
Formal Logical 
$ystem 
Semantic 
Interpretations 
CM-e~~in~~ 
Formulas 
Theorems 
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In;Eerence Rules 
Figure -2-1. Formal logical systems _with interpretations. 
N ...., 
in case the s. are strings--i.e., the concatenation to two or more 
1 
strings is a string. 
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If sand s' are strings, and So is a symbol, then the notation 
s(s'/sO) denotes the string that is obtained from s by uniform substitu-
tion of an occurrence of s' for each occurrence of So in s. It is tacit 
that, if s does not contain any occurrences of sO' then s(s'/sO) is 
just s. 
A formal language consists of a set of symbols, together with a 
set of well-formed strings, as described below: 
1) The set of symbols to be used specifically for L are assumed 
to be members of the collection S given above. The only requirement on 
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this set is that it contain a sufficient, countable or uncountable, 
number of members as appropriate for the intended use of L. Most 
languages will have a few symbols designated as logical connectives, 
which, in the case of standard languages, typically include a negation 
symbol, denoted by', and a disjunction symbol, denoted by V. 
2) The well-formed strings of L are selected from the set of all 
strings for L. For a specific L, well-formed strings may be defined 
recursively or in accordance with a context-free grammar. Depending on 
the language, they are variously referred to as formulas, expressions, 
equations, equivalences, etc. 
In general, languages are defined for the purpose of formalizing 
the essential ideas in an intended set of interpretations, i.e., a 
semantics. Thus, although strings per se are purely syntactical objects, 
devoid of any specific meanings, well-formed strings have appropriate 
forms so that they will be meaningful under certain interpretations of 
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the constituent symbols. This aspect of the creation of formal languages 
is discussed more fully in §10.4.1. 
§2.1.2. Semantics 
A semantics ~ for a formal language L is a class of interpretations 
for L, where an interpretation I for L is defined in four steps, as 
follows: 
1) A set UI is specified as a universe of discourse, the members 
of which are referred to as individuals. A universe of discourse provides 
the context in which well-formed strings of L obtain meanings: For 
sufficiently simple languages, such as that of the propositional calcu-
lus and most of the other systems studies in Part II, universes of 
discourse may be assumed to be empty, since the meanings of the logical--
connectives are always implicit in their truth-functional behavior as 
defined by the interpretation's valuations (see the following). For 
richer languages, such as studied in Part I, universes are typically 
non-empty, and the interpretation then includes specific meaning assign-
ments as described below. 
2) Meaning assignments are defined in terms of mappings of certain 
symbois in L to entities in, or definable on, the universe UI . For 
example, an "individual constant" in L (cf. §3.1.1) is assigned as its 
meaning a specific individual in UI , and a "relation symbol" in L (also 
§3.1.1) is assigned as its meaning a specific relation of individuals in 
Ur . Assignments of meanings to symbols ultimately yield meanings for 
expressions. For example, if a and b are individual constants, and if = 
denotes the equality relation, then the expression a=b "means" that a is 
equal to b. 
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3) For every interpretation, a set of values is chosen and there 
is defined a set of valuations. The values may be any objects--e.g., 
the letters T and F, the numbers 0, ~, and 1, the members of the unit 
interval [0,1], or the fuzzy subsets of [0,1]. In most places, these 
are called truth-values, but an exception is in Part II, where certain 
values are referred to as logical states. Valuations are mappings of 
the well-formed strings of L, or a certain subset of well-formed strings 
of L, into the set of values. For simple languages, which do not require 
universes of discourse, valuations merely take the place of truth tables, 
characterizing the truth-functional behavior of logical connectives. 
For richer languages, valuations apply to well-formed strings which make 
assertions about individuals in UI , and they yield a truth-value in . 
terms of the assertion's meaning. For example, a string of the form a=b 
receives the values T or F depending on whether the individual that was 
assigned as a meaning for a is, or is not, the same individual as was 
assigned to b. To avoid possible confusion, it should be noted also 
that strings of the form x=y, where x and yare "individual variables" 
(cf. §3.1.1), are not included in the domain of the valuation mappings, 
since x and y vary over the universe UI but do not have any specific 
individual assignments. A discussion of this appears in §10.4.1, and an 
example in §3.2. 
4) A concept of truth or validity is specified for well-formed 
strings. For all languages this concept is essentially predetermined by 
the set of valuations. In the propositional calculus, for example, one 
makes use of the concept of a tautology, this being a well-formed string 
which is assigned the value 1 (or T) by all valuations (cf. §7.1). In 
richer languages, the appropriate concept is that of semantic validity, 
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which is determined by the valuations as a property of the meaning of a 
string under the given interpretation (meaning assignments) of its 
constituent symbols. For example (cf. §3.2), a string of the form a=a 
would be valid, since it receives the value 1 under all valuations; and 
a string of the form x=x would be valid, since, no matter what individual 
constant is put in place of x, the string likewise receives the value 1 
under all valuations. The idea used in the latter example makes this 
notion of validity applicable to all well-formed strings of L, whether 
or not they are within the domain of the valuation mappings. Note that 
it is implicit in the foregoing that only well-formed strings which make 
assertions about specific individuals are formally regarded as "true" or 
"false." The property of a strings being valid in an interpretation. I 
is asserted by the notation IFS. 
§2. 1. 3. Logics 
A formal logic consists of a formal language L, together with a 
semantics I for L. For any semantics, it is normally implicit in the 
definition of its interpretations that all the interpretations have 
their valuation mappings acting on the same logical connectives in the 
same way. For example, in classical logics, the expression P receives 
the value T, if and only if P receives the value F, and P receives the 
value F if and only if P receives the value T. Thus, the nature of the 
logic--i.e., as being two-valued, many-valued, fuzzy-valued, etc.--is 
embodied in I; and any given L may serve as the language of several 
different logics. 
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§2.1.4. Formal Systems 
A formal logical system is normally defined for the purpose of 
characterizing the properties of a given set of semantic interpretations. 
In this case, it is desired to find a set of axioms and inference rules 
from which one can formally derive all the well-formed strings that 
happen to be true about (or valid in) all the given interpretations. 
Typically, this set of interpretations is a subset ~I of a given seman-
tics ~ for a language L, in which case L becomes the language of the 
formal system and is denoted by L(F). Then, a formal logical system F 
consists of a language L(F), together with some axioms, inference rules, 
and theorems, as follows. 
§2.1.4.1. Axioms 
The only requirement placed on axioms of F is that they be well-
formed strings of L(F). Yet, since axioms are customarily selected 
specifically for the above mentioned objective of characterizing a 
subset ~I of a semantics I for L(F), one naturally choo~es only axioms 
which are valid in every interpretation in ~I • 
§2.1.4.2. Inference Rules 
The inference rules of F are mappings of the set of well-formed 
strings of L(F) into itself. In some treatments, inference rules are 
described by means of a "schema." For example, the rule of modus ponens 
(§3.3.1 and §7.1) may be described by 
P 
P::IQ 
Q 
which says that, from the formula P, together with a formula of the form 
P~Q, one may infer the formula Q. 
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In this dissertation, an n-ary inference rule is regarded as a 
mapping in the sense of being a set of (n+1)-tuples of well-formed 
strings having certain forms. For example, modus ponens is herein 
defined as the binary rule consisting of triples having the form 
(P,~Q,Q). Each such (n+l)-tuple is an instance of the rule; and if 
(sl' ... ,sn,sn+1) is a rule instance, then sl, ... ,sn are the hypotheses 
of that instance, and sn+l is the conclusion. Thus one captures the 
sense in which a certain conclusion may be derived (or inferre~) from a 
set of hypotheses Ex means of ! rule. Owing to the desire to charac-
terize a set ~' of interpretations for L(F), one naturally chooses for F 
only inference rules which always act so as to preserve validity in each 
I in ~I, i.e., so that only valid conclusions can be inferred from v~lid 
hypotheses. 
§2.1.4.3. Theorems 
The set of theorems of F is the smallest set of well-formed strings 
of L(F) that contains the axioms of F and is closed under the inference 
rules of F. An alternative, and sometimes useful, description of this 
set is given by the following inductive definition: 
1. The axioms of F are theorems of F, 
2. If the hypotheses sl, ... ,sn in an instance of an inference rule of F 
are theorems of F, then the conclusion, sn+1' is a theorem of F, 
3. Nothinr is a theorem of F except as required by 1 and 2. 
It follows that the set of theorems of F is uniquely determined by the 
language, axioms, and inference rules of F. 
34 
§2.1.4.4. Inductive Definitions And Inductive Proofs 
The above inductive definition of a set of theorems is typical of 
many definitions used throughout the study of formal systems. Often-
times, the analogue of item 3 is omitted, in which case it is tacitly 
assumed. Whenever it is desired to establish that the members of such a 
set have a certain property, one uses a corresponding inductive proof. 
Such a proof may be regarded as a generalization of an ordinary proof by 
mathematical induction, having its own form of induction hypothesis. 
For example, to establish that the theorems of a system F have a certain 
property P, one shows: 
1. The axioms of F have the property P, and 
2. If sn+1 is the conclusion in an instance (sl, ... sn,sn+l) of an 
inference rule of F, and if the hypotheses sl, ... ,sn .have P, then 
the conclusion sn+1 also has P. 
In this example, the induction hypothesis is the assumption in 2 that 
the property indeed holds for sl, ... ,sn' A proof using this technique 
appears below, Proposition 2.1.5.1-1. 
§2.1.S. Further Properties And Terms 
The following sections discuss the concepts of proof, consistency, 
coherence, Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean, and extension for formal 
systems. These are all strictly syntactical properties in that they 
refer only to the formal structure of a system--in other words, they are 
independent of any underlying semantics. Let F be an arbitrary formal 
logical system. 
§2.1.5.1. Proofs 
A proof of a string s in F is a finite sequence sl, ... ,sn of 
well-formed strings of L(F) such that s is s , and for each index 
n 
i=I, ... ,n, either: 
1. s. is an axiom of F, or 
~ 
2. s. is the conclusion in an instance of an inference rule of F in 
~ 
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which the hypotheses of that instance are all among the s. for j<i. 
J 
Such a proof is said to have length n. The notation F~s is used 
to assert the condition that there is some proof of s in F, a~d F~s 
asserts the contrary. (Note: Many authors follow Frege (1879) by 
writing ~Fs and ~Fs. The notation adopted here is typographically more 
convenient.) 
Proposition 2.1.5.1-1. A well-formed string s of L(F) is a theorem 
of F if and only if F~s. 
Proof. To show that, if s is a theorem, then F~s, we use proof by 
induction on the set of theorems of F. 
Case 1: the string s is an axiom of F. Then the one-string 
sequence, s, is a proof of s in F. 
Case 2: the string s is a conclusion sn+l in some instance 
(sl, ... ,sn,sn+l) of an inference rule of F. In this case, the induction 
hypothesis is that F~si' for each i~n. Let sl' , ... ,sm' be the sequence 
of strings that is obtained by putting the proofs of the s., for i~n, 
~ 
together, in the order of the indices of the s .. Then the sequence 
~ 
sl' , ... ,sm' ,sm+l is a proof of sm+l in F, by the definition of a proof. 
Thus, F~s by induction on the theorems of F. 
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To show that, if F~s, then s is a theorem of F, we can use mathe-
matical induction on the length of proofs in F. Assume that s has a 
proof of length n. 
Case 1: n=1. Then s is an axiom, by the definition of a proof. 
Hence s is a theorem, by item 1 in the definition of a theorem. 
Case 2: n>1; say that the given proof of s is sl, ... ,sn' where s n 
is s. The induction hypothesis asserts that all proofs in F having 
length less than n yield theorems of F. Thus all of s1, ..• ,sn-1 are 
theorems of F, since each initial segment of s1, ... ,sn is a proof in F. 
By item 2 of the definition of a proof, s is inferred from some of the n 
s. for i<n by means of an inference rule of F. It therefore follows by 
~ 
item 2 in the definition of a theorem that sn (which is the string s? is 
a theorem of F. This completes the proof, by mathematical induction on 
n. 0 
In the sequel, Proposition 2.1.5.1-1 is used tacitly to equate the 
properties of a string's being derivable and of its being a theorem in a 
formal logical system. Thus, the notation F~s is used to assert that s 
is a theorem of F. 
§2.1.5.2. Consistency and Coherence 
The property of consistency for a formal system is based on the 
notion of a well-formed string's being an inconsistency, where an 
inconsistency is a string having a certain form, depending on the system's 
language. For example, in a system which is based on the usual logical 
connectives, inconsistencies have the form P&'P--in which case they are 
referred to as contradictions. Given an appropriate definition of an 
inconsistency for a formal logical system, the system itself is said to 
be consistent if the theorems of the system do not include any such 
inconsistent strings. 
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The following property asserts that the set of theorems has a 
nontrivial structure. Precisely, a formal logical system F is coherent 
if there exists at least one well-formed string s of L(F) such that ~s. 
This property of a formal system is used in the present work for 
establishing the characterization of Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean 
systems discussed below (§2.1.5.4). Here it should be mentioned that 
this notion of coherence bears a connection with Rescher's (1973) 
"coherence theory of truth" which was developed in an effort to obtain 
meaningful inferences from inconsistent sets of data. Rescher's approach 
may be characterized as an "internal" one, focusing on a concept of 
semantic truth which provides the fabric upon which such inferences can 
be performed; and "coherence" is taken in the literal sense as a property 
of "hanging together"--a set of propositions is coherent if the proposi-
tions are not truth-functionally independent. 
The present approach, by contrast, is an "external" approach which 
focuses on a property of formal logical systems. It makes no reference 
to propositions being, or not being, independent, and it takes "coherence" 
more in the sense of signifying "meaningfulness." The essential ingre-
dient is retained, however, inasmuch as coherent systems as defined 
herein also allow for meaningful inferences from inconsistent premises. 
The above definition is in fact more closely aligned with Rescher's 
most recent thinking on this problem (Rescher 1980). What is here 
termed "inconsistency" for a formal logic is there termed "strong 
inconsistency," and what is here termed "incoherence" is there termed 
"logical chaos." 
§2.1.5.3. Extensions 
An extension of a formal system F may be obtained by performing 
one or more of the following operations: 
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1. Adjoin some ~ symbols--i.e., symbols not already in L(F)--to L(F), 
which generates some new well-formed strings, 
2. Adjoin some additional axioms to the set of axioms of F, thereby 
generating some new theorems, 
3. Adjoin some additional inference rules to the set of inference rules 
of F, which also generates new theorems. 
In case of operation 1, it is always tacit that the domains of the 
inference rules of F--considered as mappings--are extended to the new 
language. If S is a set of symbols, A is a set of axioms, and R is a 
set of inference rules, then the system obtained by adjoining these 
items to F may be denoted by F[S,A,R]. 
A simple extension of F is an extension that is obtained by per-
forming operations only of the above type 2. An extension Fi( of F is an 
inessential extension of F if, for every well-formed string s of L(F) 
F*rs implies that Frs--i.e., ~k is such that no strings of L(F) can be 
derived as theorems of F* unless they are already derivable in F. Such 
extensions are generally nontrivial, however, since L(F*) may contain 
strings provable only in F*. 
§2.1.5.4. Aristotelean And Classical Systems 
It will be said that a well-formed string s follows from a string 
.s' in F if F[s']rs. A system F will be termed Aristotelean if, in F, 
every well-formed string of L(F) follows from any inconsistency; other-
wise F will be termed non-Aristotelean. It follows that: 
1. A system is Aristotelean if and only if all its coherent simple 
extensions are consistent, 
2. A system is non-Aristotelean if and only if it has at least one 
simple extension which is inconsistent yet coherent. 
Regarding this usage of terminology, it should be noted that we 
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here deviate from an established convention. Traditionally, "Aristotelean" 
has been taken to mean "includes the law of the Excluded Middle (which 
in standard languages is expressed by the formula PV,P) , and "non-
Aristotelean" has traditionally meant "without Excluded Middle." This 
distinction does not correspond to the above since, first, it is possible 
to weaken the propositional calculus to a system which still contains 
Excluded Middle but in which inconsistency does not imply incoherenc~, 
and second, there are formal systems not containing Excluded Middle yet 
in which inconsistency does imply incoherence. A notable example of the 
latter is Kleene's axiomatization of the logic of intuitionism 
(cf. Mendelson 1964, p. 43, Exercise 2(e), parts (i) and (v)). 
It may be argued, however, that the present usage is equally 
acceptable, in fact is possibly more appropriate, since it captures the 
general spirit of Aristotle's thinking without becoming involved with 
the details of a system's formal structure. The sense of Aristotelean 
logic was that contradiction (inconsistency) should be forbidden, and 
this for the evident reason that he viewed contradiction as being tanta-
mount to il?'.:oherence. Readers familiar with the work of E. Post (1921) 
may note that the present conception of "Aristotelean" bears a resemblance 
to what is now called "post-complete" and might equally have been termed 
"post-contradiction-complete." 
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Last, we should consider also how the above distinction relates to 
the somewhat less precise distinction between "classical" and "nonclassical" 
systems. In this dissertation is employed the traditional meaning of 
classical as referring to those systems which embody both the linguistic 
structure and the full proof-theoretical strength of the classical 
propositional calculus, together with its immediate derivates, such as 
the first-order and second-order systems. Given this terminology, we 
have immediately that classical implies Aristotelean; but not conversely. 
In §8.4 it is shown, for example, that Spencer-Brown's primary algebra, 
although clearly nonclassical, is Aristotelean. Also, the linguistic 
theories of Chapters 3 through 6 are nonclassical in their use of a 
"two-leveled" linguistics, but are Aristotelean since they are classical 
at the "outer" level. Examples of nonclassical non-Aristotelean systems 
appearing in this dissertation are Varela's calculus and its isomorphisms 
(Chapters 8 and 9). 
§2.1.6. Semantic Models And Semantic Completeness 
A semantics I for a formal language L may be denoted I(L); in case 
L is the language of a formal system F, then I may alternatively be 
denoted by I(F). Let F be a formal logical system and let I be a seman-
tics for L(F). An interpretation I in I(F) is a model of F if every 
theorem of F is valid in I. This property may be expressed by the 
notation IFF. A well-formed string s of L(F) is valid in I(F) if s is 
valid in every model of F in I(F), in which case one may write I(F)FS. 
Proposition 2.1.6-1. For any formal logical system F and any 
well-formed string s of L(F), F~s only if I(F)FS. 
Proof. This is immediate by the foregoing definitions. 0 
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A formal logical system F is complete with respect to a semantics 
L(F) if validity in ~(F) implies formal derivability in F--i.e., if the 
converse of Proposition 2.1.6-1 holds. This concept of semantic complete-
ness captures one part of what is meant by saying that a formal system 
characterizes a certain semantics. To wit, in combination with 
Proposition 2.1.6-1, it asserts that a well-formed string is derivable 
in F if and only if it is valid in every "valid interpretation"--Le., 
model--of F. Usually it is only the models in a semantics that are 
mathematically interesting. 
A further aspect of formal characterization is that the language 
of F must be rich enough to express the essential properties of the 
given semantics. Satisfaction of this requirement is usually determ~ned 
by an intuitive judgment, based on one's knowledge of the structures 
which are to be taken as interpretations. A discussion of these and 
related ideas also appears in §10.4.1, and an example appears in §3.4.2. 
§2.1.7. Classes of Formal Systems 
When defining a formal system F one usually implicitly specifies a 
generic type of system, representing a class e of systems, all of which 
have certain linguistic-axiomatic properties in common. Accordingly, 
when defining a semantics L for L(F), one winds up defining a semantics 
for every formal system in e, in which case, a proof of semantic 
completeness for F serves as a completeness proof for every system in e. 
This justifies saying that the entire class e is complete with respect 
to the semanticsi, where ~ is the class of all semantics for systems 
in e. 
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§2.1.8. Common Abbreviations 
The notation "iff" is used as an abbreviation for the phrase "if 
and only if." Membership of an element a in a set A may be indicated by 
aeA. 
§2.2. Fuzzy Sets And Logics 
Since this work is focused on the specific task of ax iomati zing 
the logic inherent in Zadeh's fuzzy linguistics, it necessarily leaves 
out a major portion of what is nowdays a very rich body of mathematical 
knowledge. The following treatment, moreover, is intentionally brief, 
and might profitably be supplemented with a reading of Zadeh (1975b) and 
Gaines (1976). Only those ideas specifically needed for Chapter 3 and 4 
are provided in detail. Other topics, such as the full fuzzy logic, 
linguistic truth, and fuzzy inference, are taken up again in the appro-
priate sections of Chapter 5. 
§2.2.1. Fuzzy Sets 
A fuzzy set is a collection of objects which has unsharp boundaries 
(Zadeh 1972). This idea is defined mathematically as a generalization 
of the classical idea of a subset of a given universe U. Let U be a 
universe of discourse--i.e., any set. Then a classical subset S of U 
may be represented by a membership function ~S:U~{O,l} defined by: 
~S(x)=l, if xeS; and ~S(x)=O, if xiS. By contrast, a fuzzy subset S of 
U is defined as the analagous object which is represented by a function 
~S:U~[O,l], where [0,1] denotes the closed unit interval. In this case 
the value ~S(x) is referred to as the degree or grade of membership of x 
in S. 
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As an example, assume that S is a fuzzy set of "red" objects (con-
sidered as a fuzzy subset of a universe consisting of all objects). 
Then a ripe red apple might be assigned the value 0.9, indicating a high 
degree of membership in S, while a ripe orange might have the value 0.4, 
indicating a moderate degree of membership in S. 
Another example, appearing frequently in Zadeh's papers, is a pair 
of explicitly defined membership functions fOl- the collections of "young" 
and "old" ages of people. Here let U be the set of ages from 0 to 100. 
Then a fuzzy set Y of "young" ages may be defined by 
lJy(x) 
and a fuzzy set 0 of "old" ages may be defined by 
if x ~ 25 
if x > 25, 
if x ~ 50 
if x > 50. 
These functions can be represented graphically as in Figure 2-2. Note 
that specification of the intended universe of discourse is always 
necessary for establishing the context in which such interpretative 
membership functions are to be defined. For example, the above defini-
tions of lJy and IJO would not be appropriate in the context of ages of 
automobiles or of galaxies. In considering a fuzzy set S as the meaning 
of a natural language expression a, the grade of membership of an object 
in S is referred to as that object's degree of compatibility with a. 
A crossover point in a fuzzy subset S of a universe U is an object 
x in U for which IJS(x)=0.5. The support of fuzzy subset S of U is the 
set of members x of U for which IJS(x) is positive. A fuzzy singleton is 
a fuzzy subset whose support consists of exactly one element in U. 
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75 Age 
Crossover Points 
Figure 2-2. compatibility functions for "Young" and "Old." 
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Evidently, a fuzzy subset S of U may be represented as a collection 
of ordered pairs (~,x) where ~ is a number in the interval [0,1] and x 
is an object in U. If S has finite support, say x1., ..• ,xn , and for 
each i=l, •.• ,n, ~. is the grade of membership of x. in S, then S may be 
1 1 
represented symbolically as a combination of fuzzy singletons by 
S = ~lx1 + ~2x2 + ... + ~nxn' 
or more compactly, by 
n 
S = I 
i=l 
~.x .. 
1 1 
A similar notation might be used in case the support is countably 
infinite. If the support is a continuum, then S may be denoted by 
S = I ~.x .. 
U 1 1 
Thus the signs "+", "I" and "I" are here used only as convenient nota-
tional devices and are not taken in their usual mathematical meanings. 
Sometimes it is useful to write the ordered pair ~.x. with a 
1 1 
separating slash mark, i.e. , as ~./x .. 
1 1 
For example, where U is the set 
of ages from 0 to 100, a fuzzy set M of "middle" ages might be given 
explicitly by 
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M = 0.3/40 + 0.5/41 + 0.8/42 + 0.9/43 + I 
x.=44 
1 
l/x. 
1 
+ 0.9/49 + 0.8/50 + 0.7/51 + 0.6/52 + 0.5/53 
+ 0.4/54 + 0.3/55. 
§2.2.2. Fuzzy Relations 
Let a1, ..• ,an be variables ranging over universes of discourse 
U1,···,Un, respectively. A fuzzy relation R of a1, ... ,an (or on U1, ... ,Un) 
is a fuzzy subset of the cartesian product U1xU2x ••• xUn . Then R is 
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represented by an n-ary membership function ~R:U1x ••• xUn~[O,1] and may 
be expressed by the notation 
R = f ~R(x1,···,xn)/(x1,···,xn)· 
U1x ..• xUn 
To illustrate (from Zadeh, 1972): if U1={TOM,DICK} and U2={JOHN,JIM}, 
then a fuzzy relation R of "resemblance" between members of U1 and U2 
may be defined by 
R = O.8/(TOM,JOHN) + O.6/(TOM,JIM) 
+ O.2/(DICK,JOHN) + O.9/(DICK,JIM). 
Let R be a fuzzy relation on a pair of universes U1,U2, and let S 
be a fuzzy relation on U2 and a third universe U3. Then the composition 
of Rand S, denoted by RaS, is a fuzzy relation on U1,U3 defined by 
RaS = f sup(min[~R(x1,x2)'~S(x2,x3)])/(x1,x3)' 
U
1
xU
3 
x2 . 
where sup refers to the maximum over all possible values of the indicated 
variable. 
Continuing the foregoing example, suppose that S is a "resemblance" 
relation between members of U2 and U3={PETE,MlKE}, given by 
S = O.6/(JOHN,PETE) + O.9/(JOHN,MlKE) 
+ O.5/(JIM,PETE) + O.4/(JIM,MlKE). 
Then the composition RaS is 
RaS = O.6/(TOM,PETE) + O.8/(TOM,MlKE) 
+ O.5/(DICK,PETE) + O.4/(DICK,MlKE), 
which may be taken as a "resemblance" relation between the members of U1 
and U3. 
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§2.2.3. Fuzzy Boolean Operations And Related Definitions 
In fuzzy set theory the definitions of fuzzy complement, union, 
intersection, and of fuzzy set equality, inclusion, and cartesian product 
are simple generalizations of the classical definitions. 
Let A and B be fuzzy subsets of a universe U, with membership 
functions ~A and ~B. The three Boolean operations are generalized as 
follows. The fuzzy complement of A, denoted by -A, is defined by 
for all xeU, 
the fuzzy union of A and B, denoted by AUB, is defined by 
for all xeU, 
and the fuzzy intersection of A and B, denoted by AnB, is defined by 
for all xeU. 
The fuzzy sets A and Bare equal, notation A=B, if 
for all xeU, 
and the fuzzy set A is included in the fuzzy set B, notation AeB, if 
for all xeU. 
Now suppose that B is a fuzzy subset of some possibly different 
universe of discourse U'. The cartesian product of A and B, notation 
AXB, is the fuzzy relation on UXU' defined by 
for all (x,x')eUxU'. 
All of the foregoing reduce to the classical case if ~A and ~B are 
restricted to the set {O,!}. 
In fuzzy linguistics (cf. §2.2.5), these mathematical ideas are 
used in various ways to provide meanings for natural language expressions. 
In particular, the fuzzy Boolean operations -, V, and n provide fuzzy 
interpretatio~s of the Boolean connectives "not" (negation), "or" (dis-
junction), and "and" (conjunction). Example: If the fuzzy sets Y and 0 
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defined in §2.2.1 are taken as the meanings of the expressions "young" 
and "old," then the meaning of the expression "not young and not old" 
would be defined as (-Y)n(-O). 
§2.2.4. Linguistic Hedges 
Linguistic hedges are modifiers, usually adjectives, such as 
"very," "quite," "approximately," "more or less," "somewhat," and so on. 
The strength of the theory of fuzzy sets as a basis for linguistic 
reasoning stems from the capacity for linguistic hedges to be represented 
as well-defined operations on fuzzy-set membership functions." A typical 
example is the interpretation of the "very" hedge in terms of the squar-
ing function on [0,1]. Let A be a fuzzy subset of a universe U, and 
suppose that A is being used as the meaning of some linguistic expression 
a. Then the meaning of the expression "very a" may be given as the 
fuzzy subset very-A of U defined by 
2 ~very-A(x) = [~A(x)] for all xeU. 
The effect of applying the "very" operator to the foregoing meanings Y 
and 0 of "young" and "old" is depicted graphically in Figure 2-3. This 
particular operator is an intuitively natural interpretation of "very," 
since, in order for an object in U to have a high degree of membership 
in very-Y (very-O) it must have an even higher grade of membership in Y 
(in 0). 
The most extensive treatment of hedges to date is Zadeh (1972), 
which defines a collection of general operations--"concentration," "dila-
tion," "fuzzification," etc.--which may be used to provide interpreta-
tions of a wide variety of linguistic expressions. Such interpretations 
are always arbitrary, except that they should reasonably conform to 
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Figure 2-3. Effect of the "very" operator. 
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ordinary usage of the expression being interpreted. A detailed analysis 
of specific hedges is foregone in this dissertation, since the axiomatiza-
tion developed herein is aimed only at capturing the general role of 
hedges in linguistic reasoning and does not attempt to provide hedges 
with explicit formal definitions. 
§2.2.5. Linguistic Variables 
A linguistic variable is a variable whose values are expressions 
in a natural or artificial language. For example "Age" becomes a linguis-
tic variable if we take its values to be expressions like "young," "not 
young," "very young," "old," "not very young and not very old," and so 
on. Such expressions will be referred to as linguistic terms. If X is 
a linguistic variable, its linguistic terms comprise a term set T(X)" 
which can be generated from a smaller set of atomic terms, or terminals, 
by means of a context free grammar G. The subject of grammars is taken 
up in §2.2.6. 
The foregoing sections give several examples of how a linguistic 
term can be given a meaning, or interpretation, as a fuzzy subset of a 
universe U. If a is a tcDffi in T(X), then its meaning will be denoted by 
I Ca), where I is refE!rred to as an interpretation function, or a meaning 
assignment function, for the linguistic variable X. It follows that a 
linguistic variable may be characterized as a quintuple CX,TCX),U,G,I). 
The basic components of a linguistic variable are illustrated graphically 
in Figure 2-4. 
It is implicit in this definition that a linguistic variable may 
take n-ary linglltstic terms, i.e., linguistic terms whose meanings are 
n-ary fuzzy relations, as its values. In case the variables of such 
Age 
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relations range over the same universe U, then one considers only rela-
tions on U, while in the more general case that they range over different 
universes, then U would be taken as the Cartesian product of those 
universes. Further, in a specific application, one usually considers 
several linguistic variables simultaneously over the same universe U. 
For example, a description of "young, tall, and agile men" would entail 
the three linguistic variables "Age," "Height," and "Physical Fitness" 
over the same universe of human males. On the other hand, it is some-
times necessary to consider different linguistic variables si~ultaneously 
over totally distinct universes. A situation in which this is done is 
where one formally includes a notion of linguistic "Truth" (cf. §2.2.9). 
Zadeh (1978a) provides the following. Two linguistic terms a and 
~ of some linguistic variable X are semantically equivalent if the 
meaning assignment function I is such that I (a)=I on, where "=" is 
equality of fuzzy sets as defined in §2.2.3. The term a semantically 
entails the term ~ if I(a)~I(~), where "~,, is the fuzzy set inclusion 
relation defined in §2.2.3. 
Semantic equivalence characterizes the situation of two linguistic 
terms representing the same semantic meaning. For example, in the 
foregoing, it turns out that "young" is not semantically equivalent to 
"not old," and "old" is not semantically equivalent to "not young," 
i.e., they are not semantic antonyms. On the other hand, they could 
become antonyms simply by redefining the compatability functions for 
"young" and "old," perhaps along the scheme of "true" and "false" given 
in §5.3.1. Semantic entailment characterizes one of the many possible 
forms of "fuzzy inference" (cf. §2.2.9). For example, it also follows 
from the foregoing that "very young" semantically entails "young." 
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§2.2.6. Grammars 
The use of a grammar for generating a term set for a linguistic 
variable ensures that the semantic meanings of composite terms are 
explicitly definable in terms of the meanings of the smaller set of 
atomic terms. Further, the grammar approach is useful for excluding 
nonsense terms like "very and not young." As an example (cf. Zadeh, 
1975b, Part II, p. 326) a term set T(X) for the linguistic variable 
x=Age may be generated by a grammar G=(VT,VN,T,P), where (i) VT is the 
set of atomic terms (or terminals) consisting of "young," "ol~," "not," 
"or," "and," "very," and some parentheses ( and ), (ii) VN is a ·set of 
nonterminals consisting of the letters T, A, B, C, D, and E, in which 
case the letter T is a symbolic representative of the term set T(X),. and 
(iii) P is a production system given by 
T -+ A, C -+ D, 
T -+ T or A, C -+ E, 
A -+ B, D -+ very D, 
A -+ A and B, E -+ very E, 
B -+ C, D -+ young, 
B -+ not C, E -+ old, 
C -+ (T) . 
A linguistic term in T(X) is produced in G by any sequence of productions 
in P which starts with the nonterminal T and ends in an expression 
containing only terminals. For example, a production of the composite 
term "not very young and not very old" is 
T -+ A -+ A and B -+ Band B -+ not C and B -+ not D and B -+ not very D 
and B -+ not very young and B -+ not very young and not C -+ not very 
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young and not E ~ not very young and not very E ~ not very young 
and not very old. 
A discussion of the use of grammars, together with the use of a 
"parsing tree" for analyzing complex expressions, is provided in the 
above reference, pp. 326-331. Note that a meaning for the term "not 
very young and not very old" may be defined explicitly in terms of the 
foregoing meanings of the atomic terms as the fuzzy set M given by 
~M(x) = min[~_(very_y)(x)'~_(very_O)(x)] 
= min[l-~ y(x),l-~ O(x)] very- very-
= min[1-[~y(x)]2,1-[~o(x)]2]. 
§2.2.7. Linguistic Approximation 
Suppose that the above grammar for the linguistic variable "Age" is 
extended to contain the term "middle aged" among its terminals, and 
suppose that one of the production rules is 
not very young and not very old ~ middle aged. 
Then the fuzzy set M defined in §2.2.1 would serve as a definition of 
I(middle aged), in which case the above production rule becomes an 
expression of semantic equivalence. 
But now consider the term "not young and not old." The meaning of 
this term will be close ·to the meaning of "middle aged," although not 
exactly mathematically identical. Yet in an application of fuzzy linguis-
tics to a discussion of human ages, it would likely cause no difficulty 
to just assume that the more complex composite term and the simpler 
atomic term are interchangeable. 
This illustrates a problem which has received considerable atten-
tion in the literature: that of developing en algorithm for determining 
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when the meanings of two linguistic terms are sufficiently similar to 
regard those terms as pragmatically identical. This amounts to creating 
an algorithmic measure of "linguistic approximation" in terms of member-
ship functions of fuzzy sets. Yager (1979) now appears to have resolved 
this problem in a simple and intuitively satisfying approach based on 
Zadeh's concept of a "level-set." 
No attempt has been made in this dissertation to axiomatize the 
concept of linguistic approximation. Rather, composite terms are dealt 
with only as they are generated by a given grammar. Yet it is a reason-
able conjecture that the results of this work can be extended to include 
a concept of linguistic approximation. This would involve "fuzzifying" 
the "'outer linguistic level" (cf. Chapter 3), and might lead to a sy~tem 
with three linguistic levels rather than two. 
§2.2.8. Multivalent Fuzzy Logic 
Transition from the concept of a linguistic variable to a specific 
multivalent logic is accomplished by interpreting degrees of compatability 
as truth values. Example: if "young" is given as its meaning I(young) 
the foregoing fuzzy set Y, then the linguistic assertion "young(x)" is 
taken as expressing that "x is young" and is given as its truth value 
the degree of compatability lJy(x). Thus, the assertion "x is young" is 
"true" to the degree that x is a member of the fuzzy set y. 
This concept of "truth" is what forms the basis for the axiomatiza-
tion of a theory of approximate reasoning as a multivalent logic in 
Chapter 3. Such systems of reasoning are to be distinguished from those 
for which Zadeh formally reserves the term fuzzy logic, however, which 
are characterized by having the truth values be fuzzy subsets of [0,1]. 
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The concept of "fuzzy truth" is taken up in §2.2.9 and §2.2.10, and the 
manner in which the formalism of Chapter 3 may be modified to accommodate 
fuzzy logic per se is discussed in Chapter 5. 
In the multivalent context, the foregoing fuzzy interpretations of 
the Boolean connectives "not," "or," and "and" can be adapted to serve 
as connectives between linguistic assertions. For example, if "p(x,y)" 
denotes the assertion "young(x) and old(y)", and if I(young)=Y and 
I(old)=O, then the truth values of p(x,y) are given as grades of member-
ship of ordered pairs (x,y) in the fuzzy relation I(p) defined by 
~I(p)(x,y) = min[~y(x),~O(Y)]' 
and if the connective was "or" rather than "and," one would use "max" in 
place of "min." 
Next arises the question of logical inference--i.e., a fuzzy 
interpretation of the logical "implies." While the foregoing interpreta-
tions of the Boolean connectives are nowdays well-established (cf. Bellman 
and Giertz 1973) there is no widespread agreement on an appropriate form 
of fuzzy-logical implication. A general analysis of fuzzy inference and 
a list of several versions appears in Gaines (1976), and Zadeh's papers 
provide several other versions, including the idea of semantic entailment 
mentioned in §2.2.5. 
A study of this topic is undertaken in this dissertation in §5.5. 
It may be noted in Chapter 3 that no specific form of fuzzy inference is 
incorporated into the class of formal linguistic theories defined therein. 
This leaves open the option of adjoining one of several different forms, 
as a given situation may demand. 
§2.2.9. Types Of Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, And Linguistic Truth 
A fuzzy set of ~ ~ is characterized by a membership function 
whose values are fuzzy subsets of [0,1], rather than points in [0,1]. 
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By contrast, fuzzy sets of the kind described in §2.1.1 are referred to 
as fuzzy sets of ~ 1. The concept of a type 2 fuzzy set has been 
developed into a fuzzy logic which uses fuzzy subsets of [0,1] as truth 
values (Bellman and Zadeh 1977) through an application of Zadeh's 
"fuzzification operator" to the connectives in the Lukasiewicz infinitary 
logic L~. In other works, particularly Zadeh (1975b), this form of 
"truth" has also been studied as a special kind of linguistic variable. 
The overall aim is to provide intuitively plausible interpretations for 
linguistic assertions like 
"x is very young is not very true", 
where the meaning of "true" is itself imprecise. 
The word "Truth" becomes a linguistic variable by taking its. term 
set to include expressions like "true," "not true," "very true," "false," 
"not very true and not very false," and so on, and by taking the universe 
of discourse to be the unit interval. In using these terms, however, it 
soon becomes evident that the foregoing interpretations of the Boolean 
connectives do not yield the ordinary intuitions about the meanings of 
composite linguistic truth values. For example, except for trivial 
interpretations of the terms "true" and "false," one does not have that 
the composite term "true and false" is even approximately equivalent to 
the term "false," which ordinary reasoning would require. 
Because of this Zadeh has developed an alternative set of connec-
tives, specifically for use with linguistic truth. The characteristics 
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of these connectives, and the manner in which they can be represented in 
a semantically complete formal logical system, is taken up in §5.3. 
§2.2.10. Linguistic Possibility 
Recent work by Zadeh has been concerned with reinterpreting the 
theory of fuzzy linguistics as a theory of "linguistic possibility" 
(eg. Zadeh 1978a and 1978b) which is an outgrowth of earlier work under 
the heading of "linguistic probability" (as in Zadeh 1975b, Part III). 
Here it is worth noting that the revised terminology is clearly more 
appropriate, since probabilistic logic--which uses joint probability as 
its interpretation of the logical "and"--is substantially different from 
the logic of fuzzy sets. A recent paper specifically addressing this 
point is Zadeh (1980). The sense in which the term "possibility" applies 
may be described as follows. Suppose that the linguistic term "small 
integer" is assigned as its meaning the following fuzzy subset of the 
nonnegative integers: 
SI = 1/0 + 1/1 + 0.8/2 + 0.6/3 + 0.4/4 + 0.2/5, 
and consider the linguistic assertion "x is a small integer." In the 
absence of any further information about x, this assertion may be inter-
preted as an expression of possibility that x is an integer in the 
interval from 0 to 5. Further, given the above meaning SI of "small 
integer," it makes sense to say that the possibility that x has a par-
ticular value v in [0,5] is computed as the degree of compatability of v 
with the term "small integer." Thus, given the above assertion and 
meaning assignment, the possibility that x=3, for example, would be 0.6. 
In this manner, the fuzzy set SI becomes reinterpreted as a possibility 
distribution for the variable x. 
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Zadeh has used this interpretation as the guiding intuition for 
developing a set of translation rules for transforming natural language 
expressions into an algorithmic language. Thus the theory of fuzzy sets 
is brought one step closer to machine intelligence applications in 
natural language processing and in question answering systems. 
The manner in which some of these ideas are formalizable in the 
axiom systems of this dissertation is taken up in §5.4. In general, 
most of the ideas used in possibilistic reasoning are coextensive with 
concepts in the theory of fuzzy linguistics and linguistic truth. 
§2.9.11. Fuzzy-Logical Quantifiers 
The standard logical quantifiers, "for all" and "there exists," 
also have generalizations for use in the context of fuzzy sets. As 
well, fuzzy linguistics offers the opportunity to express the implicitly 
fuzzy quantifiers of natural discourse, like "most," "many," "few," 
"some," "not very many," "almost all," etc. The semantics of fuzzy 
quantifiers has been developed in several of Zadeh's papers, and it 
plays an important role in the use of linguistic possibility for natural 
language translation. 
Fuzzy quantification theory is not considered in this dissertation 
because its introduction into the axiomatization problem would substan-
tially increase the difficulty of establishing semantic completeness. 
Now that the completeness results of Chapter 4 have been developed, 
however, it appears that extension to an axiomatization of fuzzy quanti-
fication is certainly feasible, and would constitute a natural topic for 
follow-on research. 
CHAPTER 3 
LINGUISTIC THEORIES 
This chapter defines a class of formal systems wherein each system 
is a formal theory of some collection of linguistic variables over a 
single universe of discourse. The first step toward this definition is 
to develop a rigorously defined formal linguistics which capt~res the 
idea of a collection of linguistic terms as being generated by one or 
more grammars, together with the idea of semantic equivalence between 
linguistic terms. Formalization of semantic equivalence leads naturally 
to a further introduction of negations, disjunctions, etc. of proposi-
tions that express such equivalence relations. Thus we arrive at a 
linguistics having two distinct "levels" as discussed in §1.1 and §2.2.8. 
Explicit definition of the formal languages which comprise this linguis-
tics is given in §3.1. 
In §3.2 we complete the formalization of the concept of a linguis-
tic variable by providing an explicitly defined semantics for the given 
class of formal languages. This captures the manner in which fuzzy 
subsets of a universe of discourse serve as the meanings of linguistic 
terms, as well as the manner in which a truth value in [0,1) for a 
linguistic assertion is computed from the meanings of the linguistic 
terms which occur in that assertion. Further, this semantics incorpor-
ates the interpretation of semantic equivalence as expressing equality 
between fuzzy sets. Thus we arrive at the required interpretation of 
the inner linguistic level as being multivalent and of the outer linguistic 
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level as being bivalent: multivalency comes from having the membership 
functions of fuzzy sets range over [0,1], while bivalency stems from the 
fact that two linguistic terms either are, or are not, semantically 
equivalent (cf. §2.2.8). Even though the definition of the semantics in 
§3.2 logically follows the definition of the linguistics in §3.1, it was 
the desire to formalize the ideas embodied in the semantics which served 
as the intuitive guide for developing the linguistics into its given 
form. The two in tandem formalize the full idea of a linguistic variable 
as defined in §2.2.5. 
The axioms and inference rules for a class of formal systems are 
described in §3.3. The intuitive guide in this case is the desire to 
develop enough proof-theoretic strength to ensure semantic completen~ss, 
which is ultimately established in Chapter 4. The axioms for the outer 
level are adaptations of the axioms for the classical propositional 
calculus, while the axioms for the inner level are based on a standard 
definition of a de Morgan lattice (cf. §4.3). 
The formal systems themselves are defined in §3.4, as a class of 
linguistic theories, or simply theories. (This usage of the word "theory" 
is retained throughout the remainder of Part I, and should not be confused 
with its more common denotation of a "first-order theory.") The idea of 
a semantic model of a theory is also discussed in §3.4, and a few elementary 
results are established--such as consistency of the "minimal theory"--
leading up to the work on the completeness theorems in Chapter 4. 
§3.1. Languages 
The development in this section follows the pattern described in 
§2.1.1. As will be seen, "individual variables" are thought to range 
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over some (unspecified) universe of discourse, "individual constants" 
represent arbitrary (fixed) members of that universe, and "fuzzy relation 
symbols" correspond to atomic linguistic terms--eg., a binary relation 
symbol would be used to express the "similar to" relation of §2.2.2, and 
a unary relation symbol would be used to represent the term "young" of 
§2.2.1. 
Further, the idea of a linguistic term here becomes embodied in 
the formal definition of a "linguistic assertion." Note that in the 
informal theory of fuzzy linguistics, a composite linguistic~ssertion 
of the form "a(x) and f3(x)" may be written alternatively as "(a and 
(3)(x)"--Le., using a composite linguistiC term--but that an assertion 
of the form "a(x) and f3(y)" cannot be so replaced. Thus the idea of. a 
linguistic assertion leads to a somewhat more complex collection of 
expressions than the collection of linguistic terms discussed in §2.2.8, 
but it includes the original idea of a linguistic term in a proper· 
subcollection. 
Last, the linguistic variable per se does not receive an explicit 
representation in these languages; but a given linguistic variable is 
nonetheless implicitly formalized through a rigorous representation of 
that variable's collection of linguistic terms. The manner in which 
further ideas from the informal theory become similarly represented will 
be illustrated in some examples. 
§3.1.1. Symbols 
The following collections of symbols are assumed to be mutually 
disjoint subcollections of the uncountably infinite collection of symbols 
which was given in §2.1.1. 
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1. Individual variables: a countably infinite set of symbols, denoted 
metalinguistically by x,y,z, etc. 
2. Individual constants: an uncountably infinite set of symbols, denoted 
metalinguistically by a,b,c, etc .. This set is assumed to include 
as a proper subset an uncountably infinite set of individual names, 
which may receive the alternate denotations i,1, etc. (Individual 
names are individual constants that are used to "name" the specific 
individuals in the universe of a given semantic interpretation, 
cf. §3. 2 . 1. ) 
3. Equality symbol: one symbol, denoted metalinguistically by =. 
4. Fuzzy relation symbols: for each n~O an uncountably infinite set of 
n-ary relation symbols, denoted metalinguistically by Ci,f3,Y, etc .. 
The O-ary relation symbols are assumed to include a special symbol, 
K , for each number re[O,l]. (In most cases, K "names" the unique r r 
fuzzy subset S of any universe U whose membership function has 
~S(x)=r for all xeU, cf. §3.2.1.) 
5. Multivalent (or fuzzy) connectives: three symbols denoted metalin-
guistically by ~ (not; negation), v (or; disjunction), and A (and; 
conjunction). 
6. Hedge (or special operator) symbols: for each n~l, an uncountably 
infinite set of symbols, denoted metalinguistically by ~, ~, etc .. 
7. Equivalence symbol: one symbol, denoted metalinguistically by~. 
8. Punctuation marks: three symbols, denoted metalinguistically by , 
(comma), and ( and) (parentheses). 
9. Bivalent (or classical) connectives: two symbols, denoted meta-
linguistically by , (not; negation) and V (or; disjunction). 
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Individual variables and individual constants (hence also indi-
vidual names) are collectively called individual terms and will have the 
common notations t, t', etc. 
The logical symbols are the individual variables, the equality 
symbol, the multivalent connectives, the equivalence symbol, the punctua-
tion marks, and the bivalent connectives. These will be common to all 
languages as defined in this section. The other symbols are proper 
symbols, any of which might or might not be used in a specific language 
(cf. §3.1.3). 
§3.1.2. Expressions 
The linguistic assertions have the general denotations p,q,r, etc. 
and are defined to consist of: 
1. Atomic linguistic assertions: expressions of the form a(t1, ... ,tn), 
where a is an n-ary fuzzy relation symbol and t1, ... ,tn are individual 
terms (hence including expr~ssions of the form a where a is O-ary), 
2. Composite linguistic assertions: all expressions which can be gener-
ated from the atomic linguistic assertions by means of a context-
free grammar (§2.2.6), subject only to the requirement that every 
such assertion has one of the following four forms: ~p, (pvq), 
(pAq), and ~(P1'···'Pn)' where P,q,Pl'··· 'Pn are linguistic 
assertions and ~ is a hedge symbol. 
The formulas have the general denotation, P,Q,R, etc. and are 
defined to consist of: 
1. Atomic formulas: all equations of the form (t=t'), where t and t' 
are individual terms, and all equivalences of the form (p~q), where 
p and q are linguistic assertions, 
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2. Composite formulas: all expressions of the forms ,p and (PVQ) where 
P and Q are formulas. 
Some abbreviations to be used are: 
P&Q for ~('PV'Q) (bivalent conjunction) 
P~Q for ,PVQ (bivalent implication) 
P=Q for (~Q)&(Q~P) (bivalent logical equivalence) 
Parentheses are left unwritten when not needed for readability--e.g., 
(PVQ) may be shortened to FVQ. Note also that, as in the above defini-
tions of & and~, the connective' has a lower priority than ~ny of the 
others, so that ~PVQ means the same as (,P)VQ, rather than ,(PVQ). In 
chains of implications we may assume association to the right, so that 
Pl~···~P means the same as (PI~···~(P l~P ) ... ). Similar remarks n n- n 
apply for composite linguistic assertions. 
An expression is closed if it contains no occurrences of individual 
variables; otherwise it is open. The notation e(e1, ... ,en/xI, ... ,xn), 
where e,eI, ... ,en are expressions, denotes the uniform substitution as 
defined in §2.1.1. Sometimes the items following the "/" are omitted, 
in which case e(e1, ... ,en) indicates that e1, ... ,en occur in e. 
§3.1.3. Definitions 
A language L is comprised of: 
1. Symbols: the logical symbols, together with an empty or nonempty set 
of each kind of proper symbol, 
2. Grammars: zero, one, or more context-free grammars which meet the 
requirement mentioned in §3.1.2, 
3. Assertions: all atomic linguistic assertions which can be made from 
symbols of L, together with all composite assertions that can then 
be generated by the grammars of L, 
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4. Formulas: all atomic and composite formulas that can be made up of 
linguistic assertions of L. 
The minimal language will be the (unique) language that contains 
no proper symbols and no grammars. Thus the minimal language contains 
no linguistic assertions, but it does contain formulas--e.g., there 
would be a formula of the form ,(x=y). A specific language of one or 
more linguistic variables is obtained from the minimal language by 
adjoining an appropriate set of proper symbols, together with one or 
more grammars. Typically, one grammar will suffice, but there is no 
technical difficulty with having several. 
It shall be required of every language that the cardinality of its 
set of symbols be not greater than Xl' the first uncountable cardinal 
number. This assumption is needed in Chapter 4. 
§3.1.4 Example 
To formalize the linguistic variable "Age" discussed in §2.2 in a 
formal language LA ,let the linguistic terms "young" and "old" be ge 
represented by the unary fuzzy relation symbols a and ~, and let the 
hedge "very" be represented by the unary hedge symbol cp. Then the 
assertion "x is very young" is represented by the formal linguistic 
assertion cp(a(x)). Composite linguistic assertions may be generated by 
essentially the same grammar as given in §2.2.6: (i) let the terminals 
be the atomic linguistic assertions of L, the multivalent connectives 
~, v, and A, the hedge symbol cp, and the parentheses ( and ), (ii) let 
the nonterminals be the letters T, A, B, C, D, and E (as before) together 
with the letters! and !', (iii) rewrite the production system of §2.2.6 
by everywhere replacing "young" and "old" with a(!) and ~(!'), replacing 
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"not", "or", and "and" with "', v, and /\, and replacing "very" with IjI, 
and for each individual term t of L add the pair of production rules. 
t ~ t and t' ~ t. 
This leads to a language of the kind defined in §2.1.3. As an example 
of a formula in this language: 
expresses the proposition (which might or might not be true) that "young" 
is not semantically equivalent with the antonym of "old" if and only if 
"old" is not semantically equivalent with the antonym of "young." 
The special O-ary relation symbols K may be used to express such r 
assertions as "the individual a is .7 young" in an eqll:ivalence of the 
form 
a(a) ~ K. r 
This is based on the interpretations of the K defined formally below. r 
§3.2. Semantic Interpretations 
The semantics to be used in this chapter and the next shall consist 
of all possible interpretations of the following kind for all languages 
of the kind described in §3.1. This section follows the pattern of 
§2.1. 2. 
§3.2.1. Definition 
An interpretation I for a language L has: 
I. A universe, UI • For each individual in UI , there is assumed to be a 
unique individual name which serves as the name of that particular 
individual. The notation "i" then denotes the name of the individual -
whose corresponding denotation is i. The language that is obtained 
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from L by adjoining all the names of the individuals in Ul is denoted 
by L(I). 
2. Meaning assignments: 
a. To each individual constant a of L, assignment of an individual 
l(a) in Ur For each individual name i of L(I), it is always "" 
understood that l(!)=i, i.e., that I assigns to each name the 
unique individual of which it is the name. 
b. To each n-ary fuzzy relation symbol a of L, assignment of an 
c. 
n-ary fuzzy relation I(a) in UI . This is equivalent to specify-
ing a membership function ~i(a):Uln~[O,l]. In particular, for each 
special O-ary fuzzy relation symbol K (if indeed there are any r 
among the proper symbols of L), one might define I(Kr ) by ~I{K )(i)=r r·· 
for all individuals ieUI ; this is to be regarded as a typical 
assignment, however, and not mandatory for every interpretation I. 
To each n-ary hedge s~abol ~ in L, assignment of an n-ary opera-
tion I(~) on fuzzy relations in UI such that, if L1, ... ,Ln are 
well-defined fuzzy relations in UI , then I(~)(Ll, ... ,Ln) is a 
well-defined fuzzy relation in Ul . This is equivalent to speci-
fying a function Fl(~) such that 
~l (tI.) ( ) ( •••• )=FI ("') (~ (. .. ) , ... ,~ ( ... ) ) . ~ L1,···,Ln ~ Ll Ln 
3. Valuations: all mappings I: {closed linguistic assertions and formulas 
of L(I)}~[O,I] such that 
a. I(a(t1,···,tn)) = ~I(a)(I(tl)' ... ' l(tn)) 
b. I(~p) = I-I(p) 
c. I(pvq) = max[I(p),I(q)] 
d. I(pAq) = min[I(p),I(q)] 
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[: if I(p) = I(q) g. I(p~q) = if not 
h. I(,P) = l-I(P) 
i. I(PVQ) = max[I(P),I(Q)]. 
An I-instance of an expression e of L(I) is a closed expression of 
the form e(i!, ..• 'in/x!, •.. ,xn) where i l , .. · ,in are individua~s in Ur 
A formula P of L(I) is valid in I (Notation: IFP) if I(P')=! for every 
I-instance P' of P. 
Note that an interpretation I for a language L is uniquely det~r-
mined by specifying a universe UI and assigning a specific meaning in 
that universe to each proper symbol of L. 
§3.2.2. Remark 
Throughout Chapters 3 and 4 we consider only the case that the 
relations being formalized in a particular language L are relations on 
the same universe of discourse (c.f. §2.2.5). The situation of multiple 
universes is easily accommodated, however, as shown in Chapter 5. 
§3.2.3. Example 
Continuing the example of §3.l.4, let UI be the set of ages from 0 
to 100; let ~I(a) and ~I(~) be any membership functions ~y and ~O such 
that "young" and "old" are antonyms (cf. §2.2.5) and let 1(11)) be the 
"very" operator of §2.2.3, defined by FI (I1»(I(P))=(I(p))2 This specifies 
one of the (infinitely many) possible semantic interpretations of LA . ge 
In this particular interpretation, ~y and ~O will be related by ~y=l-~O' 
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so that all formulas of the forms a(t)~p(t) and p(t)~a(t) are valid in 
I--thus capturing the fact that in this case "young" is semantically 
equivalent with "not old" and "old" is semantically equivalent with "not 
young." It follows by the definition of ":" that the formula (a(x)~p(x»: 
(P(x)~(x» is valid in I. 
If the symbols a and K.7 are adjoined to L, and I(K. 7) is defined 
by ~I(K )(i)=.7, for all ieUI , then if a is such that ~y(I(a»=.7, .7 
we have that the formula a(a)~K.7 is valid in I. 
§3.2.4. Remark 
The assignments and valuations of an interpretation I for a language 
L induce the assignment of a unique fuzzy relation in UI to each open 
linguistic assertion of L, according to: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
For m~O, ~I( ( )(i1, ... ,i) is a restriction of a a1, ..• ,am,x1, ... ,xn n 
~I(a)' considered as a function of jl'··· ,jm,jm+l'··· ,jm+n' to. the 
variables jm+l, ... ,jm+n (and hence is a uniquely defined membership 
function), 
~I(~p) = l-~I(p)' 
~I(pvq) = max[~I(p)'~I(q)] 
~I(pAq) = min[~I(p)'~I(q)]' 
~I($(Pl'.··'Pn» = FI($)(~I(Pl)'···'~I(Pn»' 
where it is understood that, for example, if ~I(p) is a function of two 
variables i 1,i2 and if ~I(q) is a function of i 2,i3 , then ~I(pvq) will 
be a function of the three variables i 1,i2,i3. 
This establishes that every open linguistic assertion may be 
thought of as an n-ary linguistic term, for some number n. 
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§3.3. Axioms and Inference Rules 
This section describes the basic proof-theoretic mechanism for the 
linguistic theories to be defined in §3.4. 
§3.3.1. Logical Axioms And Logical Inference Rules 
These shall consist of the following categories of formulas and 
mappings of formulas, where "formula" here refers to the entire class as 
defined in §3.1: 
1. Hilbert and Ackermann's (1928) axiomatization of the propositional 
calculus: all formulas having the forms 
a. (PVP):)P 
b. P:»(PVQ) 
c. (PVQ)=(QVP) 
d. (P::»Q)~( (RVPp(R'IQ)) 
together with modus ponens: from P and P~Q infer Q. 
2. Axioms for equality of individuals: all formulas having the forms 
a. x=x 
b. xl=Yl~(x2=Y2~(xl=x2~Yl=Y2)) 
c. xl=YlJ(···~(xn=Yn~a(xl, ... ,xn)~a(Yl' ... 'Yn)) ... ). 
3. Axioms for equality of linguistic terms: all formulas having the 
forms 
a. p~p 
b. Pl~ql~(P2~q2J(Pl~P2=ql~q2)) 
c . p~q::l"'P~q 
d. Pl~ql~(P2~q2~(PlvP2~qlvq2)) 
e. Pl~ql~(P2~q2~(PIAP2~ql~q2)) 
f. Pl~ql~(···~(pn~~~$(Pl, ... 'Pn)~$(ql, ... ,qn)) ... ). 
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4. Substitution rule: from P infer P(t1, ... ,tn/x1, ... ,xn). 
5. Axioms for a de Morgan lattice (Rasiowa 1974, p. 38): all equations 
having the forms 
a. pvq~qvp 
b. pv(qvr)~(pvq)vr 
c. pV(qAp)~q 
d. pv(qAr)~(pvq)A(pvr) 
e. """P~p 
f. "'(pvq)~"'p""'q 
pAq~q"p 
pl\ (qAr )~(pAq)1\ r 
pJ\(pvq)~p 
pl\(qvr)~(pJ\q)v(pJ\r) 
(commutativity) 
(associativity) 
(absorption) 
(distributivity) 
(involution) 
(de Morgan's Laws) 
6. Linear-ordering criterion: all formulas having the forms 
The latter pair of axiom forms are so named because in the context 
of any semantic interpretation they assert that the truth values in 
[0,1] form a linearly ordered set. These axioms playa crucial role in 
the completeness proofs of Chapter 4. 
§3.3.2. Inference Rules In General 
In §2.1 was mentioned the idea of an inference rule being "validity 
preserving." We may now provide this idea with a precise definition. An 
inference rule will be regular if every instance (H1, ... ,Hn,C) satisfies: 
for every interpretation I of any language L which contains H1, ... ,Hn , and C, 
if IFH. for all i=l, ... ,n, then IFC. 
~ 
It is easily verified that modus ponens and the substitution rule 
are regular. An important use of the concept of regularity is established 
in Proposition 3.4.2-3. 
§3.4. Theories and Models 
We are now in a position to define the desired class of formal 
logical systems. This follows the methods of §2.1.4. 
§3.4.1. Linguistic Theories 
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A theory T of zero, one or more linguistic variables is comprised 
of: 
1. A language, L(T): a formal language of the kind described in §3.1.1, 
2. Axioms: (i) the set of all logical axioms (§3.3.1), that are formulas 
of L(T), together with (ii) an empty or nonempty set of specially 
chosen formulas of L(T), to serve as proper axioms of T, 
3. Inference rules: (i) the logical inference rules--modus ponens and 
the substitution rule--together with (ii) an empty or nonempty set 
of specially chosen proper rules of T, 
4. Theorems: the axioms of T, together with all formulas of L(T) that 
can be derived from these axioms by means of the inference rules 
of T. 
It follows that a theory is specified by selecting a specific 
language L(T), and specific sets of proper axioms and proper rules. 
Proper axioms are normally used to express how certain proper symbols of 
L(T) are interrelated (see the example in §3.4.3) and proper rules 
might be used to express special modes of inference (cf. Chapter 5). 
The minimal theory will be the theory whose language is the minimal 
language, and which has no proper axioms or rules. 
The criteria for a formula P of L(T) to have a proof in T (Notation: 
T~P) are given in §2.1.5.1. 
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Proposition 3.4.1-1. A formula P of L(T) is a theorem of T if and 
only if n·p. 
Proof. By Proposition 2.1.5.1-1. 0 
It is well-known that a formula of L(T) becomes a formula of the 
propositional calculus if we treat atomic formulas as if they were 
propositional variables. This leads to the following. 
Proposition 3.4.1-2 (Tautology Theorem). If a formula P of L(T) 
is tautology of the propositional calculus, then T~P. If P is a tauto-
logical consequence of P1, •.. ,Pn , and if Tt-Pi , for all i=l, .... ,n, then 
T~P. 
Proof. (D~tails are omitted; see Shoenfield 1967, p. 27). The 
first assertion follows from the fact that the axioms and inference . 
rules of T include those described in §3.3.1-1. The second assertion is 
a corollary. 0 
A contradiction in T will be a formula of L(T) having the form 
P&~P. Then consistency for T is as defined in §2.1.5.2. 
It happens that, for any formulas P and Q of L(T), Q is a tauto-
logical consequence of P&,P. By the tautology theorem, this implies 
that a theory T is consistent if and only if there is at least one 
formula Q of L(T) such that T~Q. Thus r is consistent if and only if it 
is coherent (c.f. §2.1.5.2). This means that the formal theories defined 
in this section, when viewed at the "outer level," are Aristotelean in the 
sense defined in §2.1.5.4. 
§3.4.2. Semantic Models 
The definition of a model of a theory T and of validity in leT) is 
given by §2.1.6. We may reitterate Proposition 2.1.6-1 in this context. 
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Proposition 3.4.2-1 (Validity Theorem). If T~P, then I(T)FP. 
Proof. Immediate, by the definition of model. 0 
This gives the following. 
Proposition 3.4.2-2. A theory T is consistent if it has a model. 
Proof. Suppose that T is inconsistent, say T~P&'P. Since a 
formula of the form P&,P cannot be valid in any interpretation of L(T) 
(a consequence of the definition of "&"), Proposition 3.4.2-1 implies 
that T has no models. Thus if T has a model, it must be consistent. 0 
Proposition 3.4.2-3. If the proper inference rules of ~ theory T 
are regular rules, then an interpretation I for L(T) is a model of T if 
and only if every proper axiom of T is valid in I. 
Proof. Since axioms of Tare theorems of T, it is obvious tha~, 
if 1I=T, then IFP for every proper axiom P. Suppose that an interpreta-
tion I is such that I~P for every proper axiom P. It is easily verified 
that I~P for every logical axiom of T. It has been noted that the' 
logical rules are regular (§3.3.2). Thus, all axioms of T are valid in 
I, and all inference rules of T always act so that validity is preserved. 
It follows by the definition of "theorem" that if P is a theorem of T, 
then II=P. 0 
Proposition 3.4.2-4. The minimal theory is consistent. 
Proof. Let T be the minimal theory. By Proposition 3.4.2-3, 
every interpretation I of L(T) is a model of T. Hence T is consistent 
by Proposition 3.4.2-2. 0 
§3.4.3. Example 
A formal theory T of the linguistic variable "Age" may be Age 
specified as follows. Let L(TA ) be the language LA of §3.1.4. ge ge 
Let TA have as its only proper axiom, the formula a(x)~~~(x). Then ge 
the interpretation I of §3.2.2 will be a model of T, by Proposition 
3.4.2-3. 
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Since the squaring function, used to define the "very" operator, 
is not definable in terms of 1-, max, and min, there is no formula of 
L(TAge) which explicitly defines ~ as such. However, an approximation 
of the "very" operator can be introduced through proper axioms of the 
form 
which asserts that the truth value of ~(p) is strictly less than the 
truth value of p. Since this property is satisfied by the squaring 
function on [0,1], it follows that the same interpretation I of L(TA ) ge .. 
would be a model of the extended system that is obtained by adjoining 
all formulas of the above form as further proper axioms. This also 
shows, that the extended system may have different models, based on 
different meaning assignments for~. Further, different models of TA ge 
may be obtained by altering the definitions of lea) and l(~), subject to 
the requirement that ~I(a)=l-~I(~). Last, different models of TAge may 
be obtained by moving to completely different universes of discourse. 
This means that the theory of a given linguistic variable may sometimes 
be used to capture the logic of that variable over several different 
universes. 
As one adds further proper axioms, however, the class of models 
becomes more restricted. It is possible, for example, to require that 
the universes of all models have exactly 100 elements. This may be 
accomplished in the case of TAge by adjoining some individual constants 
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a1,a2, ... ,a100 to L(TAge), and adjoining as proper axioms a formula of 
the form 
x=a1Vx=a2V ••• Vx=a100 
together with all formulas 
,(a.=a.) 
1 J 
for i~j. 
The models of this extension of TA would then differ essentially only ge 
in their variations on the interpretations of a, ~, and ~. 
One may furthermore delimit the relevant set of truth values by 
means of the O-ary fuzzy relation symbols Kr . For example, to limit 
the set to just five values {0.0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0}, include the symbols 
KO.O' KO. 25 ' KO.5 ' KO. 75 ' K1•O as proper symbols of L(T), and add as 
proper axioms the formulas 
K.75VKl.0~Kl.0' 
which rank order the five values, together with the formulas 
~KO.O~Kl.O 
~KO.25~KO.75 
~KO.5~KO.5 
which describe their interrelations. Then for every n-ary relation 
symbol a of L(T) add the formula 
a(xl,···,Xn)~KO.OV •• ·Va(xl,···,Xn)~K1.0· 
It will follow that every semantic model of T treats each Kr as if it 
were the number r in [0,1], and effectively uses only these five numbers 
as truth-values. 
CHAPTER 4 
SEMANTIC COMPLETENESS 
The results established in this chapter show that the logical 
axioms and inference rules of §3.3 exactly capture the logic which is 
inherent in the multivalent interpretations of the fuzzy Boolean connec-
tives (§2.2.5 and §2.2.8) and the concept of semantic equiv&lence as 
equality of fuzzy sets (§2.2.5). Following Shoenfield (1967, pp. 41ff), 
semantic completeness may be expressed in two forms: 
First Form: For any theory T and formula P of L(T), if ~(T)FP then 
TI-P. 
Second Form: For any theory T, if T is consistent then T has a 
model. 
The former is the converse of the validity theorem (Proposition 
3.4.2-1), and the latter is the converse of Proposition 3.4.2-2. Both 
of these forms will be established here for linguistic theories, using 
an adaptation of some algebraic methods which were developed by myself 
and my master's thesis advisor, S. K. Thomason, for establishing semantic 
completeness for a class of "free-variable theories" (Schwartz 1973). 
This in turn is an adaptation of some methods of Rasiowa and Sikorsky 
(1963) . 
As motivation for this approach, let us contrast it with the 
standard approach for "first-order theories" as recorded in Shoenfield 
(1967). Shoenfield's first step is to reduce the first form to the 
second by means of a "Reduction Theorem for Consistency": If T~P, and if 
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P' is the "universal closure" of P, then the simple extension T[,P'] is 
consistent. Given this theorem, one then argues as follows. Suppose 
that T~P. Then T[~P'] has a model I by the second form of the complete-
ness theorem. Because P' is an axiom of T[,P'], P' is valid in I. It 
follows that P is not valid in I. But I is also a model of T. So P is 
not valid in some model of T. Hence ~(T)~P. Thus, if I(T)FP, then T~P. 
To establish the second form, Shoenfield employs the methods of 
Henkin, which involves four preliminary results: (i) every first-order 
language L has a "cannonical interpretation" I which is built out of the 
syntactic elements of L by defining the individuals DI to be equivalence 
classes of individual constants of L (assuming that L indeed contains 
constants), (ii) for every theory T there is an inessential extension 
(in Shoenfield, a "conservative" extension) T which contains a special c 
constant for each closed instantiation 3xp in L(T), called a "Henkin 
Theory" (cf. Shoenfield for a precise definition), (iii) if a Henkin 
Theory T is proof-theoretically complete--i.e., for every closed P, 
either T~P or T~,P--then the cannonical interpretation for L(T) is a 
model of T, (iv) "Lindenbaum's Theorem," every consistent theory has a 
syntactically complete simple extension. 
Given these results, one proves the second form of the completeness 
theorem as follows. Suppose that T is consistent. Let T be the inessen-c 
tion extension of T given by (ii). Tc is consistent because the extension 
is inessential. Let T' be a syntactically complete simple extension of 
T , as given by (iv). T' happens to be a Henkin theory. So, by (iii), c 
the canonical interpretation I of L(T') is a model of T' 
(this I exists, i.e., has a nonempty universe, because Henkin theories 
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contain individual constants). It follows that the restriction of I to 
L(T) is a model of T. Thus, if T is consistent, then it has a model. 
Now the free-variable theories developed in Schwartz (1974) bear a 
resemblance to linguistic theories as studied in this dissertation in 
that they do not 'contain quantifiers and they admit proper inference 
rules (which happen to not be of any use in first-order systems). It 
turns out that, because of the use of proper rules, the above approach 
does not apply for such systems. For without prior explicit knowledge 
of these rules, one has no assurance that individual constants can be 
introduced into the language of T without upsetting the consistency of 
T. This difficulty is fatal to several different steps in the foregoing 
proof. For example, it happens that a universe UI can be built out 9f 
equivalence classes of individual variables (rather than constants), but 
"new" constants are still needed to serve as surrogate existential 
quantifiers in establishing the appropriate analogues of the reduction 
theorem for consistency and of Lindenbaum's theorem. 
These considerations suggest two possible alternate approaches: 
(i) place sufficiently many restrictions on proper inference rules to 
permit the introduction of new individual constants, or (ii) use an 
algebraic approach which altogether bypasses the need for such constants. 
The latter approach was chosen in Schwartz (1974) and has turned out to 
serve well also in this dissertation for dealing with the considerably 
more complex situation of two distinct linguistic levels together with a 
multivalent interpretation. 
The general strategy of this method may be outlined as follows. 
We appropriate the theory of Boolean algebras (§4.1) and consider the 
"Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra" rT of equivalence classes of formulas in the 
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language of a given theory T (§4.2). If T is consistent, then the 
equivalence classes of theorems of T are contained in one or more "ultra-
filters" a in fT. Any such a can be used to define a universe which 
uses equivalence classes of individual terms (i.e., variables or constants) 
as individuals (§4.3). There are furthermore definable equivalence 
classes of linguistic assertions, which turn out to form a separate 
algebra, having the form of a de Morgan lattice (§4.3). Then--the main 
step--one can define a "cannonical embedding" !J>a which embeds this 
, 
lattice in [0,1] in such a way that the lattice ordering is p~eserved 
(§4.3). This leads to the definition of the cannonical interpretations 
Ia for the language L(T) of any consistent T (§4.4). Some basic proper-
ties of the Ia are established in §4.5. Then the two completeness 
results are established in §4.6 as follows: (i) the second form is 
proved by showing that any cannonical interpretation of a consistent T 
is a model of T, (ii) the first form is proved by using algebraic' 
principles to show that if T~P, then a can be chosen in such a way that 
Ia is a model of T in which P is not valid, from which it follows that 
T~P if P is valid in every model of T. 
It is noteworthy that in (ii) the reduction theorem for consistency 
is absorbed by the use of Boolean algebra tlFact 4" (§4.1), and that in 
(i) Lindenbaum's Theorem is absorbed in the use of an ultrafilter, which 
is provided by Boolean "Fact 5." This exhibits the algebraic approach 
used here as having a versatility that is not shared by the standard 
syntactical proof methods. 
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§4.1. Boolean Algebras 
The contents of §4.1.1 and §4.1.2 are adapted from Rasiowa and 
Sikorski (1963). All page numbers indicate places in that book where 
the relevant items are discussed. 
§4.1.1. Definitions 
A Boolean algebra (p. 68) is a set f that is closed with respect 
to two binary operations (Notations: U and A) and one unary operation 
(Notation: -) which, for all a,p,yer, satisfy the following: 
1. aup = ~Va 
2. aU(pUy) = (aUp)Uy 
3. (aUp)l\~ = p 
4. a~(pVy) = (anp)U(any) 
5. (aU-a)np = p 
anp = pl\a 
af\(pl\a) = (af\~)ny 
(aOp)Vp = P 
aU(pny) = (aU~)n(aUy) 
(an-a)V~ = ~ 
Let r be a Boolean algebra. A non-empty subset a of r is a filter 
(p. 44, bottom) in r if, for all a,~ef, 
1. a,~ea implie~ anpe~, and 
2. aea implies aU~ea. 
A filter a in f is proper in f if a~r. A proper filter a in r is 
an ultrafilter in r if, for every proper filter a' in f, if ~~~', then 
A=A' (cf. "max1'mal" f1'lter p 46) ~ Q ,. • 
§4.1.2. Basic Facts 
Let f be a Boolean algebra. The following facts are cited without 
proof from Rasiowa and Sikorsky (1963), except Fact 10, which is derived. 
1. f contains a unit element (Notation: 1) defined by aU1=1 and an1=a, 
for all aef, and a zero element (Notation: 0) defined by aflO=O and 
..v '" '" 
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aUQ=a for all aero It follows that l=au-a and Q=an-a, for all aero 
(pp. 37 and 68). 
2. Every subset ~ of r generates a filter in r, namely, the inter-
section of all filters ~' in r such that ~c~' (p. 45). 
3. A filter ~ is proper in r iff Qt~ (p. 46). 
4. If ~ is a proper filter in r and at~, then the filter generated by 
the set ~U{-a} is a proper filter in r (p. 79). 
5. Every proper filter is contained in an ultrafilter, i.e., if ~ is a 
proper filter in r, then there exists an ultrafilter ~' in r such 
that ~CA' (p. 46). 
6. If ~ is an ultrafilter in r, then, for all aer, either ae~ or -ae~ 
and not both (pp. 66-67). 
7. Let a=>p denote the complement of a relative to p, defined by 
a=>p = -aUp. Then a subset a of r is a filter in r if and only if: 
lea and, for all a,per, if ae~ and a=>pe~, then ~e~ (pp. 54 and 56). 
8. A nonempty subset a of r is a filter in r if and only if, for all 
a,~er, we have a,~e~ iff a~~e~ (p. 44). 
9. De Morgan's laws: for all a,per,-(av~)=-an-~ and -(a~~)=-aU-~ (p. 69). 
10. If ~ is an ultrafilter in r, then, for all a,per, aV~e~ iff either 
ae~ or pe~. 
Fact 10 may be established as follows. If either aea or ~e~, then 
aUPea by the definition of filter (§3.1.1). Thus, it remains to show 
that au~ea implies that either ae~ or ~ea. Suppose at~ and ~t~. Then, 
since a is an ultrafilter, -ae~ and -~ea by Fact 6. It follows by 
Fact 8 that -an-pe~. Then -(aU~)e~ by Fact 9. Hence ao~ta by Fact 6. 
This completes the proof, by contradiction. 
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§4.2. Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebras 
Let T be any theory; let P and Q be any formulas of L(T). Define: 
P"-Q iff T,,"P=Q. 
Proposition 4.2-1. "P"'Q" defines an equivalence relation on the 
set of formulas of L(T). 
Proof. (Details omitted.) By the tautology theorem, all three 
requirements for an equivalence relation are satisfied; i.e., (i) P"'P, 
(ii), if P"'Q, then QI\oP, and (iii) if P"'Q and Q"'R, then P"'R. 0 
Define: [p]={Qlp"-Q}, fT={[p]lp is a formula of L(T)}, and 
Ar={ [P] I Tt-P}. 
Proposition 4.2-2. fT is a Boolean algebra with respect to the 
operations U, n, and - defined by 
[P]U [Q] = [PVQ] 
[P]t\[Q] = [P&Q] 
-[P] = hP] . 
Proof. By the tautology theorem, all the equations 1 through 5 
sited in §4.1.1 are satisfied. For example, PVQ=QVP is a tautology; so 
T"'PVQ=QVP. Then PVQI\oQvP; so [PVQ]=[QVP]. Hence [P]V[Q]=[P]V[Q]. This 
verifies equation 1. 0 
Proposition 4.2-3. The set Ar is a filter in fT' 
Proof. This makes use of Boolean algebra Fact 7 (§4.1.2). (a) By 
the tautology theorem, T"P~'P; so l=[P]U-[p]eAr. (b) Observe that 
[~Q]=[P]=>[Q], by the definition of ":)" and "=>"; it follows by modus 
ponens that, if [p]eAr and if [P]=>[Q]eAr, then [Q]eAr. 0 
Proposition 4.2-4. The set Ar is a proper filter in fT if and 
only if T is consistent. 
Proof. The set Ar is a filter in fT by Proposition 4.2-3. By 
Boolean algebra Fact 3, Ar is proper in fT if and only if QtAr; and 
Q=[p]n-[p]=[P&,P]tAr iff T is consistent. 0 
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The Boolean algebra fT is commonly referred to as the 
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for T. Rasiowa and Sikorski (1963, pp. 20 ff) 
uses ideas similar to the above in application to several different kinds 
of systems. A more recent treatment is Rasiowa (1974). 
§4.3. Canonical Embeddin&! 
Throughout this section, let T be any consistent theory; let [p], 
fT' and Ar be as in §4.2; in accordance with Proposition 4.2-4 and 
Boolean algebra Fact 5, let A be any ultrafilter in fT such that Ar~A. 
Define: t~t' iff [t=t']eA, where t and t' are any individual terms of 
L(T); let [t]={t'lt'~t} 
Proposition 4. 3-1. "t~t "' defines an equivalence relation on the 
set of individual terms of L(T). 
Proof. This makes use of the axioms for equality of individuals 
and the substitution rule. We consider the three criteria of an equiva-
lence relation as follows. 
1. Pick any axiom of the form x=x (§3.2.1-2.a). Then T~t=t by the 
substitution rule; so [t=t]eAr. Hence [t=t]eA; so t~t. 
2. The formula t=t'~(t=t~(t=t~t'=t)) is a substitution instance of an 
axiom of the form 2.b (§3.2.1). Hence we have that 
([t=t']=>([t=t]~([t=t]=>[t'=t])))eAr~A. We also have that [t=t]eA, 
as demonstrated in (1). Thus if [t=t']eA, then, by three applica-
tions of Boolean algebra Fact 7, we have that [t'=t]eA. Therefore, 
if t~t', then t'~t. 
3. Similar to (2), using the formula t=t!)(t'=t":>(t=t':)t=t")) to show 
that, if t"'t' and t''''t'', then t"'t". 0 
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Define: p"'q iff [p~q]£a, where p and q are any linguistic assertions 
of L(T); let [p]={qlq"'P}. 
Proposition 4.3-2. "p"'q" defines an equivalence relation on the 
set of linguistic assertions of L(T). 
Proof. Similar to Proposition 4.3-1, using axioms for equality of 
linguistic terms (§3.3.1-3), forms a and b. 0 
Define: x={[p]lp is a linguistic assertion of L(T)}. 
Pro~osition 4.3-3. The set X is a de Morgan lattice 
operations V, n, and - defined by 
[p]U[q] = [pvq) 
[p)f\[q] = [p"q] 
-[p] = ["'p]. 
Proof. By the axioms listed in §3.3.1-5. 0 
Since X is a lattice, the relation ~ defined by 
[p]~[q] iff [p]U[q]=[q] 
is a partial ordering of X (Rasiowa, p. 39). 
under 
Proposition 4.3-4. "[p]~[q]" is a linear ordering of X. 
the 
Proof. It is required to show that, for all [p] and [q], either 
[p]~[q) or [q]~[p]. Suppose that [p]~[q). Then [p)v[q]#[q], by defini-
tion of "~"; so [pvq~q)ta. Then, since a is an ultrafilter, -[pvq~q]ea, 
by Boolean algebra Fact 6. By the linear-ordering axioms (§3.3.1-6) and 
the tautology theorem, T~,(pvq~q)~(pvq~p). It follows that 
-[pvq~q]=>[pvq~p)ea; so an application of Boolean algebra Fact 7 yields 
that [pvq~p)ea. This implies that [p]V[q)=[p); whence [q]V[p)=[p], 
since X is a lattice (axiom form 5.a). Hence [q)~[p). 
Similarly, if [q]~[p], then [p]~[q]. Thus, necessarily, either 
[p]~[q] or [q]~[p]. 0 
Now let < be the strict ordering of X defined by 
[p]<[q] iff [p]~[q] and [p]~[q]. 
Then, for each [p], exactly one of the following must hold: 
1. -[p] < [p], or 
2. -[p] = [p], or 
3. -[p] > [pl. 
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Let Xl' X2 ' X3 ' respectively, be the sets of [p] that satisfy. 1, 2, and 
3. Clearly, X=X1UX2VX3 (where here V is ordinary set union). Define: 
a mapping $A:X~[O,l] as follows: 
1. $A:X1~(\,1] is any <-preserving embedding; i.e., if [p]<[q], the~ 
$A([P])<r$A([q]), where <r is the usual strict ordering of the reals, 
2. $A:X2~[\]' 
3. $A:X3~[O,\) is defined by $A([P])=l-$A([~P])' where [~p]eXl' 
This mapping $A will be the canonical embedding based ~ A. 
Proposition 4.3-5. The mapping $A is well-defined. 
Proof. Well-definedness requires that, if [p]=[q], then 
$A([P])=$A([q])· Consider $A(XI ), The set Xl has cardinality ~~1' 
the first uncountable cardinal, since we have required the cardinality 
of L(T) to be ~t1 in §2.1.3. Observe that Xl is linearly ordered by 
<. It is easily established that any linearly ordered set having cardi-
nality less than or equal to ~1 can be embedded in any subinterval of 
the reals. Thus, a well-defined mapping of the kind $(X1) exists. 
It is obvious that ~A(X2) is well-defined. Consider ~A(X3)' If 
[P]eX3' then [p]<-[p], by definition of X3. But [p]=--[p],. because X is 
a de Morgan lattice; and -[p]=[~p], by definition of - Hence -[~p]<[~p]; 
so [~]eXI' It follows that ~a(X3) is well-defined because ~a(XI) is 
well-defined. 0 
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Proposition 4.3-6. The mapping ~a is a <-preserving embedding of 
X in [0,1]. 
Proof. Consider each possible way of choosing [p] and [q] from 
Xl' X2, X3 · For example, if [p] and [q] are both in X3 , and [p]<[q], 
then [~p] = -[p] > -[q] = [~q]ex; so that ~~([-P]»~a([~q]), which gives 
~a([p]) = I-~~([~p]) < I-~a([~q]) = ~a([q])· 0 
Proposition 4.3-7. For all p and q, 4lA([P])=~a([q]) if~ [p]=[q]. 
Proof. If [p]=[q], then ~a([p])=$~([q]), by Proposition 4.3-5. 
Thus, it remains to show that ~~ is one-to-one. Suppose that [p]~[q]. 
By Proposition 4.3-4, either [p]~[q] or [q]~[p]. Thus, by the defin~tion 
of <, either [p]<[q] or [q]<[p]. But, in either case, ~a([p])~$a([q]), 
by Proposition 4.3-6. Therefore, if $a([p])=$a([q]), then [p]=[q]. 0 
§4.4. Canonical Interpretations 
Let T be a consistent theory; let rT be the Lindenbaum-Tarski 
algebra for T; let ~ be any ultrafilter in rT, such that ~ca; let $~ be 
the canonical embedding based on ~, as described in §4.3. 
The canonical interpretation for L(T) based on a (Notation: I~) 
may be defined in accordance with §4.2: 
1. UI ={[t]lt is an individual term of L(T)}, where [t] is defined in a 
terms of a as in §4.3, 
2. For each individual constant a of L(T), assign I~(a)=[a], 
3. for each n-ary fuzzy relation symbol a of L(T), define Ia(a) by 
j.lI~ (a) ([t I ] , ... , [tn] )=$a ([a(ti"'" t~)]), 
where each t~ is any representative from the equivalence class [t.], 
1 1 
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4. for each n-ary hedge symbol ~, define IA(~) by 
~A([~(P1""'Pn)])' where P1"",Pn 
are linguistic assertions of L(T) such that 
~A([p.])=r., for all i=l, ... ,n, 
1 1 
assuming such p. exist, 
1 
o if, for some i, no such p. exists. 
1 
Notation: If some individuals in UI are denoted by [t], [a], and [x], A 
then their respective individual names in L(T) (IA) will be denoted by 1, 
a and x. - -
Proposition 4.4-1. The universe UI is well-defined. A 
Proof. The equivalence class [t] is well-defined, by Proposition 
4.3-1. 0 
Proposition 4.4-2. For each individual constant a of L(T), IA(a) 
is well-defined. 
Proof. The equivalence class [a] is well-defined, by Proposition 
4.3-1. 0 
Proposition 4.4-3. For each fuzzy relation symbol a, IA(a) is 
well-defined. 
Proof. It is required to show that, if [t1]=[t1'], ... ,[tn]=[tn '], 
then ~IA(a)([t1], ... ,[tn])=~IA(a)([t1,],.·.,[tn'])' If [ti]=[ti '], 
then t.~t.', which means that [t.=t.']eA. Observe that the formula 
1 1 1 1 
t1=t1'~(···~(tn=tn'~a(tl, ... ,tn)~(t1' , ... ,tn '»···) may be inferred from 
an axiom of the form 2.c, by means of the substitution rule. It follows 
that [t1=t1']=>(···=>([tn=tn']=>[a(t1, ... ,tn)~(t1' , ... ,tn')])···)eA. 
Then [a(t1, ... ,tn)~(t1', ... ,tn')]eA by Boolean algebra Fact 7, so 
[a(t1,···,tn)]=[a(t1',···,tn ')]· Then ~A([a(t1, ... ,tn)])= 
~A([a(t1' , ... ,tn ')]), by Proposition 4.3.7. Hence ~IA(a)([t1], ... ,[tn])= 
~I (a)([t1'],···,[tn ']), by definition of ~I(a) (§4.4-3). 0 II 
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Proposition 4.4-4. For each n-ary special operator symbol $, Ill ($) 
is well-defined. 
Proof. Suppose that r1=r1 ' , ... ,rn=rn', with ri,ri'e[O,l], and 
assume that there exist p. such that $.([p.])=r., for all i=l, ... ,n. 
111 1 
(If no such p. exists for some i, then there is nothing to prove; 
1 
FIll($)(rl,···,rn)=O=FIll($)(rl' , ... ,rn '), by definition of FIll
($).) 
Suppose that p.' , ... ,p , are such that $A([P. '])=r.' for all i=l, ... ,n. 
1 n u 1 1 
Then $ll([Pi])=$ll([Pi']); so [Pt]=[Pi'], by Proposition 4.3-7. Hence 
[Pi~Pi']ell, for all i=l, ... ,n. Observe that the formula Pl~Pl'~ 
( ••• ~(p ~p '~$(Pl""'P )~$(Pl' , .•. ,p ')) ... ) is an axiom of the n n n n 
form 3.f. It follows that [Pl~Pl']=>(···=>([pn~Pn']=>[$(Pl""'Pn) 
~$(Pl""'Pn)])"') is in ll. Then n applications of Boolean algebra 
Fact 7 yields that [$(Pl""'Pn)~$(Pl' " .. ,Pn')]ell. Then [$(Pl""'Pn)]= 
[$(Pq, ... ,Pn ')]; so $ll([$(Pl,· .. ,Pn')])=$ll([$(P1' "",Pn')]), by Proposi-
tion 4.3-7. Hence FI($)(rl, ... ,rn)=FI($)(rl' , ... ,rn'). This is what we 
needed to show. 0 
Note that if T is not consistent, then no such interpretation III 
can exist. For, if T is not consistent, Ar=rT, so that there is no 
ultrafilter II in fT such that ~e~ (recall that an ultrafilter must be a 
proper filter); whence there is no canonical embedding $ll as required in 
the definition of Ill' 
§4.5. Preliminary Results 
Proposition 4.5-1. Let T be a consistent theory, and let III be 
any canonical interpretation for LeT). For any linguistic assertions P 
and q of LeT), 
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1. ~a([~p]) = 1-~a([p]), 
2. ~a([pvq]) = max[(~a([p])'~a([q])], 
3. ~a([pAq]) = min[(~a([p])'~a([q])], 
where ~a is the canonical embedding associated with la. 
Proof. Let p and q be any linguistic assertions of L(T). Let X 
be as in Proposition 4.3-6. 
1. To show that ~a([~p])=I-~a([p]), consider three cases. 
Case a: [~p]eXl. Then -[~p]<[~p], which means that [p]<-[p]. 
Then [p]ex3, and ~a([p])=I-~a([~p]), by definition of ~a(X3).' Solving 
for ~a([~p]) gives the desired equation. 
Case b: [~p]eX2. Then -[~p]=[~p], and ~a(-[~p])~a([~p])=~. But 
[p]=-[~p], so ~a([p])=~. This yields ~a([~p])=~I-~=l-~a([p])· 
Case c: [~p]eX3. Then ~a([~p])=I-~a([~])' by definition of 
~a(X3)· But ["""p]=[p]; so ~a([~p]=I-~a([p])· 
2. From the fact that X is a lattice, we have that, for any [p] and [q], 
[p]~[p]U[q] and [q]~[p]U[q] (i) 
(cf. Rasiowa, p. 39). From the fact that "~" is a linear ordering 
(Proposition 3.3-4), we have that either 
[p]=[p]U[q] or [q]=[p]V[q]. (ii) 
Since ~a is <-preserving and one-to-one (Propositions 4.3-6 and 4.3-7), 
(i) and (ii) together imply that ~a([p]V[q])=max([~a([p])'~a([q])). 
Since [pvq]=[p]V[q], by definition of U, this gives ~a([pvq])= 
max[~a([p])'~a([q])]· 
3. Similar to (2). 0 
Proposition 4.5-2. Let T and la be as in Proposition 4.5-1; let p 
be any linguistic assertion of L(T); and let p(t1, ... ,t ) be any ,.., ~ 
lA-instance of p (where the notation t. is as in §4.4): Then 
L.lo ""J. 
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Ia(P(~I""'1n) = ~a([P(tl,···,tn)])· 
Proof: We use mathematical induction on the length of linguistic 
assertions. 
Case 1: p atomic, of the form a(t!, ... ,t~). We may assume without 
loss of generality that all the t~ are individual variables, so that 
J. 
p(t1, ... ,t) is in this case a(t1, ... ,t). Then we have the following: "" "'Il ""-n 
Ia(a(~I" .. ,~) = ~I (a)(I(~I),···,I(1n)) 
a 
= ~Ia(a)([tl],···,[tn]) 
= ~a([a(tl,···,tn)])· 
Case 2: p of the form ~q. 
Ia(~q(~l""'1n)) = l-Ia(q(~I""'!n) 
= 1-~a([q(tl,···,tn)]) 
= ~a([~q(tl,···,tn)]) 
Case 3: p of the form qvr. 
Ia(q(~I,···,~)vr(!l'···'1n)) 
= max[Ia(q[~I""'1n)),Ia(r(~I""'1n))] 
= max($a([q(t1,···,tn)]),$a([r(t1,···,tn])) 
= ~a([q(tl,···,tn)vr(tl,···,tn)]) 
Case 4: p of the form qAr. Similar to Case 3. 
(3.2.1-3.a) 
(3.2.1-2.a) 
(4.4-3) 
(4.2.1-3.6) 
(Ind. Hyp.) 
(Prop. 4.5-1.1) 
(3.2.1-3.c) 
(Ind. Hyp.) 
(Prop. 4.5-1.2) 
Case 5: p of the form ~(Pl(!I""'1n)""'Pm(~I""'1n»)' ~ m-ary. 
Ia(~(Pl(~I""'1n)"",Pm(~I""'1n))) 
= FI (~)(Ia(Pl(!I'···'1n)),···,Ia(pm(~I"··'1n))) (3.2.1-3.e) 
a 
= Fla(~)(~a([Pl(tl, ... ,tn)]), ... ,$a([Pm(tl, ... ,tn)]) (Ind. Hyp.) 
= FI (~)(rl,···,r ), where r.=$A([p.(t1, ... ,t )]) (Notation) a n J.u J. n 
= ~a([~(Pl(tl, ... ,tn)""'Pm(tl, ... ,tn»)])' (4.4-4) 
This is what we are required to show. 0 
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Proposition 4.5-3. Let T and I~ be as in Proposition 4.5-1; let P 
be any formula of L(T); let P(11"",ln) be any I~-instance of P. Then 
I~(P(11""'ln)=1 iff [P(t1,···,tn}]e~. 
Proof. We use mathematical induction on the length of formulas. 
Case 1: P atomic of the form t=t'. Then P(t1, ... ,t ) is of the form "" ""n 
a=b where a,b are either individual constants of L(T) or are names of 
individuals in U1 . Without loss of generality, assume that both are ~ 
names, so that P(t1, ... ,t ) is just t 1=t2. Then we have ".." ""'D. '" '" 
I~(11=12)=1 iff I~(11)=I~(12) 
iff [t1]=[t2] 
iff tl"'t2 
iff [t1=t2]e~. 
Case 2: P atomic of the form p~q. 
I~(p(11""'ln)~q(11""'ln))=1 
iff I~(p(11""'ln))=I~(q(11""'ln)) 
iff ~~([p(t1, ... ,tn)])=~a(rq(tl, ... ,tn)]) 
iff [p(t1, ... ,tn)]=[q(t1, ... ,tn)] 
iff p(t1, ... ,tn)"'q(t1, ... ,tn) 
iff [P(t1, ... ,tn)=q(t1, ... ,tn)]e~. 
Case 3: P of the form ,Q. 
Ia (,Q(11"",ln))=1 
iff Ia (Q(11"",ln))=O 
iff [Q(11"",ln)]ta 
iff -[Q(t1, ... ,tn)]ea 
iff ['Q(tl, ... ,tn)]e~. 
Case 4: P of the form Q R. 
(3.2.1-3.f) 
(3.2.2.1-2.a & §3.4) 
(def. [t], §4.3) 
(def. "', §3.3) 
(3.2~1-3.g) 
(Prop. 3.5-2) 
(Prop. 4.3-7) 
(def. [p], §4.3) 
(def. "', §4.3) 
(2.2.1-3.h) 
(Ind. Hyp.) 
(B. alg. Fact 6) 
(Prop. 4.2-2) 
iff either Ia (Q(11"",ln))=1 or Ia (R(11"",ln))=1 
iff either [Q(t1, ... ,tn)]ea or [R(t1, ... ,tn)]ea 
iff [Q(t1, ... ,tn)]U[R(t1, ... ,tn)]ea 
iff [Q(t1, ... ,tn)VR(t1, ... ,tn)]ea. 
This proves Proposition 4.5-3. 0 
§4.6. Completeness Theorems 
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(3.2.1-3.i) 
(Ind. Hyp.) 
(B. alg. Fact 10) 
(Prop. 4.2-2) 
Theorem 4.6-1. If T is a consistent theory and a is any ultra-
filter in fT such that Area, then Ia is a model of T. 
Proof. Let T and Ia be as specified; let P be any formula of L(T) 
such that TrP; let P(11"",ln) be any la-instance of P. By the defini-
tion of "model" (§3.4.2), it is sufficient to show that Ia (P(11"",ln)=1. 
Since TrP, we have that TI-P(tl"'" t n), by the substitution rule ... 
Then [P(t1, ... ,tn)]eAr~a, by definition of Ar; so Ia (P(11"",ln))=1, by 
Proposition 4.5-3. 0 
Corollary 4.6-1 (Second Form). Every consistent theory has a 
model. 
Proof. If T is consistent, then at least one canonical interpreta-
tion exists for L(T) (cf. §4.4). By the theorem, any canonical inter-
pretation for L(T) is a model of T. 0 
Theorem 4.6-2 (First Form). For any formula P of L(T), if ~(T)FP, 
then TI-P. 
Proof. Suppose that P is a formula of L(T) such that ~P. Then T 
is consistent (§3.4.1). Consider the filter Ar in fT' Since T~P, 
[P]tAr' Thus, by Boolean algebra Fact 4, the filter generated by the 
set ArV{-[P]} is a proper filter in fT' In accordance with Boolean 
algebra Fact 5, let a be any ultrafilter in rT such that ~O{-[p]}ca. 
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Let I6 be the canonical interpretation for L(T) based on~. Consider 
the I6-instance P(21""'2n) of P, where x1, ... ,xn are all the distinct 
individual variables that occur in P, i.e., where P is P(x1, ... ,xn). 
Then -[P(x1, ... ,xn)]=-[P]e6, by the choice of 6; so [~P(x1, ... ,xn)]e6, 
by definition of -. Hence, I6(~P(21""'2n))=1, by Proposition 4.5-3; 
so 16 (P(21""'2n))=O, by §3.2.1-3.h. Thus, we have shown that 16~P, 
But I6 is a model of T, by Theorem 4.6-1. Hence we have shown that 
~(T)~P. Since P was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that, for any P of 
L(T), if ~P, then I(T)~P. Hence:, if ~(T)FP, then T~P. 0 
CHAPTER 5 
EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS 
The results of Chapters 3 and 4 provide the basis for formalizing 
a wide variety of fuzzy set theoretic concepts within the framework of a 
semantically complete class of formal logical systems. Several of these 
concepts have already been discussed in the foregoing--e.g., linguistic 
terms, fuzzy Boolean connectives, and semantic equivalence. The present 
chapter deals with further concepts which may be similarly formalized, 
either within systems exactly as defined in Chapter 3, or through mo~ifi­
cations thereof. 
§5.1 discusses the situation of more than one linguistic variable 
operating simultaneously over a single universe of discourse. 
§5.2 describes the modifications necessary for generalization to 
multiple universes of discourse. 
§5.3 discusses fuzzy logic per se, as based on the idea of linguistic 
truth, and shows how two different versions--one old and one new--may be 
developed into semantically complete modes of reasoning. 
§5.4 explores very briefly the status of possibilistic reasoning 
within the present context. 
§5.5 delves into the formal characterization of alternative modes 
of fuzzy inference. 
§5.6 lays down sufficient conditions for a linguistic theory to be 
decideable, thereby ensuring its capacity for implementation on a finite 
state computer. 
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§S.l. Multiple Linguistic Variables Over A Single Universe 
The examples considered thus far have considered the representation 
of only a single linguistic variable within a formal theory T. However, 
the definitions laid down in Chapter 3 provide all the necessary apparatus 
for any finite or infinite number (~~l) of linguistic variables, as 
long as all those variables are intended to range over the same universe 
of discourse. The task of introducing mUltiple variables amounts only 
to that of developing a grammar which is appropriate for generating all 
of the desired linguistic terms. Once the grammar is establi~hed, then 
the formal theory of those variables may be obtained by including as 
proper axioms a set of formulas which express the manner in which the 
variables are interrelated. 
For example, suppose that we are discussing a concept of "good 
automobile," and it is decided that the criteria for "goodness" are that 
the auto be attractive, dependable, manuverable in traffic, reasonably 
priced, and fuel-economical. Then "goodness" would be analyzed as some 
logical combination of the linguistic variables "appearance," "reliabilty," 
"manuverability," "cost," and "efficiency." Formalization of this 
concept thus requires a language for six variables together with a 
grammar which is at least adequate to provide the formal definition of 
"goodness" in terms of the five criteria. 
To illustrate the latter, let a,a1, ... ,aS be unary relation 
symbols standing respectively for "good," "attractive," etc. If the 
property of goodness is thought of as just the simple conjunction of the 
five criteria, then the appropriate defining axiom would be 
a(x)~al(x)h ••• AaS(x), 
where x is any individual variable. 
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The axiomatic theory thus developed would have among its theorems 
all the formally derivable consequences of this definition. By semantic 
completeness, moreover, we have assurance that these consequences will 
be all and only the formulas which one would expect to be derivable in 
the context of a logic based on the multivalent theory of approximate 
reasoning. 
§S.2. Generalization To Multiple Universes Of Discourse 
It is oftentimes necessary to consider several universes of dis-
course simultaneously. For example, one might wish to discuss a compari-
son of the heights of trees, the heights of buildings, and the heights 
of mountains. In this case, even though the various heights may all be 
measured on the same scale--say, in meters--the meanings of "tall," 
"short," etc. will differ depending on the kind of object being measured. 
In order to express a proposition like "tall trees are shorter than tall 
buildings and tall buildings are shorter than tall mountains," one there-
fore needs to formally distinguish between the three kinds of objects 
within the same language, and as well, to allow for comparisons. 
A manner in which this can be accomplished is illustrated as 
follows. Consider a language which has three distinct sets of individual 
2 2 for trees, xl ,x2 , ... for buildings, and 
In addition, include in this language a binary 
relation ~ which allows its parameters to be individual variables of any 
of the three kinds. Then if Ci stands for "tall," and 13 is taken as the 
"shorter than" relation, the aforementioned proposition may be written 
as 
Ci(xl)Aa(x2)Aa(x3)~Mxl ,X2)A~(x2 ,x3), 
in words, "if xl (some tree) is tall, x2 (some building) is tall, and x3 
(some mountain) is tall, then xl is shorter than x2 and x2 is shorter 
than x3." Here -+ is a fuzzy inference as in §5.5. 
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To accommodate such a language, the earlier notion of semantic 
interpretation would be modified to have triples of universes (U~,Ui,Ui) 
and to have meaning assignments, together with a concept of "valid 
formula," as dictated by the structure of the language. 
The net result of developing this illustration into the general 
case will provide a new class of formal theories, together with a 
companion semantics, for which semantic completeness can be established 
by the same methods as employed in Chapter 4. 
§5.3. Linguistic Truth--Fuzzy Logics 
The subject of linguistic truth and the concept of a fuzzy set of.·· 
type 2 was discussed briefly in §2.2.9. The objective of treating 
"Truth" as a linguistic variable is to develop a formal means of encoding 
the everyday usage of truth-related discourse. This includes not only 
the primitives "true" and false," but also the somewhat more complex--and 
imprecisely intended--expressions like "very true," "more or less true," 
"not very true," etc. The desire to accommodate linguistic truth into a 
formal system of reasoning leads to fuzzy logic per se, which differs 
from the multivalent logic employed in Chapter 3 by having its truth 
values be fuzzy subsets of [0,1]. 
Haack (1979) has argued against the need for such a logic, suggest-
ing that sufficient imprecision is already provided by the multivalent 
approach. This argument is countered, however, by the fact that linguis-
tic truth nearly always appears in vivo as a linguistic variable, so 
that fuzzy logic is in actuality a more accurate rendering of the every-
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day reasoning with truth-related terms. Given that one of the chief 
anticipated uses of fuzzy linguistics is in machine intelligence--
specifically, improved man-machine interaction via natural language 
translation--this "naturalness" of fuzzy logic lends it a central posi-
tion in the work toward this goal. 
The present section recounts some of the earlier work that has 
been done in this area; it discusses how the best of these results may 
be formalized within a semantically complete class of formal logical 
systems; and it introduces a somewhat different, but perhaps more readily 
applicable approach to linguistic truth in general. 
§5.3.1. The Germinal Ideas--Basic Truth-Term.Connectives 
In developing "Truth" as a linguistic variable, Zadeh (1975b, . 
Part II, p. 334) proposes the following interpretations for the linguistic 
terms "true" and "false": 
0 for O;;i;x;;i;a 
J.lI(true) (x) = 2(x-a)2 for 
< <a+1 
I-a a=x=T 
1-2 (!:.!)2 
I-a 
f a+1< <1 or T=x= , 
where a is an arbitrarily chosen number in (0,1], and 
II (x) = J.I (I-x) for all xe[0,1]. ~I(false) I (true) 
These membership functions have graphs as shown in Figure 5-1. Thus 
depicted, they clearly represent intuitively plausible interpretations 
of "true" and "false" in that they assume high values in the appropriate 
regions of [0,1] and each is a mirror image--hence an antonym--of the 
other. 
0.5 - - -
l-a 
--r 
l-a a l+a 
-2-
--~-True 
Figure 5-1. Compatibility functions for "True" and "False." 
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A difficulty arises, however, in that the interpretations of the 
Boolean connectives given in §2.2.3 for general use with linguistic 
variables do not serve correctly in the special case of linguistic 
truth. For example, where common sense requires that "true and false" 
be reducible to "false," application of the "min" operator to I(true) 
and I(false) produces a fuzzy subset of [0,1] which is not even approxi-
mately equivalent to either I(false) or I(true). Similarly for terms 
involving "or" and "not." 
To rectify this problem, Zadeh therefore equips linguistic truth 
with its own set of connectives. Let T and T' be terms in the term set 
for "Truth," and suppose that their meaning assignments are the fuzzy 
subsets of [0,1] represented by 
T = f. a./x. and T' = f. fj./y .. 
1.1.1. JJJ 
Then the meaning of "not T" is given by 
-T = f. a./(l-x.), 
1. 1. 1. 
the meaning of "T or T'" is given by 
TVT' = f.. sup min[a. , fj.] /z, 
1.,J z=max[x.,y.] 1. J 
1. J 
and the meaning of "T and T'" is given by 
TI\T' = f.. sup min[a. ,fj.]/z. 
1.,J z=min [ x. , y . ] 1. J 
1. J 
These definitions furthermore suggest redefinition of linguistic hedges. 
For example, "very T" receives the interpretation 
2 very-T = f. a./x .. 
1. 1. 1. 
This yields many of the basic common sense requirements. In particular, 
where <-> expresses semantic equivalence, it turns out that 
true and false <-> false 
true or false <-> true 
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not true <-> false 
not false <-> true. 
However, when one considers arbitrary linguistic terms--i.e., arbitrary 
fuzzy subsets of [O,l]--two further difficulties are seen to persist. 
First is a problem noted by Haack (1979), that the term set for linguis-
tic truth is not algebraically closed under the above versions of "or" 
and "and." For example, a compound term like "not very true and not 
very false" will not in general be reducible to more elementary terms. 
Now, due to Yager (1979), this problem appears to be resolve4. by a 
simple and intuitively appealing form of linguistic approximation. 
Second is a somewhat more crucial problem: that of rank ordering 
the linguistic truth-terms according to a "more true than" relation . 
which is consistent with the everyday usage of "and" and "or." Generally, 
intuition requires that, for arbitrary truth values T and TI, the conjunc-
tion, T and TI, should be no more true than either T or TI, and the 
disjunction, T or TI, should be at least as true as both TI and T. 
In algebraic terms, this amounts to requiring that the fuzzy 
subsets of [0,1], with V and A as defined above, constitute a lattice; 
that is, the desired "more true than" relation turns out to be a lattice 
order. Misumoto and Tanaka (1976) have shown, however, that this algebra 
of fuzzy subsets of [0,1] is strictly weaker than a lattice; in particular, 
the absorptioR laws do not hold. Therefore, it is in fact mathematically 
impossible to define a rank ordering of the kind desired. 
For resolution of this difficulty, two avenues present themselves. 
First is to again redefine the Boolean connectives, and perhaps also 
correspondingly redefine the meaning assignments for truth-terms. 
Second is to retain the above connectives, but limit the base collection 
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of acceptable meanings for truth terms to some appropriate subcollection 
of the fuzzy subsets of [0,1]. A solution along the lines of the former 
is developed in §5.3.3. The section below shows a solution along the 
latter provided by Mizumoto and Tanaka. 
Note: during the research for this dissertation, the possibility 
of limiting the value set to just fuzzy subsets of [0,1] having monotone 
membership functions was investigated and was found to be unsatisfactory 
for the same reason as above: absorption does not apply. 
§5.3.2. Fu~zy Numbers 
A fuzzy number N in [0,1] is a convex normal fuzzy subset of 
[0,1], where N is convex if, for all x,y,z in [0,1], 
x~~z implies ~N(y)~in[~N(x)'~N(z)], 
and N is normal if there is at least one x in [0,1] such that 
~N(x)=1. 
Mizumota and Tanaka (1976) show that the fuzzy numbers in [0,1], together 
with Zadeh's connectives as defined in §5.3.1 form a "pseudocomplemented 
distributive" lattice, Le., a deMorgan lattice. Hence we have a lattice 
ordering "~" with the desired properties: for any two fuzzy numbers N 
and N', if N~', then 
NUN' = N' 
and. 
NnN' = N. 
This ordering is simple to visualize in terms of graphs of the 
membership function ~N. 
and Q defined by 
The lattice has maximal and minimal elements 1 ,.., 
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=[: 
if O~x<1 
1J1(x) if x=O "" 
~O(x) = [ I if X=O 
if O<x~H, "" 0 
and, in general, N~' if and only if there exists (a unique) ae[O,l] 
such that 
and 
IJN(x)~IJN'(x) fer a~x~l. 
Thus.N~' if and only if the graph of ~N lies generally to the left of 
the graph of ~N' and crosses it at no more than one point. Moreover, 
the union and intersection of two fuzzy numbers Nand N' may be 
visualized as in Figure 5-2. Note that in this example Nand N' are not 
related by ~, yet the following relations do hold: 
NON' ~ N ~ NON' 
NON' ~ N' ~ NVN' . 
Of especial interest here is that the fuzzy numbers in [0,1] 
provide a version of linguistic truth which is easily formalizable in a 
semantically complete class of formal logical systems. There are required 
only two simple modifications of the definitions developed in Chapter 3: 
(i) in every linguistic theory, delete from the set of logical axioms 
all instances of the linear ordering critereon (§3.3.1-6), (ii) in every 
semantic interpretation, replace the value set [0,1] for linguistic 
assertions with the set of fuzzy numbers in [0,1], and redefine the 
connectives ~, v and A in terms of the operators of §5.3.1. Note that 
this automatically transforms the interpretations lea) of relation 
symbols a into fuzzy sets of type 2. 
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1;..0 
- - - = Intersection I' " = Union 
Figure 5-2. Union and Intersection of fuzzy numbers. 
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The resultant class of formal systems may be established as seman-
tically complete with respect to the resultant class of semantic inter-
pretations by the methods of Chapter 4. In this case, the crucial step 
is redefining the cannonical embedding ~~ in such a way that it preserves 
the lattice ordering of equivalance classes [p] (as opposed to the 
linear ordering employed in §4.3). The existence of such an embedding 
is ensured by the fact that the lattice ordering of fuzzy numbers in 
[0,1] is dense, i.e., for any fuzzy numbers Nand N' such that N<N', 
there is at least one fuzzy number N* such that N<N*<N. This allows us 
to adapt the definition ~f ~~ in §4.3 as follows. Let Xl' X2 , and X3 be 
as before. Let ~1 be the set of fuzzy numbers N in [0,1] such that 
-N<N (where "_" is as in §5. 3 .1), let 'Y\2 be the set such that -N=N, and 
let ~3 be the set such that N<-N. Then let 
1. 
2. 
3. 
~~:X1~~1 be any <-preserving embedding, 
~~:X2~~2 be any mapping of X2 into ~2' 
~~:X3~ ~3 by ~~([p])=-~~([-p]), where [-P]&X1· 
It follows that the cannonical interpretation I~, as defined in 
§3.4 in terms of ~~, of any consistent theory is well-defined, and that 
the analogues of all the propositions and theorems of §3.5 and §3.6 hold 
true. Thus one obtains a semantically complete axiomatization of fuzzy 
logic. 
Because fuzzy nUmbers in [0,1] form a lattice, the logic captured 
in this class of systems has many desirable properties. One possible 
defect persists, however, in that the lattice ordering relation is 
generally a partial order--i.e., not all truth values will be comparable. 
Theories with total orders can be defined, nevertheless, through the 
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techniques described in Example 3.4.3. In this case it must be assumed 
that there is a O-ary relation symbol KN for every fuzzy number N. 
§5.3.3. An Alternate Approach 
Since it is customary for logicians to use numbers in [0,1] as 
truth values, it is only reasonable that when moving to the more general 
conception represented by linguistic truth one should employ fuzzy 
subsets of [0,1]. In reflecting on the everyday use of truth-related 
language, however, it is evident that there is no truely compelling 
reason why "Truth," even considered as a linguistic variable,. should 
have [0,1] as its universe of discourse. Indeed, a moments reflection 
will remind us that the actual universe of discourse for this variable 
as it appears in natural languages is more exactly the class of all 
propositions--to wit, it is actually the linguistic assertions, and not 
numbers, which are "true," "false," "more or less true," "not very 
true," etc. It therefore makes sense to look for a formulation of 
linguistic truth which incorporates this view. 
This section presents one such formulation, which is conveniently 
formalizable in the systems discussed in Chapter 3. In this treatment, 
linguistic terms from the term set for "Truth" are introduced formally 
as operators on linguistic assertions--somewhat on the same order as 
linguistic hedges--with each such term being assumed to either hold or 
not hold for any given proposition. For example, the claim that a 
proposition p is "true" will be expressed formally by the linguistic 
assertion true(p), where "true" here denotes a unary operator symbol; 
the proposition that "true(p)" holds, will be represented by the formula 
true(p)~Kl' where Kl is the zero-ary relation symbol with constant value 
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1; and the proposition that "true(p)" does not hold will be represented 
by the formula true(p)~KO. 
The determination of whether "true(p)" does or does not hold is 
then dependent on the value in [0,1] which a given interpretation I 
assigns to p. If it is decided, for example, that a proposition p 
deserves to be regarded as true if I(p)~0.6, then the operator "true" 
may be formally associated with the interval [0.6,1] by some defining 
axioms: 
(true(p)~K1) = (PVKO.6~P) 
(true(p)~KO) = '(true(p)~K1). 
Additional linguistic truth terms may be defined in a similar fashion. 
As examples: "false" may be defined by 
(false(p)~Kl) - (pAKO.4~P) 
(false(p)~KO) - '(false(p)~Kl)' 
"more or less true" by 
"very true" by 
(m-l-true(p)~Kl) - (pvKO.4~P)&(pAKO.6~P) 
(m-l-true(p)~KO) - '(m-l-true(p)~Kl)' 
(v-true(p)~Kl) - (pVKO.8~P) 
(v-true(p)~KO) - '(v-true(p)~Kl) 
and "absolutely true" by 
(a-true(p)~Kl) - (p~K1) 
(a-true(p)~KO) - ,(a-true(p)~K1). 
Choice of the range in [0,1] for each linguistic term is of course 
arbitrary, but will normally be dictated to a certain extent by the 
kinds of interrelations that one wishes to set up among the terms being 
used. With the above definitions of "true" and "false," for example, 'it 
happens that these terms are not autonyms of one another, i.e., for 
arbitrary p, both of the formulas 
~true(p) ~ false(p) 
~false(p) - true(p) 
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are semantically invalid; yet they become valid if "true" is associated 
with [0.5,1] and "false" is associated with [0,0.5]. 
The virtue of this approach to linguistic truth rests on the 
following result. 
Theorem 5.3.3-1. If the intervals associated with "true" and 
"false" are mirror images of one another about the point 0.5, then these 
two linguistic terms satisfy all of the classical principles for ~, v, 
and A; that is, the following truth table holds: 
p q "'p pvq pAq 
true true false true true 
true false false true false 
false true true true false 
false false true false false 
Proof. Each entry in the truth table may be verified by straight-
forward appeal to the definitions, together with applications of the 
semantic completeness result for formal theories. To illustrate: the 
first entry--if p is true, then "'p is false--is established as follows: 
.,(true(p)~Kl) - (pvKO.6~P) (def. of "true") 
- ("'P KO.4~P) (sem. completeness) 
- false(~p)~K1' (def. of "false. ") 
Details of the remaining entries are omitted. 0 
One thus has in this formulation a "fuzzy logic" on a different 
order. Individual linguistic truth terms apply non-fuzzily, i.e., they 
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either hold for a given proposition p or they do not hold for p; yet 
linguistic imprecision is accommodated (i) by allowing a range of [0,1] 
to be assigned to each linguistic term, and (ii) by accommodating for 
any number of fuzzy linguistic terms, with or without hedges. Moreover, 
by Theorem 5.3.3-1, appropriately defining the meanings of "true" and 
"false" leaves the full strength of the classical logic completely 
embedded within a multivalent fuzzy logic, thereby preserving the common 
sense usage of true-false reasoning. Last, this version of linguistic 
truth is mathematically simpler than the versions considered ~n §5.3.1 
and §5.3.2, thus making it somewhat more amenable to direct implementa-
tion on a computer. 
§5.4. Linguistic Possibility 
Zadeh (1978a and 1978b) has shown that the imprecision in everyday 
discourse may be regarded as essentially possibilistic in nature. The 
basic idea of a possibility distribution was given in §2.2.10. We here con-
sider the status of possibilistic reasoning from the formal point of view. 
Consider the fuzzy set 81 of "small integers" defined in §2.2.10, 
81 = 1/0 + 1/1 + 0.8/2 + 0.6/3 + 0.4/4 + 0.2/5. 
The proposition that x has a possibility of 0.6 of assuming the value 3 
may be expressed by the notation 
Poss{x=3} = 0.6. 
Thus written, possibilistic assertions are clearly metalinguistic, and 
are of a kind which is not directly formalizable in the languages 
developed in Chapter 3. 
Yet because of the correspondence between fuzzy sets and possibility 
distributions, the net effect of a possibilistic interpretation is 
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implicit. It is simply the matter of an intuitive heuristic whether one 
takes a formal expression like x=a with truth value I(x=a)=ie[O,l] as 
asserting that "x=a is true to the degree i" or as saying "x is possibly 
a to the degree i." Therefore the necessary apparatus for formalizing 
many of the concepts from possibility theory is available in the systems 
of Chapter 3. 
This includes in particular the idea of a possibility measure fi(A) 
for a non-fuzzy set A, as induced by a possibility distribution fix: if 
fi is given as some fuzzy set B, then fi(A) represents the possibility x 
that xeA, and is defined by 
fi(A) = sUPaeA ~B(a). 
By virtue of the two-levels in our formal languages, this definition is 
effectively captured in a formula of the following form: 
(fi(a{x»~p(x» :: (,(x'=x)::»P(x' )vP(x)~P(x». 
This shows that even fairly sophisticated concepts are formalizable in 
the languages as given. Many concepts will not be accessible in this 
manner, however. In particular are the fuzzy quantifiers mentioned in 
§2. 2 .11. 
§S.S. Fuzzy Inference 
As was mentioned in §2.2.8, the fuzzy interpretations of the 
Boolean connectives are nowdays well-established in the literature, 
while the question of an appropriate form of the fuzzy "implies" remains 
open. Gaines (1976) lists several alternative formulations, and other 
versions appear in papers by Zadeh. We shall here give a sampling of 
three such connectives and consider their formalizability both within 
multivalent theories of fuzzy reasoning and within fuzzy logics of the 
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kind developed in §5.3.2. These three are conveniently chosen as those 
for which Dubois and Prade (1979b) have already developed the fuzzy-
logical analogues, i.e., generalizations for use with fuzzy sets of 
type 2. 
§5.5.1. Dienes-Rescher 
This is the ~ connective of classical logic, simply generalized to 
the case of approximate reasoning. Formally it may be introduced into 
any theory T--multivalent or fuzzy-logical--by adjoining axioms according 
to the scheme 
In the multivalent case, this defines an operator => on fuzzy sets of 
~A=>B(x,y) = max[l-~A(x),~p(Y)]' 
where A and B are the meanings of p and q. In the fuzzy-logical case, 
the same scheme defines an operator => on fuzzy sets of type 2 by 
A=>B = -AUB, 
where - and V are as given in §5.3.2. 
This mode of inference is generally not satisfactory as a form of 
approximate inference for the reason that, if p~q has a higher truth 
value than p, then the truth value of q is greater than or equal to the 
truth value of p~q, contrary to the intuitive requirement that the 
conclusion of a logical inference (in this case, modus ponens) should 
not be more true than any of the hypotheses. 
§5.5.2. Lukasiewicz L~ 
I 1 
This mode of inference has been the most popular, partly because 
it satisfies the above intuitive requirement for modus ponens, and 
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partly because it has already been studied extensively in the theory of 
multivalued logics. Gaines (1976) discusses it at length in the context 
of fuzzy reasoning, and Bellman and Zadeh (1977) have used it as a "base 
logic" which is "fuzzified" to produce a fuzzy logic over fuzzy sets of 
type 2. 
In the multivalent semantics the Lukasiewicz connective is defined 
by an operator => on fuzzy sets of type 1, as: 
~A=>B(x) = min[I,I-~A(x)+~B(x)], 
and in the context of fuzzy sets of type 2, it is given by 
A=>B = !~[-A$B], 
where 1, (), and - are as in §5. 3.2, and where ED is defined by ,.. 
AeB = f min[~A(x)'~B(Y)]/x+y. X,y 
Because of the use of the arithmetic sum, this mode of inference cannot 
be formally defined explicitly in terms of the connectives ~, v, A. 
However, the essence of this ~ connective can be captured in a theory 
T--either multivalent or fuzzy-logical--by adjoining all axioms for 
L"" • 
'''I 
Following Gaines (1976), this leads to axioms having the forms: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
(p~K1&p~q~K1)~q~K1 
p~(q~)~Kl 
((p~q)~)~((q~)~)~K1 
(p~q)~((q~r)~(p~r))~K1 
(modus ponens) 
(paradox) 
(disjunction) 
(transitivity) 
In addition, one should have axioms which relate ~, A, and v to~. The 
necessary relationships would here be derivable from 
5. ~P~P~KO 
6. pvq~(p~q)~q. 
By using these axioms in a formal theory T, one is ensured that ~ has 
the requisite logical behavior, even though it will in general have 
different meanings in different semantic models of T. 
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Note: An alternative approach would be to introduce a connective + 
which satisfies sufficiently many of the rules for addition of real 
numbers so that ~ could be introduced by 
p~q~K1J\ (("'p )+q) . 
In fact, it is conceivable that + could be defined in such a way that 
its only possible meaning assignment is addition of reals, in which case 
p~q is uniquely defined fot all semantic interpretations. Development 
of the necessary axioms for such a + connective has not been pursued in 
this research. 
§5.5.3. Zadeh's Generalized Modus Ponens 
A relational mode of inference was proposed in Zadeh's first 
papers on the subject, and continues to be discussed (c.f. Zadeh 1975, 
Part III for a review). The assertion "if p then q" is considered as a 
special case of "if p then q, else r," which receives as its meaning the 
union of cartesian products 
(AXB)V(-AXC), 
where it is assumed that Band C are fuzzy subsets of the same universe V. 
The requisite special case is gotten by taking C=V, so that 
A=>B = (AxB)V(-AxV) 
This leads to a generalized modus ponens through its combination 
with a compositional rule of inference, which is defined as follows. 
Let A be a fuzzy subset of U, and let R be a fuzzy subset of uxV, i.e., 
a binary fuzzy relation. Then a fuzzy set B may be inferred from the 
fuzzy sets A and R as the composition 
B = AoR. 
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Since the meaning of tip implies qtl given above is a binary fuzzy relation 
of U and V, the rule of modus ponens "from p and p~q infer q" obtains as 
its meaning 
B = Ao(A=>B). 
This mode of inference is formalizable in the multivalent systems 
of Chapter 3, since cartesian products of fuzzy sets and comp~sitions of 
fuzzy relations are formally definable in the given two leveled languages. 
(For compositions, the role of the "sup" operator is captured as for 
Il(A) in §5. 4.) 
Dubois and Prade (1976) give a fuzzy logical version of this mode 
of inference as well. Here it is left as a conjecture for future inves-
tigations that this mode is similarly representable in a fuzzy logic as 
described in §5.3. The task is to formalize the generalizations of 
"max," "min," and "sup" to fuzzy sets of type 2. 
§5.6. Decidability 
Given that a substantial portion of the theory of approximate 
reasoning has been axiomatized in a semantically complete class of 
formal logical systems, the question next arises concerning which of 
these systems are representable on a finite state computer. In mathe-
matical terms this amounts to determining decidability, where a theory T 
is decidable if there is a mechanical procedure (a decision procedure) 
by which one can effectively determine in finitely many steps whether a 
formula P of L(T) is a theorem of T. (For a more detailed discussion of 
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decision procedures, cf. §8.1 and §8.3.) Here decidability will be 
established for a subclass of the theories defined in Chapter 3. 
By semantic completeness, a formula P is a theorem of a theory T 
if and only if it is valid in every semantic model of T. Therefore, a 
decision procedure for T would amount to a procedure for determining the 
semantic validity of formulas of L(T). By the definition of semantic 
validity, for such a procedure to exist it is sufficient that T satisfy: 
1. T has only finitely many semantic models, 
2. every model of T has a finite universe of discourse, and 
3. every model of T effectively uses only finitely many of the truth 
values in [0,1]. 
In certain cases it may be possible to modify a given theory S9 
that these requirements are satisfied. We he~e discuss a procedure for 
doing this, by treating the three conditions in reverse order. 
Condition 3 may be ensured for a theory T .by the techniques dis'~ 
cussed in Example 3.4.3. Let the language L(T) contain a finite set of 
O-ary relation symbols Ki , where the set of indices i1, ... ,in is symmet-
ric about the point 0.5. Adjoin as proper axioms all formulas of the 
form 
Then in every semantic model of T, the linguistic assertions in a valid 
formula P can assume only the values i1, ... ,in . 
Condition 2 can be ensured in an analogous manner. Let L(T) 
contain a finite collection of individual constants a1, ... ,am, and 
adjoin as a proper axiom a formula of the form 
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Then individual variables in a valid formula can range over only finitely 
many individuals. 
Condition 1 is ensured by requiring that the theory T have a 
property of categoricity, which may be defined as follows. Two models I 
and II of Tare isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence ~ 
between UI and UrI such that 
I(a(il""'!n))=I(a(~(il)""'~(in)) 
for all relation symbols a in L(T) and all n-tuples of individuals 
i1, ... ,ineUI . It can be shown that two models I and II of T are iso-
morphic if and only if exactly the same formulas of L(T) are valid in 
both I and II. Then, a theory T is categorical if all of its semantic 
models are isomorphic. Because of the manner in which Conditions 2 and 
3 are ensured, categoricity can be ensured by explicitly defining the 
meanings of every relation symbol within the formal theory T: for every 
k-ary relation symbol a, and every k-tuple a. , ... ,a. of the individual 
11 1k 
constants specified for Condition 2, adjoin a proper axiom of the form 
a(a. , ... ,a. ) = K., 
11 1k 1 
where K. is one of the O-ary relation symbols specified for Condition 1. 
1 
When invoking this procedure, however, it is important to verify 
that this does not lead to a theory which is inconsistent. In particular, 
the procedure is not applicable to any theory whose axioms already 
require that either the set of individuals or the set of truth values be 
infinite. For in this case, the above methods for satisfying conditions 
2 and 3 will yield a theory that has no semantic models and which is 
therefore inconsistent by the second form of the completeness theorem 
(Theorem 4.6-1). An illustration of this is the theory eM developed in 
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§6.3, which requires that its set of truth values obey the axioms for an 
algebraic field. Condition 3 cannot be satisfied in this case, since it 
is known that the field axioms are not satisfied by any finite subset of 
the real numbers. On the other hand, the procedure succeeds for the 
theory described in Example 3.4.3; and many other, considerably more 
complex, theories of one or more linguistic variables can be rendered 
decidable in this fashion without difficulty. 
Note also that undecidability does not of itself forbid computer 
applications. It rather points out potential sources of error where 
assumptions of finitude are involved. This situation is also illustrated 
by the theory CM of §6.3. 
CHAPTER 6 
AN APPLICATION--SPIN+ 
Uncertainty about the future is in part a consequence of the 
imprecision in our knowledge of the present, together with our manner of 
reasoning with imprecise ideas. This chapter outlines an approach to 
structural modeling of complex systems which makes this present-future 
relationship formally explicit, via fuzzy sets and the theory of approxi-
mate reasoning. The main result is a direct mathematical connection 
between the imprecision in a given structural model and the degree o~ 
uncertainty that this imprecision contributes to the model's forecasted 
results. 
§6.1 states the problem context, taking into consideration the aim 
of forecasting methodology, the use of structural models, and the ques-
tion of "certainty accounting." 
§6.2 takes McLean's (1976) modeling package SPIN, and enhances it 
to a package SPIN+ by adding some algorithms for computing certainty 
values for forecasted events. SPIN+ is illustrated with sample calcu-
lations for a five-variable "Citizen's Model" of a transit system. 
§6.3 lays down all the details needed for representing SPIN+ and 
the Citizen's Model in a multivalent linguistic theory. 
§6.4 discusses the possibility and potential advantages of improv-
ing this approach through an implementation of fuzzy logic as is described 
in §5.3. 
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§6.1. Forecasting Under Uncertainty 
The task besetting contemporary forecasters stems from man's being 
caught between the two sides of a perennial dilemma. First, we must 
plan. This clearly is necessary merely for human survival. Even the 
simplest of cultures must undertake a small amount of planning in order 
to meet the minimum requirements of food and shelter. And in the more 
sophisticated cultures, such as ours, planning is a common aspect of 
everyday life. In order to survive we must have well-defined goals. and 
a reasonable idea of how they can be achieved. 
At the same time, however, in order that our plans have a practical 
viability, they must also be couched within a forecast of possible future 
events. A plan which is crafted in a vacuum, that is, in complete 
disregard for the context within which it is to be executed, is not 
really a plan at all. Any project can be affected by myriad factors of 
different kinds, e.g., physical, biological, human, economic, environ-
mental, and so on. Hence no plan can be crafted without a reasonable 
prognosis of what lies ahead. 
But herein resides the second half of the dilemma. We cannot 
accurately predict. No one knows for sure what will happen in a given 
situation (except perhaps a few self-prcclaimed soothsayers and clair-
voyants, whose claims still remain dubious). Therefore, all our predic-
tions leave an element to chance. Cognizance of chance overshadows our 
plans with uncertainty. 
Thus arises the problem of forecasting: to improve our ability to 
see into the future so as to reduce uncertainty. The basic tool of the 
forecaster is the concept of a model, by which one abstracts form a 
given situation those aspects deemed relevant to the plan or goals one 
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has in mind. Such models may be roughly grouped into the categories of 
mathematical and nonmathematical, while the former may in turn be sub-
divided according to mechanistic and probabalistic. Mechanistic mathe-
matical models normally implement the mathematics of dynamical systems, 
such as linear algebra or differential equations, and treat the future 
as being predetermined by the characteristics of the present. Probaba-
listic models implement the laws of averages, i.e., statistics, and 
investigate the future in terms tendencies, or trends, of events. Non-
mathematical models, on the other hand, forego rigorous computations and 
focus on the nonmeasurable "ill-defined" aspects of a system, e.g., 
problems of management or individual human behavior. These distinctions 
are not at all crisp, however, as is illustrated in this dissertatio~, 
and particularly, in this chapter. There are mathematical techniques 
which can be applied to certain kinds of "ill-definedness." 
The best forecasts combine an assortment of modeling techniques, 
so as to bring into consideration an optimal collection of relevant 
factors. Yet even given the most carefully wrought prognosis, a degree 
of uncertainty must remain. First, there will often be aspects of the 
system in question for which no known modeling procedure applies. This 
inability to model leaves uncertainty regarding those aspects unaffected, 
i.e., it is at the maximum. Second, inasmuch as models are only abstrac-
tions of carefully chosen factors, they characteristically blur a large 
quantity of detail. Hence, models are always imprecise, even where they 
apply, and this imprecision automatically propogates an element of 
uncertainty into the models predictions. Last, experience teaches that 
we in any case must always expect the unexpected. Here we note a fact 
of the planner-decisionmaker's life, that any number of human factors 
and unexpected events may affect what actually occurs. 
123 
For these reasons, forecasters have of late adopted the practice 
of accompanying their forecasts with an accounting, as best as is feasible, 
of the regions where uncertainty remains. This assists the planner by 
pOinting out those areas for which he should incorporate flexibility. 
In the face of uncertainty, of course, this is the planner's only realis-
tic alternative: to design courses of action which can adapt. 
The work in this chapter deals with a somewhat more spe~ialized 
question within this problem of uncertainty accounting, that of develop-
ing an actual measure of the uncertainty that obtains. In this, the 
current approach is a priori limited to a consideration of only thos~ 
forecasting methods for which such a measure can be defined, namely, the 
mathematical models. SpeCifically, we consider the "structural models," 
of which a wide variety are currently in vogue. 
An extensive study of selected structural modeling techniques, 
explicitly for their use in forecasting, was recently undertaken by a 
team at Portland State University under the auspices of the National 
Science Foundation (Linstone, et. ale 1978 and 1979). An outgrowth of 
that project is a more recent paper which gives a thorough analysis of 
the nature of structural models, a comparison of the essential features 
of a selected collection of structural modeling tools, and a discussion 
of the kinds of information about a system that can be obtained in this 
way (Lendaris 1980). 
Structural models differ from other mathematical models in that 
they directly represent systems in terms of their structure and inner 
dynamiCS, while relegating quantitative (i.e., numerical) considerations 
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to a level which is mostly nonsignificant. In general, a structural 
model is defined as a collection of variables (or parameters) together 
with their interactions (Lendaris, p. 808). A chief advantage of struc-
tural modeling is that the system being modeled is visualized geometri-
cally as a digraph which shows the impacts of each parameter on the 
other (as will be seen later in Figure 6-1). Impacts may be either 
positive or negative, linear or nonlinear, have short or long delay 
times; etc., and they may be measurable in real units (e.g., dollars or 
BTU's) or in nominal units on a qualitative scale (such as from "high" 
to "low"). The digraph in turn can be transformed into a matrix, which 
is analyzed on a computer. 
Use of the model in generating forecasts involves a "what if ... " 
analysis wherein one tests the future consequences over nominal or real 
time units of hypothetical changes in the present or future values of 
the parameters. Anyone forecasting study may include a variety of 
different sets of hypotheses and results, and as well, the results of 
several different structural models of the same system. These increase 
our understanding of the system by illustrating the implications of 
conceptualizing the system in different ways. 
As both Linstone and Lendaris point out, an important aspect of 
this technique is the insight into the system which is gained by the 
modeler during the process of building the model itself--i.e., creating 
the digraph, assigning weights, delay times, etc. Given that the model 
output is to be published as part of a forecasting study, however, it is 
mainly the results which bear meaning for the planner. For this reason, 
the planner is best advised that the results should not be taken too 
literally, i.e., as predictions. As was stressed above, such forecasts 
always inherit an element of imprecision from the imprecision of the 
model. 
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Hence arises the question of how much imprecision obtains; or more 
exactly, given a measure of model imprecision, to what extent does this 
affect the confidence that one may place in the forecasted results. The 
sections to follow provide an approach to this question via the theory of 
approximate reasoning. Here the modeling package SPIN of McLean, et. al. 
(1976) is enhanced by allowing the modeler to adjoin judgments as to the 
"certainty of impacts" along with the usual weights and delays. These 
certainty values are then manipulated in parallel with the ordinary SPIN 
calculations, according to a property chosen from of fuzzy inference. 
The result is a unique "certainty of forecast" computation along the, 
individual system parameters for each time unit that the parameters are 
projected into the future. A sample run of the modified package shows 
that a reasonable link between model imprecision and uncertainty of 
forecast is established. If the assigned certainty of impacts in the 
digraph are high, then certainty of projected parameters degrades slowly 
with respect to time, whereas certainty degrades rapidly if the assigned 
certainties are low. 
In using this approach, however, two points regarding the present 
use of the word "uncertainty" should be noted. First, the "certainty 
measures" which the modeler contributes to the digraph are strictly 
subjective measures of the modeler's confidence that the impacts will 
occur and will persist over time. Hence they are measures of "impreci-
sion" as such, but only given that the basic structure and dynamics of 
the model is correct. They do not account for imprecison due to "hidden 
variables" or other system aspects which tq.e model does not represent. 
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Second, the computed "certainty of forecasts" is strictly connected only 
with the model imprecision and should not be taken in the broader sense 
discussed above. Uncertainty due to an inability to model or an aware-
ness of the unexpected must be dealt with by other means. 
Last it should be mentioned that, whereas SPIN and its relatives 
among the class of structural models are strictly mechanistic in their 
representation of reality, the present proposal to introduce approximate 
reasoning is a move to combine this mechanism with a form of stochasm. 
This of course is not stochasm in the traditional sense of being based 
on probability theory (for the reasons cited in §2.2.10). But it is 
stochastic inasmuch as it deals with uncertainty and is based on an idea 
which is akin to subjective probability. Here judgments as to model 
imprecision are obtained in the form of subjective choices of degrees of 
certainty that a given impact relation will persist over time. 
In focusing specifically on the impact relations, moreover, the 
present approach differs further from conventional stochastic methods, 
which deal only with uncertainty in the values of the system parameters. 
Yet it at the same time still leaves unaddressed the common limitation 
of all structural models, this being that they do not account for uncer-
tainty regarding the model's topology. There is no provision for the 
possibility that a given impact relation may cease to be effective, or 
that new impact relations may appear. Even given these limitations, 
however, it is clear that the models developed here are equally applic-
able, and in the same situations, as their nonstochastic predecessors. 
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§6.2. McLean's SPIN And The Enhancement SPIN+ 
It will be convenient to preface the technical details of SPIN+ 
with an outline of the basic idea. Suppose that a digraph has been 
constructed as in Figure 6-1, and assume that two variables A and Bare 
related by 
"an increase of AA in the value of A produces an 
increase of ~=i~~AA in the value of B after a 
delay of d time units." 
This assertion may recast as a logical implication 
where 
PA is "A increases by AA," and 
PB is "B increases by ~=i%XAA 
after a delay d." 
Then a degree of certainty c(PA~PB) measured on a scale from 0 to 1 can 
be assigned, with a high (low) degree indicating a high (low) confidence 
that the inference PA~PB is true. Given an explicit definition of ~ as 
a function on [0,1], this leads to a capability for computing an in-
ferred degree of certainty c(PB) from the pair c(PA), c(PA~PB)' In turn 
this leads to a capability for computing degrees of certainty for the 
consequent PA n 
of a sequence of inferences PA ~PA ""'PA ~PA 1 2 n-1 n 
from 
c(PA ) and the c(PA. ~PA.)' i=2, ... ,n. 1 1-1 1 
Certainty accounting is accomplished automatically by the computa-
tions, with the specific characteristics of the accounting being dependent 
on the choice of the implication operator~. For the present purposes, 
the most appropriate choice appears to be the Lukasiewicz operator 
discussed in §5.5.2. Given the definition 
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Variables Im:eacts 
Xl = Use of Energy 1st no. is a .. ~J = vJeight 
X = Hassle of Driving Car 2nd no. is d .. = Delay 2 (Parking,concestion,etc.) ~J 3rd no. is c .. = Certainty 
X3 = Use of !4ass Transit ~J 
X4 = Use of Automobile 
Xs = Convenience of Mass Transit 
Figure 6-l. The Citizen's Hodel for SPIN+. 
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c(PA~PB) = min[l,l-c(PA)+c(PB)] (1) 
we can solve for c(PB) obtaining 
c(PB) ~ max[O,c(PA)+c(PA~PB)-l], (2) 
which forms a basis for the accounting procedure. For example, suppose 
that c(PA)=1.0, c(PA~PB)=0.9, and c(PB~PC)=0.9. Then, by (2), c(PB)~ 
1.0+0.9-1=0.9, from which it follows in turn that c(PC)~0.9+0.9-1=0.8. 
Note that, while the certainty of the two inferences are equal, we have 
that c(PA»c(PB»c(PC)' Le., the certainties of inferred events steadily 
degrade. For computational simplicity, equality is assumed i~ (2), 
which has the effect of making each inferred value be the highest 
certainty estimate that is ensured by the previously computed.values. 
The core of McLean's modeling package may be described as fol19WS 
(Linstone, et. al., 1978, p. D-9). Let X1"",Xn be the parameters in a 
digraph representation of a given system; let w .. and d .. be the weight 
~J ~J 
and delay of the impact of X. on X.; let X.(O) be the assumed value of 
~ J ~ 
X. at time t=O; and assume that one or more of the X. are "pulsed" by 
~ ~ 
letting X.(l)=X.(O)+pulse. Then future values of the X. are computed by 
~ ~ ~ 
the formula 
n 
X.(t+l) = X.(t)+~ w .. -(X.(t)-X.(t')), 
J J '-1 ~J ~ ~ ~-
where t'=max[O,t-l-d .. J. In words, the next value of X. is the current 
~J J 
value of X. plus the net change (which may be positive or negative) 
J . 
brought about by the cumulative impacts of the most recent changes in 
all of the X .. 
~ 
Calculation of 
veloped in parallel. 
a degree of certainty for X.(t+l) 
J 
Let ax .. (t) denote X.(t)-X.(t'), 
~J ~ ~ 
may now be de-
the change in X. 
~ 
over the time of the delay d .. ; and let a.X.(t+l) denote w .. -ax .. (t), 
~J ~ J ~J ~J 
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the change in X. due to 
J 
the change AX .. (t) in X .. 
l.J l. 
Then let c .. be the 
l.J 
certainty of the impact of X. on X.; let c(X. (0)) 
l. J l. 
be the certainty of 
the initial values of the X.; and assume that pulses have a certainty of 
l. 
1.0. Then the certainty of the change a.x. in X. due to AX .. (t) may be 
l. J J l.J 
calculated in accordance with the Lukasiewicz ~ by 
c(a.X.(t+I))=max[O,c(AX .. (t))+c .. -1]. 
l.J ~ ~ 
To obtain next a certainty for the net impact of all the changes 
n 
in the X.--i.e., the quantity AX. (t+I)=I a.X.(t+I)--compute a weighted 
l. J i=l l. J 
average of certainties by 
c(AX.(t+I)) 
J 
n 
I c(a.x-, (t+I))· (a.x. (t+1)1 
i=l l. J l. J 
= --------------------------n 
I la.x. (t+l)\ 
i=l l. J 
The rationale for this calculation is that the certainty of a sum of two 
changes in X. is partly dependent on the sizes of those changes, thus. 
J 
ruling out a straightforward application of the simple logical conjunc-
tion (i.e, saying that the certainty of the sum is the "and" of the 
certainties of the summands, where "and" is interpreted as the arithmetic 
min). For example, if a change of 10 units has certainty 0.9, and a 
change of -2 units has certainty 0.2, then the weighted averaging tech-
nique yields a net change of 8 units with net certainty 0.8, which is 
much more reasonable than a net certainty of only 0.2. To distinguish 
this weighted average interpretation for the logical "and," we here use 
the term balanced conjunction, the formal details of which will be given 
in §6.3. 
The same rationale may finally be applied again to obtain 
c(X. (t)· IX. (t)1 +c(~. (t+1» ·I~. (t+1)1 
C(Xj (t+1» = J IXj it)1 + I~j d+1)1 J , 
which completes the certainty calculates for the SPIN computed value 
X.(t+1). 
J 
The acronym SPIN+ refers to the modification of SPIN which is 
obtained by including all of these computations. To test the kind of 
output that one can obtain using SPIN+, a small FORTRAN program was 
written for a model using five variables, with a forecast covering 30 
time units. The data used was as shown in Figure 6-1. All variables 
were assumed to have an initial value of 50 units, to be bounded by 
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0~.~100, and to have initial certainty c(X.(0»=1.0. A pulse of 1 unit 
1 1 
was applied to each of X3 (use of mass transit) and X4 (use of autos). 
The output at selected time intervals is shown in Figure 6-2. The 
five variables fluctuate in accordance with the original version of 
SPIN, while certainties degrade, more rapidly for some variables than 
for others. Most importantly, further runs of the same program showed 
that adjusting the certainties of the impact relations in the model has 
the effect described in §6.1. Certainty of forecasted events degrades 
slowly if the certainty in the model is high, and it degrades rapidly if 
the certainty of impacts is low. Thus is established a firm mathematical 
link between the amount of confidence that may be placed in the implica-
tions of a given model and the amount of imprecision that the model is 
acknowledged to bear as a description of the corresponding system in the 
real world. 
§6.3. Formalization Of SPIN+ In A Multivalent Linguistic Theory 
The motivation for formalizing a given model of a real-world 
system is discussed at length in Part III. In brief, where non-classical 
Time Energy Hassle Mass Auto 
Use Transit 
t I Xl c (Xl) X2 c(X2 ) X3 c (X 3 ) X4 c(X4 ) 
1 150 1. 00 50 1.00 50 1.00 50 1.00 
5 50 .99 49 .99 52 .99 49 .99 
10 52 .98 46 .96 54 .98 50 .96 
15 157 .96 45 .92 61 .96 48 .92 
20 67 .92 36 .86 78 .91 38 .84 
25 61 .89 13 .72 83 .88 30 .77 
30 58 .85 3 .59 84 .85 27 .68 
Xi = parameter value calculated by SPIN 
c(x.) = certainty of X. calculated by SPIN+ 
~ ~ 
Figure 6-2. Sample output for SPIN+. 
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Conven-
ience 
X5 c(X5 ) 
50 1.00 
51 .99 
57 .95 
-, 
73 .87 
~00 .77 
00 .66 
00 .60 
133 
logics are involved, representation of the model in a semantically 
complete formal logical system is called for in orde~ to obtain an 
explicit characterization of the underlying logic, which can then be 
analyzed for its consistency or coherence. In the present case of 
approximate reasoning, which is classical at the outer level, consis-
tency is equivalent with coherence. Hence, if the formalization were 
discovered to be inconsistent, this would mean that any result is deriv-
able from the given digraph, so that all model output would be devoid of 
credibility. 
The following establishes that the logic of the SPIN+ Citizen's 
Model is indeed consistent. At the same time it pinpoints a possible 
source of inconsistency in the computer implementation, namely, erro+s 
of rounding due to decimal approximation. Since such errors will in 
practice be negligible, however, one is hereby assured that the model 
will always produce logically meaningful results. 
Formalization of SPIN+ and the Citizen's Model requires developing 
a formal theory with linguistic and axiomatic capabilities adequate to 
express all of the calculations for an arbitrary run of the SPIN+ package. 
This involves four main steps: 
1) Starting with the minimal multivalent theory, form the theory 
FL of algebraic fields, 
2) From FL, form the theory OF of ordered fields, thus in two 
steps laying down the needed properties of real-number arithmetic, 
3) Develop from OF the theory SP+, which includes explicit defini-
tions of (i) the Lukasiewicz -+, (ii) a notion of "balanced conjunction" 
as mentioned in §6.2, and (iii) general calculations of forecasted 
parameters and certainty measures, 
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4) From SP+ build the theory CM which describes the specific 
characteristics of the Citizen's Model--i.e., the weights, delays, and 
certainties of impacts, together with initial certainties and values of 
the model parameters. 
In order to develop the theory FL it is necessary first to extend 
the basic definition of a linguistic theory, to allow for the formal 
representation of functions defined on the individuals of a semantic 
interpretation. The necessary modifications are: 
1) proper symbols now include n-ary function symbols for any 
finite n, with general denotations f,g,h, etc., 
2) individual terms include strings of the form f(t1, ... ,tn), 
where f is n-ary and the t. are individual terms, 
1 
3) semantic interpretations I for a language L now assign a 
n function I(f):UI ~Ui to each n-ary function symbol f in L. 
To ensure semantic completeness, the following addition can be 
made to the definition of the canonical interpretation Ia given in §4.4: 
for any n-ary function symbol f in L(T), assign the function IA(f) 
defined by 
This function is well-defined, and leads to the desired completeness 
result. 
Now let F be the minimal linguistic theory. To form the theory 
FL, adjoin to L(F) three individual constants, denoted by 0,1, and -1, 
two binary function symbols, denoted by + and ., and one unary function 
symbol, denoted by -1. The terms +(t,t'), ·(t,t'), and -l(t) will be 
-1 written t+t', t·t', and t . Next, where x,y, and z are arbitrary 
individual variables, adjoin the following formulas as proper axioms: 
FLl. 
FL2. 
FL3. 
FL4. 
FL5. 
FL6. 
FL7. 
FL8. 
FL9. 
(x+y)+z=x+(y+z) 
x+O=x 
x+(-l'x)=O 
x+y=y+x 
(x·y)·z=x·(y·z) 
x'l=x 
x'(y+z)=x'y+x'z 
-1 y=x :: x'y=l 
FLI0. ,(0=1). 
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This axiomatization follows Shoenfield (1967, p. 70) with the exception 
that the concept of multiplicative inverse is here introduced in terms 
of a unary function, -1, rather than by the existential axiom 
, (x=O)::> 3 y(x 'y=I) . 
It can be shown that the two approaches are equivalent, i.e., in either 
case multiplicative inverses are properly defined. To simplify nota-
tions, assume that FL furthermore contains two binary function symbols 
denoted by - and / having the defining axioms: 
FLU. 
FLI2. 
x-y=x+(-I'Y) 
x/y=x·y-l. 
Readability may be enhanced by writing terms of the form (x-y)-z as 
x-y-z. 
To define the theory OF of ordered field, adjoin a binary fuzzy 
relation symbol, denoted by <, and make it non-fuzzy by the axiom 
OFI. X<~KO.OVX<y~Kl.0' 
where KO.O and K1.0 are the zero-ary relation symbols defined in §3.1.1. 
For notational convenience, formulas of the form t<t'~K1.0 will be 
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written as t<t'. Then the axioms specific to ordered fields may be 
written exactly as in Shoenfield (1967, p. 87): 
OF2. , (x<x) 
OF3. x<y~(y<z~x<z) 
OF4. x<yVx=yVy<x 
OFS. x<y~x+z<y+z 
OF6. O<x~(O<y~O<x·y). 
The theory OF will furthermore be assumed to contain a binary relation 
symbol ~ (with notational convention similar as for <), a unary function 
symbol I I, and two binary function symbols max[ ] and min[ ], defined 
by: 
OF7. x~y = x<yVx=y 
OF8. (Ixl=x = O~x)&(lxl=-I·x = x<O) 
OF9. (max[x,y]=x = y~x)&(max[x,y]=y = x~y) 
OFI0. (min[x,y]=x = x~y)&(min[x,y]=y = y~x). 
We are now in a position to consider SP+. Adjoin to OF: (i) for 
each re[O,I], the zero-ary relation symbol K defined in §3.1.1, (ii) for r 
each re[O,I], an individual constant denoted by a , (iii) the defining r 
axiom SP+l. aO.OO=O & a1. 00=1, 
and (iv) for each pair r,r'e[O,I] such that r<r', the axiom 
SP+2. a <a ,. 
r r 
Axioms SP+l and SP+2, together with the axioms for FL and OF, ensure 
that the constants a serve as formal representatives of the truth values 
r 
in [0,1]. 
In terms of the ar and Kr' two operators, denoted K and V, may be 
introduced by adjoining, for each re[O,I], the axiom 
SP+3. K(a )~K 
r r 
together with all formulas of the form 
SP+4. V(p)=a = p~K , r r 
where p is a linguistic assertion. Although these operators are not 
formally accommodated by the present definition of linguistic theory, 
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their use here causes no difficulty. Semantic completeness is unaffected 
since the behaviors of K and V are explicitly defined in terms of the a r 
and K • 
r 
Given these operators, the Lukasiewicz ~ has the explicit definition 
SP+5. p~q ~ K(min[l,l-V(p)+V(q)]). 
Assurance that there is a unique certainty value for q, given the certain-
ties of p and p~q, can be gained by adjoining 
SP+6. q ~ K(max[O,V(p)+V(p~q)-l]). 
In order to discuss certainties of model parameters within SP+ it 
is necessary to have, for an arbitrary SPIN calculation of X. as having 
~ 
+ a value b, a means of expressing the degree of certainty that SPIN· 
assigns to the proposition that X.=b. To this end, we may introduce a 
~ 
binary certainty of equality fuzzy relation symbol, denoted by = (and 
writing t=t' for =(t,t')). A formula of the form x=ar ~ KO.50 ' for 
example, expresses the proposition that the variable x assumes the value 
r with a certainty of 0.50. It is useful to relate certainty of equality 
to ordinary equality by 
SP+7. X~K1.0:)X=Y. 
The aforementioned balanced conjunction, denoted by , may now be 
defined for a finite sequence of certainty of equality relations as follows: 
Sp+g. x :y ~ .. ·'Ax:Y ~ K( [Vex :y ).( y , +- - ·+V(x :y ) -Iy I ] lIn nIl 1 n n n 
• [\Y1\ +···+\Ynl ]-l). 
The manner in which this is used for dealing with cumulative impacts 
will be seen below. 
The next step in the definition of SP+ is to introduce a formal 
representation of the time parameter. At this stage SP+ becomes a 
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theory of the kind described in §5.2, having the universes of discourse 
for its semantic interpretations being pairs of universes, one of which 
in this case is understood as a set of times. To this end adjoin: 
(i) a new set of individual variables t 1,t2 , ... , with general denota-
tions t,t', etc., (ii) for each s=O,1,2, ... ,M (some finite M) an indi-
vidual constant denoted by b , (iii) for each individual constant, s 
function symbol, and relation symbol of OF (which contains FL), a 
corresponding symbol bearing the subscript t, (iv) the corresponding 
analogues of all the proper axioms of OF, but excluding FL9, and (v) the 
axioms 
SP+9. bO=Ot 
SP+10. bS+1=bs+t1t (for each s=l, ... ,M-l). 
These axioms ensure that the constants b behave formally as a set of s 
times which obey the necessary laws of real arithmetic. The subscript t 
will be omitted when the intended meaning is clear. 
Now, for each i=l, ... ,N (some finite N), adjoin a unary function 
symbol, denoted by X., and for each pair i,j=l, ... ,N, adjoin two unary 
1. 
function symbols denoted by DX .. and D.X .. The expressions X.(t), 
l.J 1. J 1. 
DX .. (t), and D.X.(t) will represent the SPIN computed values at time t 
l.J 1. J 
of, respectively, the parameter X., the change in X. since the time 
1. 1. 
t'=max[t-1-delay .. ], and the change in X. due to the most recent change 
l.J J 
DX ... 
l.J 
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The general notion of a weight of impact is introduced by adjoin-
ing, for each pair i,j=l, .•• ,N, an individual constant denoted by a ... 
~J 
To represent delays of impacts, similarly adjoin a (time) constant b .. 
~J 
for each pair i,j. Then the SPIN computations are described by adjoin-
ing, for each pair i,j, the axioms 
sp+n. DX .. (t)=X. (t)-X. (max [0, t-1-b .. ]) 
1J ~ ~ 1J 
SP+12. D.X. (t+1)=a .. ·DX .. (t) 
1 J 1J 1J 
SP+13. DX.(t+1)=D1X.(t+1)+···+D--X.(t+l) J J ]f-J 
SP+14. X. (t+1)=X. (t)+DX. (t+1). 
J. J J 
Proceeding to the SPIN+ calculations, it will be convenient to 
have the following abbreviations: 
o .. (t) 
~J 
for DX .. (t)=X. (max[O, t-1-b .. ]) 
~J 1 ~J 
0' .. (t+1) 
~J 
for D.X. (t+l)=a .. ·DX .. (t) 
~ J ~J 1J 
o. (t+1) 
~ 
for DX. (t+1)=D1X. (t+1)+" ·+D __ x. (t+l) 
J J N-J 
y. (t+1) 
J 
for X. (t+l)=X. (t)+DX. (t+1) . 
J J J 
Next let c .. e[O,l] be the certainty of the impact of X. on X .. Then the 
1J 1 J 
certainty computations of SPIN+ are defined by adjoining, for each pair 
i,j, the axioms 
SP+1S. o .. (t)~o .. '(t+1)~K 
1J ~J c .. 
1J 
SP+16. o.(t+l)~ol" (t+1)i\ ••• AO'N.(t+l) 
J J J 
SP+17 . y. (t+l)~y. (t)A o. (t+l). 
J J J 
The use of these axioms in SP+ has the effect that, given a specific 
model (such as the Citizen's Model formalized below), the certainty of 
the value of X. at time t, X.(t), will be the truth value of the linguis-
J J 
tic assertion yj(bt ). 
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To formalize the Citizen's Model in a theory CM: let M=30, the 
number months used in §6.2; let N=S, the number of model parameters; for 
each pair i,j=l, ... ,S, let c .. e[O,l] be the certainties of impacts, with 
1.J 
c .. =0 if no impact was given; for each pair i,j, adjoin the axiom 
1.J 
CMI. a .. =a , 1.J w .. 1.J 
where w . . e[O,l] is the weight of impact, with w .. =0 if no impact was 
1.J 1.J 
given; and, for each pair i,j, adjoin the axiom 
CM2. b .. =bd ' 1.J ij 
where d .. is the delay of impact, with d .. =0 if no impact was given. 
1.J 1.J 
For convenience, the range [0,100] of the model parameters wil~ be 
compressed to [0,1]. This allows the constants ar to also be used as 
specific values of the X.(t). Thus the parameters are initialized by 1. 
adjoining, for each i=l, ... ,S, the axiom 
CM3. Xi(O)~aO.SO ~ K1. 0 · 
There remains only the specification of pulses. Following the 
example of §6.2, this may be accomplished by adjoining the five axioms 
CM4~ X1(b1)~X1(bO)+ao.00 ~ K1.0 
CMS. X2(b1)~X2(bO)+ao.00 ~ K1.0 
CM6. X3(b1)~X3(bO)+aO.01 ~ K1. 0 
CM7. X4(b1)~X4(bO)+aO.01 ~ KI.O 
CMS. XS(b1)~XS(bO)+aO.00 ~ K1.0 
These also provide initial values to the SPIN computations, by axiom 
SP+7. 
It is easily verified that the Citizen's Model of §6.2 constitutes a 
semantic model of the theory CM. The relation symbol < can be interpreted 
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as the usual ordering of the reals, and the function symbols +, ., and -1 
can be interpreted as the usual addition, multiplication, and inversion of 
reals. Thus, by Proposition 3.4.2-2, CM is consistent. 
CM is not categorical, however, since it is known that the theory 
OF is not categorical. Thus CM has semantic models which are not iso-
morphic with the Citizen's Model. On the other hand, since all of the 
functions and relations of CM, other than t, • -1, and <, are explicitly 
defined in terms of the individual constants a and b , nonisomorphic r s 
models will always agree at least on the interval [0,1] and for the 
times from 0 to 30. Since CM clearlY encodes all of the computations of 
the computer run described in §6.2, it follows by semantic completeness 
that a formula of L(CM) which expresses a property of the Xi--within.th~ 
given ranges of values, certainties, and times--will be a theorem of CM 
if and only if it is generated by the SPIN+ computer run of the Citizen's 
Model with the given initial values. This of course excepts minor 
discrepancies due to CM's being infinitary, while the computer deals with 
decimal approximations. Since such discrepancies will in practice be 
negligible, we may in any case conclude that CM is a correct characteriza-
tion of the logic of the Citizen's Model, and hence that the model 
output will in general always be logically reliable. 
§6.4. Future Directions 
This chapter shows how a reasonable rendering of certainty account-
ing can be built into the SPIN modeling package through some fairly 
simple modifications, and it may be expected that similar modifications 
can be developed for most of the structural modeling packages in use 
today. The formalized logic of approximate reasoning is generally 
applicable to any "A impacts B" relationship, or for that matter, any 
transitive relation such as "A is preferred to B," which occurs in 
applications of ISM (see Linstone, et. al., 1978). 
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At the same time, this work is properly regarded as only an ini-
tial step toward a more sophisticated apP,roach which would use fuzzy 
logic per se as described in §5.3, and as recently extended to the 
possibilistic logic described in §5.4. This would invoke "Certainty" as 
a linguistic variable having linguistic terms such as "certain," "un-
certain," "very certain," "absolutely certain," "more or less certain," 
and so on, and having its universe of discourse be the interval [0,1]. 
In other words "Certainty" may be developed exactly as Zadeh's linguis-
tic "Truth," which has its truth values being fuzzy subsets of [0,1]: 
This logic has now been axiomatized (§5.3), but the entirety of 
the mathematics for full implementation as an enhancement to SPIN has 
yet to b~ worked out. Partial steps in this direction are available 
from the work of Dubois and Prade (1979), which provides the needed 
generalization of the Lukasiewicz? The main task remaining is a 
corresponding generalization of the balanced conjunction defined in 
§6.3. 
The advantages of using fuzzy logic, rather than the multivalent 
logic, are two-fold: 
1) user-machine interaction can be carried out exclusively with 
the qualitative linguistic terms in the term set for certainty--i.e., 
both for input certainty values and as output--thus approaching a natural 
language conversation, 
2) in addition to the qualitative values given by the linguistic 
term set, one also has a measure of the precision of those values. 
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The latter may conceivably add a further dimension to certainty account-
ing, since it is known (Dubois and Prade 1979) that in sequences of 
inferences in fuzzy logic, the consequents tend both to become less true 
(i.e., less certain) and to become less precise. 
PART II 
LOGICS OF FORM AND SELF-REFERENCE 
CHAPTER 7 
THE LAWS OF FORM 
The aim in this chapter is to show that the "primary algebra" of 
Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form (1969) is essentially isomorphic with the 
axiomatized classical propositional calculus. 
In §6.1 the classical propositional calculus is presented as a 
specific logic (cf. §2.1.3) consisting of a formal language L(PC) to-
gether with a semantics I(PC). The formal system PC is then obtained by 
adopting the axioms and inference rules of Hilbert and Ackerman (192~). 
This axiomatization is known to be a consistent and semantically complete 
characterization of the classical logic. 
In §6.2 we define an extension PC* of PC, and then expand I(PC) to 
an appropriate semantics I(PC*) for L(PC*). PC* is a consistent and 
semantically complete inessential extension of PC. 
In §6.3 we rewrite Spencer-Brown's primary algebra as a formal 
system PA having a semantics I(PA). Brown's work established that PA 
is consistent and semantically complete with respect to I(PA). 
In §6.4 the latter result is used to show that PA is isomorphic 
with PC* in the general sense that exactly the same English language 
assertions can be expressed in both L(PA) and L(PC*) and, of those 
assertions, exactly the same ones can be formally derived as theorems of 
both PA and PC*. This in turn leads to a proof that "equality" in PA is 
isomorphic with "logical equivalence" in PC~ .... 
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§6.5 reviews and offers new proofs of some earlier results of 
Spencer-Brown (1969) and Orchard (1975) concerning the same questions as 
addressed here. 
As motivation for the development in this chapter, an outline of 
the isomorphism theorem is provided in Figure 7-1. The main steps are 
as follows. First, a translation t is defined. t is a one-to-one 
mapping of expressions of L(PA) into propositions of L(PC*). Next, 
~(PA) is shown to be identical with ~(PC*) in the sense that an equation 
E=l is valid in ~(PA) if and only if the proposition teE) is ~autology 
of ~(PC*). One then has the following simple argument: 
PAI-E= 1 iff E= 1 is valid in ~(PA) 
(completeness of PA and Proposition 1.1.6-1) 
iff teE) is a tautology of ~(PC*) 
(by the result mentioned above) 
iff PC'I~I-t (E) 
(completeness of PC~ and Proposition 1.1.6-1). 
The task in the first three sections is mainly to describe the systems 
PC* and PA with sufficient precision so that the translation t can be 
provided a rigorously explicit definition. 
§7.1. The System PC 
As symbols for a language L(PC) select a countably infinite set 
from the collection which was assumed to exist in §2.1.1. Let two of 
these symbols be denoted by , and V, to serve as logical connectives--
respectively, negation and disjunction. Let two further symbols be 
denoted by ( and ), to serve formally as parentheses. Assume that the 
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uivalence 
(*) 
Figure 7-1. Isomorphism of PC* and PA. 
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other, infinitely many, symbols of L(PC) are denoted by P1,P2"'" and 
serve as propositional variables. 
The propositions of L(PC) are defined inductively as follows: 
1. The propositional variables are propositions of L(PC) , 
2. If a string P is a proposition of L(PC) , then the string of the 
form,p is a proposition of L(PC) , 
3. If two strings P and Q are propositions of L(PC), then the string of 
the form (PVQ) is a proposition of L(PC). 
It is convenient to introduce other logical connectives--& 
(conjunction), ~(logical implication), and = (logical equivalence)--for 
purposes of abbreviating complex formulas, as follows: P&Q abbreviates 
., bP'hQ); P:lQ abbreviates '1PVQ; P=Q abbreviates (P~Q)&(Q:;)P). The use of 
parentheses is necessary for distinguishing between such formulas as 
,P&Q and ~(P&Q). On the other hand, for writing out formulas of L(PC) , 
parentheses may be dropped when the intended grouping is clear. 
Now define a semantics ~(PC) for L(PC) as follows. Let the truth 
values be the numbers 1 and O--with 1 standing for "true" and 0 standing 
for "false." Let the truth valuations (or truth-value assignments) be 
the mappings V of formulas of L(PC) into {l,O}, such that: 
1. For each propositional variable p., V(p.)e{l,O}, 
~ ~ 
2. For each proposition of the form ,P, V(,P) = 1-V(P), 
3. For each formula of the form PVQ, V(PVQ) = max[V(P),V(Q)]. 
It is easy to see that ~(PC) encodes the usual truth-tables for , and 
V. Furthermore, each V in ~(PC) acts on propositions abbreviated by 
means of &, ~, and =, in the expected ways; for example, V(P&Q)=l if and 
only if both V(P)=l and V(Q)=l. A proposition P of L(PC) is a tautology 
of ~(PC) if V(P)=l for all truth-valuations V of ~(PC). 
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By classical propositional calculus is meant the logic which is 
represented by the pair L(PC),~(PC). In this dissertation, the term 
propositional calculus shall sometimes also refer to the axiomatized 
propositional calculus--i.e., a formal logical system--denoted by PC. 
The following axiomatization was developed by Hilbert and Ackerman 
(1928, cf. Rescher 1969). As axioms, PC has the following propositions 
of L(PC): 
1. (P1VP1 )::lP1 
2. P1;:) (P1VP2) 
3. (P1VP2)=>(P2'1P1) 
4. (P1;:)P2);:)((P3'lP1)::>(P3VP2))' 
As inference rules PC has the following mappings of L(PC) into 
itself: 
1. Modus Ponens: the binary rule consisting of all triples of the form 
(P,~Q,Q) where P and Q are propositions of L(PC) , 
2. (Uniform) Substitution: the unary rule consisting of all pairs of 
the form (P,P(Q/p.»), where Q is a proposition of L(PC) , p. is a 
~ ~ 
propositional variable, and the notation P(Q/p.) is as defined in 
~ 
§2.1.1. 
The theorems of PC are generated from the axioms by means of the infer-
ence rules, in the manner described in §2.1.4.3. 
Hilbert and Ackerman's work establishes that PC is semantically 
complete with respect to ~(PC). A contradiction of L(PC) is a proposi-
tion of the form P&1P. To see that PC is consistent observe that no 
contradiction of L(PC) can be a tautology of ~(PC). Hence no contradic-
tion can be a theorem of PC, by Proposition 2.1.6-1. 
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§7.2. The Inessential Extension PC* 
Let! denote a symbol which is not in the symbol set for L(PC). 
An extension PC* of PC can be obtained as follows: 
1. Adjoin the new proposition symbol! to the set of symbols of L(PC), 
as a new proposition, thereby generating a larger set of propositions, 
2. Adjoin the proposition !=Pl&'Pl to the set of axioms of PC, thereby 
generating a larger set of theorems. 
The semantics I(PC) can be expanded to a semantics I(PC*) for L(PC*) by 
extending the domain of each valuation V in I(PC) by the additional 
requirement that V(!)=O. Thus the symbol! may be considered seman-
tically as standing for "falsehood," and syntactically as being a "name" 
for the contradiction Pl&'Pl' which name has been introduced by means of 
a "defining axiom." 
Contradiction for L(PC*) is defined similarly as for L(PC); and. 
the same simple technique discussed in §7.1 may be used to show that PC* 
is consistent. 
Proposition 7.2.-1. The system PC* is complete with respect to 
I(PC*). 
Proof. Let P be a proposition of L(PC*) which is a tautology of 
I(PC*). It is desired to show that PC*rP. Since V(!)=V(Pl&'Pl)=O for 
all truth valuations V of I(PC*), the proposition P(Pl&'Pl / !)--which is 
obtained from P by replacing each occurrence of F with an occurrence of 
Pl&'Pl--must be a tautology of I(PC*). But P(Pl&1Pl /!) is a proposition 
of L(PC), whence it follows that it must be a tautology of I(PC). Then 
PCrP(Pl&'Pl/!) by the completeness of PC with respect to I(PC). Since 
the theorems of PC are a subset of the theorems of PC*, this means that 
PC*rP(Pl&'Pl /!). From this it may be established, by induction on the 
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length of propositions of L(PC*), that PC*~P. An example of a proof by 
induction on the length of strings appears in Theorem 7.4-1. 0 
Proposition 7.2-2. The system PC* is an inessential extension of 
pc. 
Proof. Let P be a proposition of L(PC). It is desired to show 
that, if PC*~P, then PC~P (cf. §2.1.5.3). For a proof by contradiction, 
assume that P~P. Then, by the completeness of PC with respect to 
I(PC), P is not a tautology of I(PC). It follows that P is not a 
tautology of I(PC*). Hence PC*~P, by Proposition 1.1.6-1. 0 
§7.3. The System PA 
Spencer-Brown's Laws of form (1969) develops an equation calculus 
in which logical reasoning is connected to a few simple rules governing-
the manipulation of some elementary conceptual "forms." The work begins 
with the concept of a "distinction" in a uniform conceptual space. One 
side of the distinction is termed the "marked state" and is indicated by 
a "token," I; the other side of the distinction is termed the "unmarked 
state" and is indicated by the absence of a token, i. e., a blank space. 
A "primary arithmetic" is devised, which has two basic axioms: 
II=! 
91= 
(Law of Calling) 
(Law of Crossing). 
The Law of Calling may be interpreted by the statement: To indicate (or 
"call") the marked state twice is the same as to indicate it once. The 
Law of Crossing may be interpreted by: To cross the boundary of the 
distinction twice is the same as to not cross at all. 
Expressions in the primary arithmetic can be defined formally by: 
(i) the token and the blank space are expressions, (ii) if E is an 
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expression, then E1 is an expression, and (iii) if E and F are expres-
sions, then the concatenation EF is an expression. Spencer-Brawn's 
Theorem 3 (1969, p. 14) establishes that the above two laws, together 
with a few intuitively plausible "canons," enable one to reduce any 
expression of the arithmetic to either the token or the blank space. 
Thus every expression of the arithmetic indicates exactly one of the 
"marked" or "unmarked" states. 
When reducing expres.sions of the arithmetic by means of the two 
laws, it is evident that the token has two different interpretations, 
depending on whether it "covers" a blank space or some other (non-blank) 
expression--to wit, the expression -, is always interpreted as the 
"marked state," while an expression of the form E1 is interpreted as the 
state that one arrives at by crossing from the state that is indicated 
by E. These two interpretations may be united, however, by interpreting 
as the state one arrives at by crossing from the unmarked state--namely 
the marked state. In other words, the "crossing" interpretation serves 
the purpose for all expressions. 
Given the primary arithmetic, Spencer-Brown next generalized by 
introducing expression variables into the language, and by formalizing 
"equality" of expressions so that one obtains equations like e1 fl =g and 
e1 = This leads to a "primary algebra" having two "initials" and two 
"rules" (see the following). An equation of the algebra is termed 
"valid" if it is true in the primary arithmetic for all possible (uni-
form) substitutions of arithmetical expressions into that equation in 
place of the variables. Spencer-Brown's prinCipal result is that the 
primary algebra is complete under this notion of validity. Because of 
the above-mentioned Theorem 3, it is evident that this in effect is 
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completeness with respect to a two valued semantics, having as its 
values the marked and the unmarked states. 
The primary algebra will here be represented as a formal logical 
system in the sense of §2.1.4. To this end, several mathematical objects 
and properties left unwritten or simply assumed in the primary algebra 
must here be made formally explicit. These are discussed in what follows. 
As symbols for a language L(PA), select a countably infinite set 
of symbols which are different from those used for L(PC*). Let two of 
these symbols be denoted by [ and ], to serve formally as square brackets; 
let two further symbols be denoted by ( and ), to serve as parentheses; 
let a fifth symbol be denoted by =, to serve as an equality symbol; and 
let a sixth symbol be denoted bye, serving to formalize the notion of 
blank space. The infinitely many remaining symbols will be denoted by 
e1,e2 , ••. , and will be referred to as expression variables. The language 
L(PA) has expressions, defined inductively by: 
1. Expression variables are expressions of L(PA) , 
2. The symbol e is an expression of L(PA), 
3. If a string E is an expression of L(PA) , then the string of the form 
[E) is an expression of L(PA) , 
4. If two strings E and F are expressions of L(PA), then the string of 
the form (EF) is an expression of L(PA). 
In writing out expressions, parentheses may be dropped if the symbol 
groupings are clear or irrelevant; but square brackets may not be dropped. 
Brackets are here being used as logical connectives, and therefore are 
always essential to the syntactical form of an expression. 
An equation of L(PA) is a string of the form E=F, where E and F 
are expressions of L(PA). 
The formal logical system PA has as axioms the following five 
equations of L(PA): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
[[e1]e1]=e 
[[ele3][e2e3]]=[[el] [e2]]e3 
e1e=e1 
e1e2=e2e1 
el(e2e3)=(ele2)e3· 
The inference rules of PA are the following mappings of L(PA) into 
itself: 
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1. (Not-Necessarily-Uniform) Substitution: all pairs of the form 
(E=F,G=G*), where E=F is an equation of L(PA), G is an expression of 
L(PA), and G* is an expression of L(PA) that is obtained from G by 
2. 
substituting an occurrence of F for each of one or more (but not 
necessarily all) occurrences of E in G, 
(Uniform) Replacement: all pairs of the form (E=F,(E=F)(G/e.)), 
~ 
where G is an expression of L(PA), e. is an expression variable, and 
~ 
(E=F)(G/e.) is as defined in §2.1.1, 
~ 
3. Symmetry of Equality: all pairs of the form (E=F,F=E), where E and 
F are expressions of L(PA), 
4. Transitivity of Equality: all triples of the form (E=F,F=G,E=G), 
where E, F, and G are expressions of L(PA). 
The system LOF has a set of theorems as defined in §2.1.4.3. 
The manner in which LOF represents Spencer-Brown's primary algebra 
may now be summarized as follows: 
1) The blank space is here replaced by a specific symbol, denoted 
by the Greek letter e, 
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2) In order to have expressions be strings--instead of two dimen-
sional arrays made up of tokens and blank spaces--the token -', is here 
replaced by the pair of square brackets, [ and ], 
3) On account of item 1, the token -" thought of as "covering" a 
blank space, is now written as [e), 
4) In the present notation, the above axioms 1 and 2 of PA are 
Spencer-Brown's "initials" of the primary algebra, entitled "position" 
and "transposition"; and the above inference rules 1 and 2 are Spencer-
Brown's rules of "substitution" and "replacement," 
5) Axiom 3 encodes the use of the blank space, which in Laws of 
form (p. 15) is expressed by the "Rule of Dominance" and, briefly stated, 
says that "marked" dominates "unmarked", 
6) Commutativity and associativity of concatenation are here 
formalized, by means of axioms 4 and 5, 
7) Parentheses are introduced for expressing the associativity 
property of concatenation, in axiom 5, 
8) Symmetry and transitivity of equality are here formalized, by 
inference rules 3 and 4. 
From these notes it can be seen that exactly the same equations--under 
transliteration in accordance with the above items 1 and 2--are express-
ible and derivable in both the primary algebra and the formal system PA. 
The semantics I(PA) for L(PA) has as values the letters ~ and ~, 
standing respectively for the marked and unmarked states. The valuations 
of I(PA) are the mappings v of expressions of L(PA) into {~,~} such 
that: 
1. For each elementary variable e., v(e.)e{m,u}, 
l. l.--
2. v(e)=~, 
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3. For any expression of the form [E], v([E])=~ if v(E)=~; and v([E])=~ 
if v(E)=~, 
4. For any expression of the form EF, v(EF)=~ if either v(E)=~ or 
v(F)~; otherwise v(EF)=~. 
Item 4 evidently is in keeping with the aforementioned "rule of dominance." 
An equation E=F of L(PA) is valid in L(PA) if v(E)=v(F) for all valuations 
v of L(PA). 
An inconsistency of L(PA) is an equation of the form E=[E]. It 
can be shown that the system PA is consistent, by Proposition 1.1.6-1 
and the same technique as discussed for PC in §7.1. 
Proposition 7.3-1. The system PA is complete with respect to 
I(PA) • 
Proof: Spencer-Brown's completeness proof applies, since the 
foregoing remarks show that L(PA) is essentially the same semantics as 
used in Laws of form. More exactly, if an equation E=F is valid in 
I(PA) , then it is also valid in Spencer-Brown's semantics, since every 
arithmetical expression is uniquely reducible to either -, or the blank 
space (Laws of form, Theorem 3); and conversely for the same reason. 0 
§7.4. The Systems PA And PC* Are Isomorphic 
A translation t of expressions of L(PA) into propositions of 
L(PC*) can now be defined as follows: 
1. For each index i,t(e.)=p., where e. is the i-th expression variable 
1. 1. 1. 
of L(PA) , and p. is the i-th propositional variable of L(PC*), 
1. 
2. t(e)=K, 
3. For each expression of the form [E], t([E])= ~t(E), 
4. For each expression of the form EF, t(EF)= t(E)Vt(F). 
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It can be shown, by induction on the length of expressions of L(PA), 
that the mapping t is well-defined. Furthermore, by induction on the 
length of propositions of L(PC*), t is a one-to-one correspondence 
between expressions of L(PA) and propositions of L(PC*). Consequently, 
the inverse translation, t-1, is also well-defined. 
The following theorem establishes an isomorphism of PA and PC* in 
the precise sense that, for any expression E of LePA) , PArE=[e] if and 
only if PC~t(E). This notion of isomorphism may be interpreted as 
saying that essentially the same assertions of ordinary Engli~h are 
expressible in both L(PA) and L(PC*), and, of those so expressible, 
exactly the same assertions are formally derivable in both PA and PC*. 
This interpretation is justified by reading teE) as usual for formulas 
of PC--Le., simply as asserting "teE)"--and by reading the expression 
[e] as standing for "true"--so that "E=[e]" may be interpreted as assert-
ing "the proposition lEI is true". 
Theorem 7.4-1. The systems PA and PC* are isomorphic. 
Proof. By the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
sufficient to show that IePA) can be identified with I(PC*) in the sense 
that for any expression E of L(LOF), 
I(PA)FE=[e] iff I(PC*)Ft(E). 
By the definition of I(PA) , each valuation v is uniquely deter-
mined by its action on the expression variables e .. Similarly, by the 
~ 
definition of I(PC*), each truth-value assignment V is uniquely deter-
mined by its action on the propositional variables p .. Consequently, 
~ 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of valuation 
mappings, given by: 
v(e. )=m iff V(p. )=1. 
~ - ~ 
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Since v([e])~, for all v in I (PA) , it now follows by the defini-
tions of "valid in I(PA)" and "tautology of I(PC*)" that it is sufficient 
to show: for every expression E of L(PA) , and every valuation v of 
I(PA), if V is the truth-value assignment of I(PC*) corresponding to v, 
then 
v(E)~ iff V(t(E))=l. 
This will be accomplished by induction on the length of expressions E of 
L(PA). Let E be any expression of L(PA); and let n be the length of E. 
Case 1: n=l. By definition of the expressions of L(PA) , there are 
two possibilities: 
Case 1.a: E is an expression variable, e .• Then t(e.)=p., by the 
~ 1 ~ 
definition of t; so v(E)~ iff V(t(E))=l, by virtue of the assumed 
correspondence between v and V. 
Case l.b: E is the symbol e. This case does not arise, since here 
there is no v such that v(E)=~. 
Case 2: n>l. Here also there are two possibilities: 
Case 2.a: E is an expression of the form [F]. Then F has length 
less than n, and the induction hypothesis applies, giving 
v(F)=~ iff V(t(F))=l. 
It follows that 
Thus, 
v(F)=~ iff V(t(F))=O. 
v(E)~ iff v(F)=~ 
iff V(t(F))=O 
iff V(,t(F))=l 
iff V(t(E))=l 
(1) 
(def. of I(PA)) 
(by (1)) 
(def. of I(PC*)) 
(def. of t) 
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Case 2.b: E is an expression of the form FG. Then each of F and G 
have length less than n, and the induction hypothesis provides 
Thus, 
v(F)~ iff V(t(F»=l 
V(G)=~ iff V(t(G»=l. 
(2) 
(3) 
v(E)~ iff either v(F)=~ or v(G)=~ 
iff either V(t(F»=l or V(t(G»=l 
iff V(t(F)~t(G»=l 
iff V(t(FG»=1. 
(def. of ~(PA) 
(by (2) and (3» 
(def. of ~(PC*» 
(def. of t) 
This completes the proof, by induction on n. 0 
The following theorem shows that equality in PA is isomorphic with 
logical equivalence in PC*. 
Theorem 7.4-2. For all equations E=F of L(PA) , 
PA~E=F iff PC~~t(E)=t(F). 
Proof. Let G be the expression t-1(t(E)=t(F» of L(PA). By-
Theorem 7.4-1 and the fact that t-1 is well-defined, 
PC*~t(E)=t(F) iff PA~G=[E]. (1) 
By Propositions 7.2-1 and 1.1.6-1, 
PC*~t(E)=t(F) iff ~(PC*)Ft(E)=t(F). (2) 
By Propositions 7.3-1 and 1.1.6-1, 
PA~G=[E] iff ~(PA)FG=[E]. (3) 
It follows by (1), (2), and (3) that it is sufficient to show 
~(PA)FG=[E] iff ~(PA)FE=F. (4) 
Item (4) can be established as follows. Observe that G can be 
written explicitly as [[[E]F][[F]E]], by the definition of t and the 
definition of the connective =. 
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For the "only if" part of (4), suppose that G=[E] is valid in 
~(PA). Then, for all v, v(G)~. It is easy to verify that, if v(E)~(F), 
for any v, then v(G)~. Consequently, for all v, v(E)=v(F)--i.e., the 
equation E=F is valid in ~(PA). 
For the "if" part of (4), suppose that E=F is valid in ~(PA). 
Then, for all valuations v, v(E)=v(F). Hence, for all v, either 
v(E)=v(F)~ or v(E)=v(F)=~. Here one can verify that, in either case, 
v(G)=!. Thus, for all v, v(G)=v([E])--i.e., the equation G=[E] is valid 
in ~(PA). 0 
§7.5. Review of Spencer-Brown's and Orchard's Results 
Concerning Propositional Calculus 
Let t* be the restriction of the inverse translation t-1 to just 
the propositions of L(PC). Then t* turns out to be Spencer-Brown's 
"interpretation" of propositions of the propositional calculus into 
expressions of the primary algebra. In the present notation, his result 
concerning propositional calculus may be expressed as follows. 
Proposition 7.5-1. For P any proposition of PC, PArt*(P)=[E] iff 
P is a tautology of ~(PC). 
Proof. By Theorem 7.3-1, PA~t*(P)=[E] iff PC*~t(t*(P)). But 
t(t*(P)) is just P. Hence 
PA~t*(P)=[E] iff PC*~P. (1) 
Since PC* is an inessential extension of PC (Proposition 7.2-2) and P is 
a proposition of L(PC), 
PC*I-P iff PcrP. (2) 
By the completeness of PC with respect ~(PC), 
PCrP iff P is a tautology of ~(PC). (3) 
Lines (1),(2), and (3) together imply the desired result. 0 
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A proposition P of L(PC) is an antitautology of ~(PC) if V(P)=O 
for all V in ~(PC). A proposition P of L(PC) is a contingency of ~(PC) 
if V(P) may be either 1 or 0, depending on V. Orchard (1975) establishes 
the following. 
Proposition 7.5-2. For any proposition P of PC, (i) PA~t*(P)=e 
iff P is an antitautology of ~(PC), and (ii) neither PA~t*(P)=[e] nor 
PA~t*(P)=e iff P is a contingency of ~(PC). 
Proof: (i) Similar to the proof of Proposition 7.5-1. (ii) It is 
obvious that P is either a tautology, an antitautology, or a contingency 
of ~(PC). Thus (ii) follows by (i) and Proposition 7.5-1. ·0 
These results established conclusively that the propositional 
calculus can be embedded in the primary algebra; but they also raised 
the question of why, conversely, the primary algebra cannot be embedded 
in propositional calculus. This led to the isomorphism theorem of §7.4. 
It was observed that the translation t* could not be inverted to provide 
a translation of expressions of the primary algebra into propositions of 
the propositional calculus, simply because the language of the proposi-
tional calculus contains no symbol corresponding to Spencer-Brown's 
blank space. This suggested adding a new symbol, together with a defin-
ing axiom, as was done in §7.2 to obtain PC* from PC. The fact that PC* 
is an inessential extension of PC justifies the terminology of the 
conclusion: the primary algebra is essentially isomorphic with classical 
propositional calculus. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE 
The primary aim of this chapter is to establish that F. J. Varela's 
calculus for self-reference (Varela 1975) provides a semantically com-
plete axiomatization of' S. C. Kleene's three-valued logic of partial 
recursion (Kleene 1938 and 1952). 
In §8.1 the calculus is represented as a formal system CSR having 
a semantics I(CSR). Varela's work establishes that CSR is complete with 
respect to I(CSR). 
In §8.2, first, the three-valued truth-table system studied by 
Kleene is represented as a formal logic, consisting of a language L(K), 
together with a semantics I(K). This formalizes a notion of "strong 
equivalence" of logical propositions, denoted by~. Next is defined a 
translation t of expressions of L(CSR) into propositions of L(K), which 
is then used to define a formal system K. The axioms and inference 
rules of K are just the images under t of the axioms and inference rules 
of CSR. Thus, it is immediate that CSR is isomorphic with K. 
§8.3 establishes that K is complete with respect to the semantics 
I(K). This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.4-1. 
In §8.4 it is shown that PC, PC* and PA are Aristotelean systems, 
while CSR and K are non-Aristotelean systems. Thus we establish that 
extensions of K having the form K(P~'P), although inconsistent, are 
nevertheless coherent. 
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§8.5 studies the completeness and coherence of some special exten-
sions of K. This in part corrects an apparent oversight in Varela's 
paper. Where that work uses E=D as an "abbreviation" for E=E1; it 
happens that these two equations are in fact formally derivable from one 
another in CSR. This section also establishes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a simple extension to be coherent. 
As motivation for the developments in this chapter, an outline of 
the abovementioned completeness result for K is provided in Figure 8-1. 
Here the primary task is to show that I(CSR) is identical with I(K) in 
the sense that an equation E=F of L(CSR) is valid in I(CSR) if and only 
if the strong equivalence t(E)~t(F) is valid in I(K). With this result, 
one may then argue as follows: 
KrP~ iff CSRrt-1(p)=t-1(Q) 
(isomorphism of CSR and K) 
iff t-1(p)=t-1(Q) is valid in I(CSR) 
(completeness of CSR and Proposition 1.1.6-1) 
iff P~ is valid in I(K) 
(by the result mentioned above). 
No such axiomatization of Kleene's logic has heretofore been known. 
§8.1. The System CSR 
The development in Varela's "A calculus for self-reference" 
parallels the discussion in Laws of form. First, the notion of a marked 
and an unmarked state is augmented by the notion of an "autonomous 
state." This state may be conceptualized as the entire uniform space in 
which Spencer-Brown makes his "distinction," and it is indicated formally 
by a new sign, LJ. 
Equivalence 
(* ) 
U) 
U) 
(!) 
c 
(!) 
.j..l (?) 
(!) 
1 
CJ 
Figure 8-1. Semantic completeness of K. 
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This leads to an "extended arithmetic" having the following axioms: 
et = -, , where e is either , blank, or (Dominance) 
(Crossing) 
(Reflexion) 
(Autonomy) 
=U= 
51= Ll 
iJLJ~L1 
which axioms may be interpreted similarly as Spencer-Brown's two "laws." 
For example, the third axiom (Reflexion) may be interpreted as saying: 
to cross from the autonomous state is to remain in the autonomous state. 
Furthermore, the rule of dominance is hereby modified to read: marked 
dominates autonomous, and autonomous dominates unmarked. 
Based on these axioms, Varela established an analogue of Spencer-
Brown's Theorem 3: that any expression of the extended arithmetic ca~ be 
reduced to exactly one of -','blank, or LJ.' The extended arithmetic is 
then generalized to form an' "extended algebra," which includes a 
formalized equals sign, expression variables, and three axioms (repre-
sented below as axioms 1, 2, and 3). Last, equations of the extended 
algebra are termed "valid" in the analogous sense as equations of the 
primary algebra, and it is established in full detail that the extended 
algebra is semantically complete with respect to this notion of validity. 
It follows that remarks similar to those given in §7.3 will estab-
lish that the following system CSR and semantics I(CSR) provides a 
correct formalization of the extended algebra. We may here note that 
the Greek letter a is now used as a replacement for the sign LJ.' 
Let the formal language L(CSR) be the language that is obtained 
from L(PA) by adjoining a new symbol, denoted by a, to the symbols of 
L(PA) (cf. §2.1.5.3). Let the semantics I(CSR) have as values the 
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letters !, ~, and !, and as valuations have the mappings v of expres-
sions of L(CSR) into {!,~,!} such that: 
1. For each expression variable e., v(e.)e{m,u,a}, 
1. 1. ---
2. v(e)=~ and v(a)=!, 
3. For any expression of the form [E], v([E])=!,~, or !, according as 
4. For any expression of the form EF, if v(E)#V(F), then v(EF) equals 
whichever one of v(E) and v(F) is most "dominant", where m dominates 
!, and ! dominates ~; otherwise v(EF) is the value that v assigns to 
both E and F. 
An equation E=F of L(CSR) is valid in I(CSR) if v(E)=v(F) for all valua-
tions v of I(CSR). 
The formal logical system CSR has as axioms all equations of L(CSR) 
having the following forms: 
1. [[E]G]E = E 
2. [[EG][FG]] = [[E][F]]G 
3. [Ea]E = E 
4. Ee = E 
5. EF=FE 
6. E(FG) = (EF)G. 
As inference rules CSR has the following mappings of L(CSR) into itself, 
all defined similarly as for PA: 
1. (Not-Necessarily-Uniform) Substitution 
2. Symmetry of Equality 
3. Transitivity of Equality 
These axioms and inference rules generate a set of theorems of CSR as in 
§2.1.4.3. A rule of (uniform) replacement is not used in CSR since the 
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axioms are here defined in accordance with some axiom schemes--i.e., 
the above "forms" 1 through 6--which ensures a priori that all substi-
tution instances of theorems are also theorems. 
Proposition 8.1-1. The system CSR is complete with respect to 
I(CSR) . 
Proof. By Varela's completeness theorem and essentially the same 
argument as in Proposition 7.3-1. 0 
An inconsistency of L(CSR) shall here be defined as an equation of 
the form E=[E], exactly as for PA. It should be noted that this defini-
tion differs from that of Varela, who adheres more closely to Spencer-
Brown in haVing an inconsistency be anyone of the specific equations 
[e]=a, a=e, and [e]=e. The present definition is a much more natura~ 
one, however, especially in view of the following two propositions. 
Proposition 8.1-2. The system CSR is inconsistent. 
Proof. The inconsistency a=[a] is valid in I(CSR). Hence 
CSR~a=[a] by Proposition 8.1-1. 0 
Proposition 8.1-3. The system CSR is coherent. 
Proof. Consider anyone of Varela's inconsistencies mentioned 
above, saya=e. This equation is not valid in I(CSR). Hence CSR~a=e, 
by Proposition 2.1.6-1. 0 
Thus CSR, although inconsistent, is nevertheless coherent--and is 
therefore a nontrivial non-Aristotelean system in the sense described in 
§2 .1.5.4. 
§8.2. Kleene's Logic And The System K 
Kleene's three-valued system of truth-tables incorporates an 
"undefined" truth-value and a notion of "strong equivalence" between 
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propositions. This system is here presented as a formal logic consist-
ing of a language L(K) and a semantics ~(K), wherein the undefined 
truth-value is represented by the number ~ and the notion of strong 
equivalence is denoted, as in Kleene's work, by~. An addition to 
Kleene's system is the special proposition symbol A, introduced formally 
below. 
Let A and ~ denote two symbols which are not included in the 
symbol set for L(PC*). The language L(K) may be obtained from L(PC*) as 
follows: 
1. Adjoin the new symbol ~ as a proposition symbol, thereby generating 
a larger set of propositions, 
2. Let the well-formed strings of L(K) be the equivalences of the form 
P~Q where P and Q are propositions of L(K). 
The same abbreviations with &, ~, and =, apply here as for L(PC) 
and L(PC*). 
The semantics ~(K) for L(K) may be obtained from the semantics 
~(PC*) by: 
1. Include the number ~ in the set of truth-values, thereby forming the 
set {O,~,l}, 
2. Extend the truth-valuations of ~(PC*) to the propositions of K 
according to: for all v, v(~)=~. 
An equivalance E~ of L(K) is valid in ~(K) if v(E)=v(F) for all 
valuations v in ~(K). This concept of validity exactly captures the 
sense in which Kleene (1952) asserts that a strong equivalence of propo-
sitions is "true." 
Given the language L(K), one may now define a formal system K, as 
follows. Let the Greek letter t here denote the translation of L(CSR) 
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into L(K) that is obtained by extending the translation of §7.4 according 
to: 
tea) = ~. 
It can be verified that this t is one-to-one, so that the inverse mapping 
t-1 is well-defined. Then the axioms and inference rules of a formal 
logical system K are obtained simply by applying this translation to the 
axioms and inference rules of CSR. This leads to an explicit description 
of the axioms of K as being all equivalences of L(K) having the following 
forms: 
alternatively, (P~Q)~P ~ P, 
2. ,(,(PVR)V'(QVR» ~ ,(,PY'Q)VR 
alternatively, (PVR)&(QVR) ~ (P&Q)VR, 
3. , (PV!)VP ~ PV! 
alternatively, (PV!)~P ~ PV!, 
4. PVF ~ P 
5. PVQ ~ QVP 
6. PV (QVR) ~ (P'/Q)V R. 
The inference rules of CSR may similarly be transcribed, leading to a 
set of theorems for K. 
For the systems CSR and K, it is natural to say that they are 
isomorphic if the translation t has the property that, for all equations 
E=F of L(CSR), CSR~E=F if and only if K~t(E)~t(F). In this terminology, 
we have: 
Theorem 8.2-1. The systems CSR and K are isomorphic. 
Proof. Given the definition of K in terms of the translation t, one 
can show: (i) proofs in CSR translate into proofs in K, by induction 
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on the length of proofs in CSR, and (ii) proofs in K translate into 
proofs in CSR, by induction on the length of proofs in K. 0 
The following results establish that K is non-Aristotelean. 
Proposition 8.2-2. The system K is inconsistent. 
Proof. Similarly as for CSR, Proposition 8.1-2. 0 
Proposition 8.2-3. The system K is coherent. 
Proof. Similarly as for CSR, Proposition 8.1-3. 0 
§8.3. Semantic Completeness of K 
This result is patterned after the isomorphism theorem of §8.4. 
Theorem 8.3-1. The system K is complete with respect to I(K). 
Proof. Let P~ be any equivalence of L(K). Let E=F be the equa-
tion t- 1(p)=t-1 (Q) of L(CSR), where t is the translation defined in 
§8.2. By the argument given at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
sufficient to show that I(CSR) and I(K) can be identified in the sense 
that 
I(CSR)FE=F iff I(K)FP=Q. 
Observe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
valuations v in I(CSR) and the truth-value assignments V of I(K), given 
by 
and 
v(e.)=u iff V(p.)=O. 
1. - 1. 
Here it is implicit that v(e.)=a iff V(p.)=~. It follows by this cor-
1. - 1. 
respondence, and the definitions of "valid" for I(CSR) and I(K), that it 
is sufficient to establish: for all expressions E of L(CSR), and all 
valuations v of I(CSR), 
v(E)~ iff V(t(E))=l, (1) 
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and 
v(E)=~ iff V(t(E»=O, (2) 
where V is the truth-value assignment of ~(K) corresponding to v. This 
may be established as follows. Let E be an expression of L(CSR), and 
let n be the length of E. 
Case 1: n=l. There are three possibilities: 
Case 1.a: E is an expression variable, e .. In this case, both (1) 
~ 
and (2) hold by virtue of the stated correspondence between v and V . 
• 
Case 1.b: E is the symbol e. On the one hand, v(E)=~, ~or all v, 
by definition of ~(CSR); on the other hand, t(E)=K, so that V(t(E»=O, 
for all V, by definition of ~(K). Thus (2) is established for all v and 
V. Assertion (1) holds for all v and V by default; there is no v such 
that v(e)=~, and there is no V such that V(K)=l. 
Case 1.c: E is the symbol a. In this case, both (1) and (2) hold 
by default. 
Case 2: n>l. Here there are two possibilities: 
Case 2.a: E is an expression of the form [F]. Since the expres-
sion F has shorter length than E, the induction hypothesis provides that 
(1) and (2) hold for F. Thus, 
v(E)=~ iff v(F)=~ 
iff V(t(F»=O 
iff V(,t(F»=l 
iff V(t(E»=l 
(def. of ~(CSR» 
(ind. hypo (2» 
(def. of ~(K» 
(def. of t) 
which establishes (1) for E. A similar argument establishes (2). 
Case 2.b: E is an expression of the form FG. In this case the 
induction hypothesis provides that (1) and (2) hold for both F and G. 
Thus, 
v(E)~ iff either v(F)=~ or v(G)=~ 
iff either V(t(F»=l or V(t(G»=l 
iff V(t(F)Vt(G»=l 
iff V(t(E»=l 
which establishes (1); and 
v(E)=~ iff both v(F)=~ and v(G)=~ 
iff both V(t(F»=O and V(t(G»=O 
iff V(t(F)Vt(G»=O 
iff V(t(E»=O 
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(def. of I(CSR» 
(ind . hyp . (1 ) ) 
(def. of I(K» 
(def. of t) 
(de£. of I(CSR» 
(ind. hyp . (2» 
(def. of I(K» 
(def. of t) 
which establishes (2). This completes the proof, by induction on n. 0 
§8.4. Aristotelean Vs. Non-Aristotelean Classification 
Of PC, PC*, PA, CSR, And K 
Classification of CSR and K has already been accomplished in the 
preceding sections. These results may be summarized as follows. 
Proposition 8.4-1. The systems CSR and K are non-Aristotelean 
systems. 
Proof. This fact about CSR is a consequence of Propositions 8.1-2 
and 8.1-3. The proposition about K is established by Propositions 8.2-2 
and 8.2-3. 0 
The corresponding facts about PC, PC*, and PA can be demonstrated 
as follows. 
Proposition 8.4-2. The systems PC, PC* and PA are Aristotelean 
systems. 
Proof. For PC: Let PC' be any inconsistent simple extension of 
PC. It is required to show that PC' is incoherent. Let P&,P be an 
inconsistency of L(PC) such that PC'rP&,p. Let Q be any proposition of 
L(PC'). Since PC' is a simple extension of PC, Q is also a proposition 
of L(PC). Observe that the proposition (P&'P)~Q is a tautology of 
I(PC). Then PC~(P&'P)~Q, by the completeness of PC with respect to 
I(PC). Hence, PC'~(P&'P)~Q. By modus ponens, it follows that PC'~Q. 
Since Q was chosen as an arbitrary proposition of L(PC'), this shows 
that PC' is incoherent. 
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The proof for PC* is identical to the above. Then the fact that 
PA is Aristotelean may be established as a consequence of isomorphism, 
Theorem 7.4-1. 0 
These results show that the present characterization of,formal 
logical systems as Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean is both natural and 
intuitively appealing. Its strength lies in its being sufficiently 
general to apply for all systems as defined in §2.1. 
§8.5. Completeness And Coherence Of Simple Extensions 
Let f be a set of equivalences of L(K). By the semantics I(K[f]) 
for the simple extension K[r] is meant the semantics that is obtained 
from I(K) by limiting the set of valuation mappings to be the set of 
only those V such that, for every equivalence P~Q in r, we have 
V(P)=V(Q). 
Proposition 8.5-1. For any simple extension K' of K, K' is 
complete with respect to I(K'). 
Proof. Let CSR' denote the inverse image of K' under the transla-
tion t of §8.2; and let a semantics I(CSR') be defined analagously as 
the semantics I(K'). By going back to Varela's original proof (Varela 
1975), which was used in §8.1 to affirm that K is complete with respect 
to I(K) , and everywhere replacing the word "true" with the phrase "valid 
in I(CSR')," one obtains a proof that CSR' is complete with respect to 
I(CSR'). Then the methods of §8.3 apply to show that K' is complete 
with respect to I(K'). 0 
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The above proof makes tacit use of the fact that Varela's complete-
ness theorem can be generalized to the statement: If the inference "from 
E=E' infer F=F'" is valid in the extended arithmetic, then that inference 
is formally derivable within the extended algebra. Proposition 8.5-1 
leads to a formal connection between paradox and autonomy in K as follows. 
and . 
Proposition 8.5-2. For all formulas P of L(K), 
K[P~ P] f- P~ 
K[P~] f- P~ P. 
Proof. Since, for all V in I(K), V(P)=V(,P) if and only if 
V(P)=V(~), both assertions follow from Proposition 8.5-1 by the defini-
.tion of I(K'). In the first case, K' is K[P~'P]; in the second, K' is 
K[P~]. 0 
The next two propositions establish some necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a simple extension to be coherent. 
Proposition 8.5-3. For all simple extensions K' of K, K' is a 
coherent system if and only if the set of valuation mappings for I(K') 
is nonempty. 
Proof. Let K' be any simple extension of K'; and let ~ denote the 
set of valuation mappings for I(K'). Suppose that K' is coherent. 
Then, by the definition of coherence, there exists an equivalence P~ in 
L(K') such that K'~P~. Hence, by Proposition 8.5-1, the equivalence 
P~ is not valid in I(K'). But then, by the definition of "valid," 
there must exist V in I(K') for which V(P)#V(Q). Thus, necessarily, ~ 
is nonempty. 
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Suppose next that $ is nonempty. Then some valuation V in I(K) is 
a valuation in I(K'). Observe that, for all V in I(K), V(~)#VC~). It 
follows that there exist V in I(K') such that V(~)#V(~). But then, F~ 
is not valid in I(K'), so Proposition 2.1.6-1 shows that K'~~~. 
Accordingly, K' is coherent. 0 
Let the notation V* denote the valuation V of I(K) defined by: 
V*(p.)=~, for all i=1,2, .... 
1. 
Proposition 8.5-4. For all formulas P of L(K), the simple exten-
sion K(P~ P) is a coherent extension if and only if V*(P)=~. 
Proof. It can be shown, by induction on the length ·of formulas P 
of L(K), that V*CP)=~ iff there exists at least one valuation V of 
I(K) such that V(P)=V(1P). We can make use of this result in the follow-
ing way. Let K' denote a simple extension K[P~'P] of K. 
Suppose that K' is coherent. Then, by the Proposition 7.5-3, the 
set $ of valuations of ICK') is nonempty. Say that V is in $. By the 
definition of the semantics ICK'), we have that the equivalence P~'P is 
valid in I(K'). It follows that V(P)=V(,P). Then the above-stated 
result implies that V*(P)=~. 
Suppose that V*(P)=~. Then, by the same result there exist V in 
I(K) such that V(P)=V(,P). By the definition of I(K'), this means that 
the set of valuations for ICK') is nonempty. Hence, K' is coherent, by 
Proposition 8.5-3. 0 
An immediate consequence of Proposition 8.5-4 is that the defini-
tion of "inconsistency" used by Varela is, more exactly, a form of 
incoherence--i.e., the three extensions CSR[a=e]. CSR[a=[e]], and 
CSR[e=[e]] are all incoherent extensions of CSR. This also illustrates 
by example that coherence, and not consistency, is the relevant critereon 
for determining the meaningfulness of non-Aristotelean systems. 
CHAPTER 9 
UNDECIDABILITY AND UNKNOWABILITY 
The aim of this last chapter of Part II is two-fold: (i) to estab-
lish a formal connection between Varela's concept of logical autonomy 
and the notion of a totally undecidable partial recursive set, (ii) to 
define a general concept of "mechanical unknowability" and to show how 
various instances of this idea may be represented in a'non-Aristotelean, 
yet coherent, frame. The former is accomplished in §9.1, the latter in 
§9.2. 
§9.1.1 lays down basic terminology from recursion theory. Then 
§9.1.2 defines a system PRS of partial recursive sets, which in principle 
is a simple recasting of the system K. Then the desired connection 
between autonomy in CSR and undecidability in PRS is then established in 
§9.1.3. 
§9.2.1 begins the study of mechanical unknowability with a reorien-
tation on the concepts from recursion theory, taking Turing machines as 
the basic givens. §9.2.2 extends this into a definition of mechanical 
unknowability vs. mechanical conceivability, based on the popular brain-
computer analogy. §9.2.3 looks more carefully at the general form of 
paradox. §9.2.4 then proceeds to some illustrations regarding 
(i) "perfect" systems, (ii) time, (iii) the concept of "goodness," and 
(iv) transcendent realms of being. 
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§9.1. Formal Autonomy Vis-A-Vis Recursive Undecidability 
§9.1.1. Partial Recursive Sets 
The following is an admixture from Kleene (1952) and Rogers (1967). 
Let N denote the natural numbers. A partial function ~ is a mapping of 
some subset Dom(~) N into N. Dom(~) is the domain of definition of ~, 
and, for each argument x&N, the value ~(x) is defined or undefined 
according as x&Dom(~) or xtDom(~). A partial function is a total 
function if Dom(~)=N. 
The concept of recursion may be given in terms of a mathematically 
well-defined class ~ of Turing machines. For an explicit definition, 
see Rogers (1967). Loosely, a Turing machine is an algorithm consisting 
of a set of instructions describing precise mechanical steps by which, . 
given any number in N, one can proceed with a well-defined computation. 
Let M be a machine in ~ and let M(x) represent the application of M to 
the argument x. If the computation procedure terminates, producing a 
value y, one writes M(x)=y and says that the computation converges; 
otherwise, the computation diverges (loops, provides no information, 
etc.). A partial function ~ is algorithmic if there is a Turing machine 
M~ such that: 
1. If ~(x) is defined, then M~(x)=~(x), 
2. If ~(x) is undefined, then M~(x) diverges. 
Each M describes a unique ~; on the other hand, it is possible that a 
given ~ have more than one choice for M. A recursive function is an 
algorithmic total function. A partial recursive function is an algo-
rithmic partial function. Hence, by definition, recursive functions are 
partial recursive. 
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A characteristic function is a partial function K such that either 
K(x)=l or K(X)=O, for all xeDom(K). For each characteristic function K, 
there is a partial set PK defined by 
xePK if K(x)=l 
xtPK if K(X)=O 
undecided if K(X) is undefined. 
If K is total, then PK is a total set (hence a "set" in the classical 
sense). For a given partial set p, let K denote the characteristic p 
function for p. A partial set PK is a recursive set if K is a recursive 
function, and is a partial recursive set if K is a partial recursive 
function. 
The interrelation of partial sets, sets, part1al recursive set~, 
and recursive sets is illustrated in Figure 9-1. We may see that the 
various regions of this figure are nonempty as follows. A simple example 
of a recursive set is the empty set ~ defined by K(X)=O, for all xeN. 
The set ~ is recursive because there is a Turing machine M such that 
M(x)=O for all xeN. A partial recursive set which is not a recursive 
set is the empty partial set v defined by having Kv(X) be undefined for 
all xeN. v is recursive because Kv can be represented by a machine 
which always "loops" or is otherwise nonterminating. That there are 
sets which are not recursive sets and that there are partial sets which 
are not partial recursive sets is an immediate consequence of there 
being only countably infinitely many Turing machines, while the sets and 
partial sets are uncountably many. A specific example of a (total) set 
which is not recursive can be given as an instance of the well-known 
"halting problem." Let tVo , tVl'tV2 ' ... be a standard (Godel) numbering of 
the unary partial recursive functions. Define q by 
Total Sets 
Partial Sets 
Recursive 
Sets 
Partial 
Recursive 
Sets 
Figure 9-1. Interrelation of different "sets." 
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xeq iff xeDom(~x). 
Then, for all xeN, either xeq or xtq; so K must be total. However, q 
Roger's Corollary I-VII shows that Kq is not ~i for any i=I,2, .... 
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Hence, K is not recursive. A specific example of a partial set which q 
is not a partial recursive set can be obtained from q by the ad hoc 
specification that K (0) is undefined. 
q 
§9.1.2. The System PRS 
Kleene's original definition of L(K) treated propositional 
variables as n-aryO relation symbols, and each was thought of as repre-
senting an "n-ary partial recursive relation" on N. For convenience, we 
here deal only with unary relations, i.e., partial recursive sets. 
The system PRS is obtained from K by modifying L(K) as follows: 
let! denote a new symbol, called an individual variable; replace Pi 
with Pie!), for all i=I,2, .... ; replace ~ and ~ with ~(!) and ~(!). 
Then propositions P become denoted by P(x). ,.., 
To motivate the definition of ~(PRS), Kleene's results may be 
summarized as follows. A partial set p is alternatively denoted by 
p(x), taking x as ranging over N, in which case the notation pen) 
represents the assertion that nep. Then some truth-values may be 
defined by: 
1. pen) is t if K (n)=I, p 
2. pen) is f if K (n)=O, p 
3. pen) is u if K (n) is undefined. p 
This leads to truth tables for 1, V, &, ~, =, and ~, with the following 
properties: (i) if p(x) and q(x) are partial recursive sets, then 'p(x) 
and p(x)Vq(x) defined by 
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K (n) = 1-K (n) p p 
K (n) = maX[K (n),K (n)] p q p q 
are partial recursive sets, (ii) if &, ~, and = are defined in terms of , 
and V as in §7.1, then they similarly yield partial recursive sets, 
(iii) the strong equivalence p(x)~q(x) asserts that p(x) and q(x) are 
identical, i.e., that K (n)=K (n) for all n&N, (iv) the connective ~ is p q 
not explicitly definable in terms of , and V, and (v) " V, and & 
correspond to the customary partial-recursive set complementation, 
union, and intersection. 
Now, the semantics I(PRS) has as values the numbers 1, 0, and ~--
corresponding to ~, !, and ~--and as valuations has all ordered pairs 
(~,a), where a is an assignment such that 
A 
1. a is a partial recursive set, p. 
~ 
'" 
2. Fa is the empty set q" 
A 
3. Aa is the empty partial set v, 
A 
4. a is a number in N, x 
and where ~ is defined by 
5. If P is ;[, A, or p. for some i=1,2, ... , then 
- l. 
A 
[ 1 if 
'" (:sa)=l Kpa 
" " ~(p(xa» 0 if " (xa)=O = Kpa - -
'" ~ if '" (xa) is undefined Kpa -
6. If P is of the form ,Q, then 
'" " ~(p(xa» = l-~(Q(xa», - -.; 
7. If P is of the form QVR, then 
~(p(:sa» = max[~(Q(:sa»,~(R(:sa»] 
An equivalence P(x)~Q(x) is valid in I(PRS) if ~(p(xa»=~(Q(xa» for 
".., I'V "..., ".., 
every assignment a. It follows that P(x)~(x) is valid in I(PRS) if and 
-.; -
only if P~ is valid in I(K). Then Theorem 8.3-1 implies that PRS is 
complete with respect to I(PRS). 
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Evidently, PRS is essentially identical with K, and I(PRS) is only 
a slightly more sophisticated version of I(K). 
§9.1.3. Undecidability 
A partial set is undecidable if it is not a recursive set. Thus, 
a partial set can be undecidable in either of two ways: (i) it is non-
total, or (ii) it is total but not recursive. An example of (ii) is the 
set q of §9.1.1. In terms of Turing machines, this means that there is 
no Me~ which effectively distinguishes between the members and non-
members of q. The modified q, on the other hand, is an example of 
(i); membership for a in q is "undecided" a priori. 
This terminology motivates referring to the empty partial set v as 
the totally undecidable partial recursive set, since (i) v is in fact· 
partial recursive, and (ii) v strictly speaking is not "empty," rather 
its membership relation is merely "undecided" for all xeN. The afore-
mentioned correspondence between v and Varela's concept of formal 
autonomy can be exhibited as follows. 
The isomorphism t of CSR and K can be taken as an isomorphism of 
CSR and PRS. Then t(a)=!(!). Recall that v(a)=!, for all valuations v 
,. 
in I(CSR). From §9.1.2, !a=v for all assignments a of I(PRS). Since 
CSR is complete with respect to I(CSR), and PRS is complete with respect 
to I(PRS), it follows that any assertion about the autonomous state a 
that is both formalizable and derivable in CSR is simultaneously an 
assertion about the totally undecidable partial recursive set v that is 
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formalizable and derivable in PRS; and conversely. Thus, a (autonomy) 
and v (total undecidability) are formally identical. 
§9.2. Mechanical Unknowability 
A saying among logicians is that in recursion theory one perceives 
the world "through a glass darkly." The sense of this is that the 
concept of recursive undecidability can be regarded as a concept of 
mechanical unknowability; to wit, from the standpoint of the class of 
partial recursive functions, our knowledge about the subsets of N is 
limited to the information that is provided us by the collection ~ of 
Turing machines. This section makes this idea explicit in a model of 
the observer-observed relationship based on the popular brain-computer 
analogy, together with Church's Thesis about the relation of real-world" 
machines to recursive functions. 
To this end, the concept of recursion is here recast in terms of 
just 'n\, rather than with the concept of a "partial set," as follows. 
§9.2.1. Recursion Revisited 
An alternative formulation of recursion is as follows. Let N 
denote the natural numbers; let ~ be the class of Turing machines 
operating on N. If Me~converges for all xeN, then M is a total machine; 
otherwise, M is a partial machine. A characteristic machine M will be 
such that, for each xeN, either M(x)=1, M(x)=O, or M(x) diverges. For 
each characteristic machine M, let a partial recursive set aM be defined 
by: (i) xeaM if M(x)=1, (ii) xtaM if M(x)=O, and (iii) undecided if M(x) 
diverges. aM is said to be a recursive set if M is total. These 
collections are identical with the corresponding collections defined in 
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§9.1.1, except that here "recursive" and "partial recursive" are mutually 
exclusive. 
Church's Thesis asserts that the intuitive concept of "effectively 
computable" is exactly captured by the class of partial recursive func-
tions. More exactly, if a (partial or total) function defined on N 
satisfies one's reasonable understanding of what it means for a function 
to be algorithmic, then its values will be computable by a Turing machine. 
(The converse, that recursive implies effectively computable, is obvious 
from Turing's definition of the class ~.) The support for Church's 
Thesis is largely empirical: (i) every intuitively acceptable mathemati-
cal formulation of "effective computability" has been shown to be equiva-
lent to the Turing characterization, and (ii) no function on N has been 
discovered which satisfies the intuition as being "effectively computable" 
and is not representable in ~. 
Let a be a subset of N. A decision method for a is a method·· by 
which, given any xeN, one can determine in a finite number of steps 
whether xea or xta. Evidently, this would be a method of effective 
computability for the characteristic function Ka. The decision problem 
for a is: find such a decision method or prove that no such method 
exists. By Church's Thesis, a decision method exists for a if and only 
if a is a recursive set, so the decision problem amounts to finding a 
Turing machine for Ka or showing that there isn't one. One says that 
the decision problem for a is recursively solvable if a is recursive, 
and recursively unsolvable if not. It follows that the decision problem 
for a is recursively solvable if and only if C1 is decidable in the sense 
of §9 .1.3. 
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The import of recursive unsolvability is that, given any "candidate" 
decision method for an undecidable 0, there will be numbers xeN for 
which that method produces no result. Yet this does not exclude the 
possibility that a decision problem be approximately recursively solvable 
or that different decision methods might be better than others in pro-
viding recursive approximations of a complete determination for 0. By 
Church's Thesis, such partial approximations will be represented by 
partial characteristic machines. For each such M in ~, let OM be the 
subset of N defined by xeoM if and only if M(x)=l. Then a maximal 
approximation of 0 will be any maximal 0M~o. It follows that 0 is 
decidable if and only if 0M=O' In any case, maximal approximations are 
recursive sets. 
A totally undecidable set in this context will be any set v such 
that every maximal approximation vM=~. Such a set might be one whose 
members are prescribed completely at random, so that for each xeN,there 
is only a 50-50 chance that xev. In contrast with the v defined in 
§8.1.l, as a unique partial set, there here may be any number of such 
totally undecidable subsets of N. From the standpoint of recursive 
solvability via the class ~, however, all such sets are equivalent. It 
follows that the semantics ~(PRS) can alternatively be defined in terms 
of equivalence classes of partial characteristic machines, rather than 
partial recursive sets. 
§9.2.2. Universes: Conceivable Vs. Knowable 
The popular brain-computer analogy asserts that the human brain 
may be regarded merely as an extremely sophisticated computing machine. 
Given the present state of the art for computers, however, it is perhaps 
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more reasonable to refer to an "intellect-computer" analogy, since 
machines have not yet been designed which replicate the emotive, intui-
tive, and similar aspects of the human personality (even though it might 
be speculated that they can be). Given an intellect-computer analogy, 
the foregoing analysis of recursive solvability leads to a provocative--
albeit simple--model of the limits of "intellectual knowability." 
One easily conceptualizes a countably infinite set of natural 
numbers N and its set of subsets f(N) , and it is reasonable to assume 
that this manner of conceptualization is mechanical. Indeed, a computer 
program could be developed which describes all the axioms and inference 
rules of classical set theory, and proceeds to derive proofs of theorems. 
Thus, if the human intellect is a machine, the ordered pair (N,f(N)) 
constitutes a mechanically conceivable universe Uc. 
Yet, as was seen in §9.1.1, not all of the subsets of N--in fact 
only countably infinitely many of the uncountable collection P(N)--are 
recursively decidable. Let the decidable sets in ~(N) be denoted by 
~(N). Then it makes sense to take the ordered pair (N,~(N)) as a 
corresponding mechanically knowable universe Uk. ~(N) is that segment 
of feN) which is completely discernible by the Turing machines ~, where 
~by Church's Thesis, includes all machines that can possibly exist. 
The interconnection between Uc and Uk can be elaborated. Let a be 
any subset of N; let aM be 'a maximal recursive approximation of 0; and 
let oM be the set of xeN such that M(X) diverges. Then oM consists of 
all potential elements of 0 which are left undecided by M. Consider U 
the collection of all subsets of N having the form ova where OeOM. 
Clearly aeU; and 0 is the unique member of U if and only if 0 is 
decidable. Suppose that 0 is recursively undecidable and let c be the 
cardinality of 6M. It may be noted that the cardinality of U is 2
c , 
where 2c is the uncountable infinity reI in case c is infinite. Most 
importantly, from the standpoint of U , the members of U are distinct c 
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members of feN), while from the standpoint of Uk' the members of U are 
indistinguishable from the set a. These considerations suggest the 
following interpretation for Uc and Uk' 
A being which has a strictly mechanical intellect is able to 
conceptualize an uncountably infinite universe U of which only a count-c 
able part Uk is really (intellectually) knowable. The intellectually 
unknowable part, however, is' approximately knowable--more or less so 
depending on how closely he obtains a knowable approximation. The same 
being is furthermore able to determine a closeness of fit for his 
approximation by looking at the number of elements of N which his approxi-
mation leaves undecided. And he can sometimes, through a concept of 
recursive unsolvability, be cognizant of whether a complete approxi-
mation is possible. 
Thus, this being resides in a world where he cannot "know" every-
thing that he calL "conceptualize"; he can approximate a complete knowledge 
of some unknowns, but he is aware that absolute knowledge of everything 
is impossible. Indeed, he can be aware of "totally unknowable" concepts 
as represented by intellectual loops or otherwise paradoxical circular 
reasoning. 
In this manner, paradox represents the absolute limits of intel-
lectual knowability. By means of circularity, intellect formulates 
concepts of things which are completely beyond its ability to comprehend. 
The interpretation of mechanical unknowability as an idea of 
intellectual unknowability can be extended to an idea of empirical 
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untestability. For, all manners of scientific observation, measurement, 
and analysis here become strictly mechanical as products of the human 
intellect. To elaborate, suppose that the physical universe consists of 
countably infinitely many objects. Then these objects can be enumerated 
by the members of N, and ~(N) represents the collection of all conceiv-
able properties of objects--i.e., x has the property represented by cr if 
and only if xecr. Thus, one has a physical interpretation of U , while c 
Uk correspondingly becomes interpreted as giving the properties for 
which one can determine by strictly scientific analysis whether an 
object does or does not have that property. Thus ~(N) represents those 
properties which alone are empirically testable. Partially knowable 
concepts accordingly become partially testable properties, and total~y 
unknowable concepts become totally untestable properties. Thus, a being 
having a strictly mechanical intellect and living in a countably infinite 
universe can conceptualize properties of objects which he should not 
hope to establish by strictly empirical methods. While this in itself 
is not surprising--indeed it is rather common knowledge--it is remarkable 
that recursion theory provides such a simple model which suggests why 
this is true. 
§9.2.3. Paradox 
As a preface to specific examples of mechanical knowability, it 
will be useful to look more carefully at the general form of paradoxical 
assertions. In the classical notations, a proposition P is paradoxical 
if it enters into an assertion of the form 
(1) 
which reads IIp is true if and only if not-P is true." This is to be 
distinguished from an ordinary contradiction having the form 
P &.,p, (2) 
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which reads "both P and not-P are true." The latter asserts the simul-
taneous truth of P and ,P, while the former asserts that the truth of 
each is predicated on the truth of the other. 
However, both (1) and (2) are antitautologies of I(PC) , and hence 
are formally equivalent with one another--i.e., each implies the other. 
Thus paradoxes cannot be adjoined to a classical Aristotelean system 
such as PC without rendering the system trivially incoherent. Similar 
remarks apply to the adjunction of a paradoxical assertion of the form 
P = Pl 
to the primary algebra. This shows that in Aristotelean systems, para-
doxes are always formally meaningless. 
Paradoxes can become meaningful, however, in non-Aristotelean 
systems. In the calculus for self-reference, paradoxical assertions 
have the form 
P = Pl 
and, when translated into the system K, have the form 
P ~ ,P. 
(3) 
(4) 
Each of (3) and (4) can be validated in their respective semantics--the 
former by any v such that v(P)=a, and the latter by any V such that 
V(P)=~. Thus (§8.5), they can be adjoined to their respective systems 
without ruining coherence. 
This shows generally the value of Kleene-Varela type systems for 
the discussion of paradoxical ideas. Moreover, it suggests a generalized 
definition of paradox per se as being any assertion to the effect that a 
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proposition is equivalent with its negation. The familiar semantic 
paradoxes, such as the paradox of the liar (Martin 1970) and Russell's 
set of all sets which are not members of themselves (Russell 1902 and 
1908) are special cases of paradox which involve an internal linguistic 
self-reference. The general paradoxical form does not require such 
self-reference, but when it is regarded in the context of the calculus 
for self-reference, it is revealed as involving a self-reference on 
another level; to wit, the logical status (i.e., autonomy) of d para-
doxical proposition is formally defined in term of itself through 
"re-entry" into the "form of indication" -, (Varela, 1975). The logical 
autonomy of paradoxical propositions P is furthermore made explicit in 
the systems K, PRS, and the calculus for self-reference by 
Proposition 8.5-2. 
§9.2.4. Sample Interpretations 
The foregoing shows how the model of a universe, the knowledge of 
which is limited by the capabilities of a collection of machines, can be 
formalized in PRS. Of course, for more sophisticated interpretations of 
"mechanical unknowability," a much richer linguistic structure than 
L(PRS) is required. To this end, PRS might be expanded, in the same 
manner that PC is normally expanded to obtain first-order and second-
order systems. Indeed a work by Zadeh shows that the prototype self-
referential paradox, the paradox of the liar, is representable in the 
logic of possibilistic reasoning (Zadeh 1979), which suggests that the 
required richer languages may be just those, or developments of those, 
for the linguistic theories defined in Chapter 3. 
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The interpretations described below are intended merely as illus-
trations of how such expanded systems might be employed. Moreover, they 
focus only on "total unknowability" and therefore do not explore the 
full range of potential application to "approximately knowable" ideas. 
§9.2.4.1. Perfect Systems 
Weinberg's "perfect systems law" asserts: "true systems properties 
cannot be investigated" (Weinberg 1975, p. 160). The standard method of 
investigating a real-world system is to observe it while it undergoes 
transformations. But "true systems properties"--such as "perfect whole-
ness" or "absolute autonomy"--are invariants intrinsic to the system and 
are therefore lost if the system is changed. Consequently, a "perfect 
system"--Le., a system which has only true system properties--"could 
not be studied if found." 
The concept of a perfect system may be formalized in a Kleene-
Varela system by developing a proposition PC!) which asserts that! is 
perfect--e.g., P might be built up of propositions P , P , etc., which w a 
assert !'s wholeness, autonomy, etc.--and by adjoining the equivalence 
P(!)~(!) as an axiom. Then P becomes interpreted as a totally unknow-
able property of real-world objects. 
In this context, the semantics may receive an alternative inter-
pretation, based on a logic of empirical methods, which is defined by 
having a proposition be 
1. "true" if it has been verified by experiment, 
2. "false" if it has been refuted by experiment, 
3. "unknown" if it has been neither verified nor refuted. 
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Then P(!)~(~) asserts that for all ~ the truth-value of P(~) is always 
unknown. 
§9.2.4.2. McTaggart's Paradox 
Gale (1968) "uses McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time 
as a starting-point for an examination of the logic of and interconnected-
ness between tensed and tenseless discourse" and defends "the common 
belief in the objectivity of temporal becoming" (from the book jacket). 
McTaggart's paradox involves two conceptions of time: an A-series based 
on the notions of "past," "present," and "future," and a B-series based 
on the relation of "before and after." A "positive thesis" shows that 
the A-series is reducible to the B-series, while a "negative thesis" 
shows that the B-series leads to an irreconciable infinite regress of 
paradoxes. 
Gale's treatment begins with the observation that all attempts to 
define time inadvertently lead to paradox, and it proceeds by the method 
of linguistic analysis to show that people naturally accept a belief in 
the objectivity of temporal becoming even though they cannot define it 
or rationally prove it to be real. "What time makes it possible for us 
to say is exactly what cannot be said about time" (p. 234). 
This implies that the natural use of temporal language involves 
paradoxical, or otherwise circular, reasoning. Thus a Kleene-Varela 
system which includes McTaggart's paradox as an axiom might serve for 
formalizing temporal discourse as it actually appears in observable uses 
of human language. Time is a clear example of something that can be 
conceptualized but cannot be understood by ordinary "rational" means. 
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§9.2.4.3. Moore's Paradox 
Another is the idea of "goodness." Hartman (1967) develops a 
"logic of value" which uses Moore's paradox as a prototype test case. 
This paradox is quoted from Moore (p. 18) as consisting of "the two 
different propositions that are both true of goodness, namely: (i) that 
it does depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it, and 
(ii) that, though this is so, it is as yet not itself an intrinsic 
property." Hartman "solves" this paradox by unraveling a confusion of 
levels, showing that "the negative proposition--concerning what goodness 
is not--refers to the thing itself; and the positive proposition--
concerning what goodness is--refers to the concept of the thing." 
Hartman's work then disbands the self-referential negative proposi-
tion and elaborates the positive one in terms of properties of concepts 
rather than of things. While this is certainly a reasonable approach.to 
the problem of values, it leaves unaddressed a fact that remains embodied 
in Moore's paradox: that people nevertheless do speak and think !! if 
goodness is an inherent property of things. This raises the question of 
why it is so natural for people to think of value in this way. Evidently, 
one has here another example of circularity in natural human reasoning, 
and the property of goodness becomes another candidate for formulation 
in a logically autonomous proposition. 
§9.2.4.4. Transcendent Realities 
God, Truth, Justice, Beauty, Perfection, Freedom of the Will, and 
so on all represent realities which are completely beyond the human ken. 
Indeed, it is almost an embarrassment to philosophers and theologians that 
the existence of such entities has no logical or empirical verification. 
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In point of fact, the only position of complete intellectual integrity on 
such matters is Skepticism: the existence of transcendent realities is 
uncertain. In theology, this is Agnosticism. 
Yet it is equally true that intuition, beliefs, experiences of 
faith, and the higher ideals, frequently take precedence over the rational 
intellect as prescriptors of human behavior. While much effort has been 
directed toward justifying this phenomenon, little has been done to 
explain how it occurs. 
The Kleene-Varela logic can be offered as a model of the kind of 
intellect which makes such occurrences possible. In this model, the 
intellect remains strictly mechanical, but goes beyond the exclusive 
"true of false." Clearly, if the intellect was exclusively two-valued, 
there would be no question of transcendental realities. It is only by 
virtue of man's ability to entertain logical uncertainty that he has the 
opportunity to extend beyond the purely "rational" and act intuitively, 
to formulate beliefs, and to experience fai th--i. e., to be "human" in 
the higher sense of the word. 
PART III 
THE USE OF NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS 
CHAPTER 10 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The primary aim of this chapter is to set the stage for the methodo-
logical issues taken up in Chapter 11. We lay down a few items of 
terminology, discuss the sense in which the proposed use of nonclassical 
logics obtains a theoretical rationale, and generally motivate the 
ensuing considerations. 
§10.1 constitutes a brief survey of the development of logical 
ideas insofar as this illustrates a particular view regarding the 
processes by which mathematical studies evolve. 
§10.2 takes up the matter of "selecting" one's mode of reasoning, 
and considers the manner in which this relates to an inherent "bimodality" 
of mathematical thinking. 
§10.3 discusses the use of nonclassical logics for purposes of 
modeling qualitative aspects of real-world systems. 
§10.4 is a general introduction to the subject of formal systems 
and their semantics, which is intended both as a supplement to §2.1 and 
as a prelude to Chapter 11. 
§10.1. An Evolutionary Overview 
The prospect of using nonstandard modes of reasoning in the design 
of system models stems largely from there being a wide variety of known 
nonclassical logics. In order to obtain a better idea of how such 
logics may be employed, it will be useful to first consider the manner 
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in which they have evolved. We therefore begin here with these more 
general considerations, before going into the particulars concerned with 
"selecting" alternative modes of reasoning. In process, this brings to 
fore some ideas which will playa role in later sections. 
The development of logical ideas may be viewed as involving two 
distinct but interrelated processes of human intellection. First is the 
one by which mathematics most directly serves the purposes of science, 
and which shall herein be referred to as observation formulation. 
Specifically, this designates a process which springs from studies of 
concrete physical, biological, social, etc. systems under the motivation 
to provide these systems with precise analytical descriptions. As such, 
observation formulation sometimes leads to implementation of existin~ 
bodies of mathematical knowledge, whereas it at other times leads to the 
invention of completely new kinds of mathematics. To illustrate: the 
differential calculus was created for purposes of formulating the concept 
. of a "rate of change" as it appears in the laws of mechanics; and statistics 
were developed to capture the notion of "tendencies" or "trends." 
Observation formulation thus construed clearly underlies the development 
of all mathematical models of real-world situations. 
The second process to be considered is a somewhat more subtle one, 
pertaining to the intrinsic nature of mathematics proper. It may be 
characterized as a process by which the mathematician makes explicit 
certain aspects of his own role in relation to his work--i.e., his 
manners of thinking about specific mathematical ideas. Two examples 
here are the invention of the "variable quantity" and the definition of 
a "set of elements." Ordinarily, the process by which such concepts as 
these come into being is referred to as one of "abstraction." A truer 
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assessment, however, is that these concepts are tools by which certain 
acts of abstraction may be carried out. The concepts themselves arise, 
rather, only when the mathematician strives to comprehend and then make 
explicit his own manners of thinking, for purposes of organizing and 
clarifying ideas or for simplifying the mental exercises that his work 
requires him to perform. Accordingly, this second process shall be 
referred to as introspection articulation, which emphasizes furthermore 
that it customarily leads to new items of mathematical language. 
This classification of mental activities is of course not inclusive 
of all aspects of mathematical endeavor. It is concerned rather only 
with the creation of new ideas and therefore omits other activities, 
such as theorem proving, by which mathematical theories grow to fruition. 
Nor is the classification crisp, since most mathematical investigations 
invoke both processes. On the one hand, the desire to formulate a model 
of a given real-world situation may lead to introspection in search of 
new modeling techniques. On the other hand, the results of mathematical 
introspection may inspire the development of modeling approaches not 
previously conceived. ' In physics, for example, an illustration of the 
former would be functional analysis, which generalizes the theory of 
differential equations; and an instance of the latter would be quantum 
logic (Reichenbach 1944), which applies formal systems to the treatment 
of anomalies in the physical theory. 
In any case, the present distinction is not to be confused with 
the conventional classification of mathematics as being "pure" or 
"applied." Among contemporary mathematicians, the latter distinction is 
almost universally regarded as an unfortunate choice of words, since the 
underlying intention of all mathematics is that it is either directly or 
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indirectly meant to be applied. This pertains even to philosophical 
studies, which are undertaken to provide the mathematics of science with 
a solid foundation. Yet even taking this into account, it may be argued 
that various forms of mathematics involve more of one of the above 
processes than the other. Mathematical logic, in particular, is funda-
mentally a product of introspection articulation and, only after reaching 
a sufficient maturity, became available for direct applications. 
As motivation for the style of applications proposed in this 
dissertation, and to illustrate more fully the notion of introspection 
articulation, it will be useful to recount some of the milestones in the 
development of logical ideas. Except where indicated otherwise, the 
following references are from Kleene (1952, pp. 60-65). 
The discovery of the axiomatic deductive method is attributed to 
Pythagoras (c. 700 B.C.) who used it to derive many of the fundamental 
theorems of elementary geometry. After several centuries of continued 
development, the Pythagorean geometry received its optimum crystalization 
in Euclid's "Elements" (c. 300 B.C.), which work for many centuries 
thereafter remained unchallenged as representing the ideal of mathemati-
cal elegance and clarity of thought. 
Institution of the formal treatment of logic per se, as a method 
of reasoning with sentences in terms of their grammatical forms, is due 
to Aristotle (also c. 300 B.C.). Out of Aristotle's work come many of 
the basic principles of classical logic, notably: Excluded Middle (for 
any proposition A, either A is true or not-A is true); Non-Contradiction 
(for no proposition A do we have that both A is true and not-A is true); 
and Modus Ponens (if A is true, and it is true that A implies B, then B is 
true). Also due to Aristotle is the idea of "syllogism," which constituted 
a major step toward the theory of logical "quantification" as used in 
modern first- and second-order logics. 
200 
The invention of the variable quantity, and in general, the develop-
ment of the algebraic symbolism, is attributed to Vieta (1591) and 
others working around the same time. Kleene indicates this period as a 
significant turning point in the history of mathematical ideas: "The 
discovery of simple symbolic notations which lend themselves to manipu-
lation by formal rules has been one of the ways by which modern mathema-
tics has advanced its power" (p. 61). Prior to Vieta, mathematicians 
suffered the tediousness of describing their deductions in words. 
Significant early developments in the contemporary logic are 
Leibniz (1866), de Morgan (1847 and 1864), Boole (1847 and 1854), Pierce 
(1867 and 1880), and Schroder (1877 and 1890-1905). These works collec-
tively led to formalizations of various portions of mathematics. The 
theory of arithmetic was first axiomatized by Dedekind (1888), and_then 
developed deductively from Dedekind's axioms by Peano (1889). Frege 
(1893 and 1903) wrote down the first definition of formal "proof," by 
means of diagrams showing interconnections between assertions, and used 
this to study the "logical foundations" of arithmetic. Whitehead and 
Russell (1910-1913) reduced much of the prior work to a concise symbolism, 
thereby providing what is today the standard prototype of a formal 
logical system. The sense in which logical systems are "formal," how-
ever, may be attributed to Hilbert, who was first to emphasize the total 
abstraction of symbols from meanings, so that proofs became simply 
mechanical derivations carried out in accordance with precise rules for 
operating on symbols and symbolic expressions. 
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Not included in Kleene's list are important advances by Tarski and 
Godel. To Tarski we are indebted for articulating the concept of mathe-
matical "truth," which now forms the basis for the study of "semantic 
interpretations" of formal systems (model theory). Tarski's definition 
(cf. Tarski 1949), "The assertion 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 
snow is white," is an excellent example of how a simple statement of the 
obvious can have profound consequences in the development of mathe-
matical thought. 
Godel's contribution (1931) made use of all the foregoing ideas, 
together with a development of Skolem's idea of "recursive function" 
(Skolem 1923). This work showed that the system of Whitehead and Russell's 
Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), which derives Peano arithmetic within 
a formal logical system, can be interpreted within its own language by 
means of a straightforward enumeration of that system's symbolic compo-
nents. Attendant with this came the now famous result (the incomplete-
ness theorem) that that system contains "formally undecideable" 
propositions--i.e., propositions which can neither be affirmed nor 
denied on the basis of the system's axioms. This result in tHrn led to 
a general study of undecideability and the discovery of many other 
formally "unsolvable" problems of contemporary mathematics. A collec-
tion of these is documented by Odifreddi (1981). 
In viewing this development as a phenomenon of articulated intro-
spection, it is easy to see how mathematics arrived at the genre of 
systems that are studied in this dissertation. As soon as the concept 
of a formal logical system was fully articulated, and became a subject 
on its own for mathematical investigation, a phenomenon analagous to the 
development of the non-Euclidean geometries began to occllr--namely, the 
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invention of non-Aristotelean or otherwise nonclassical logics. The 
first of these new logics were studied for purely philosophical reasons, 
by Brower's school of Intuitionism (cf. Heyting 1956). However, once 
those studies were begun, it soon became evident that the basic idea of 
a formal logic could be extended for purposes of describing many further 
aspects of human reasoning. Thus ensued the plethora of multi-valued 
logiCS, modal logics, temporal logics, inductive logics, autogenetic 
logiCS, and so on, that we have today. Very recently these logics have 
begun to be applied, and the aim of the next following section is to 
consider the foundational justifications for this development. 
Before proceeding to that issue, however, it should be said that 
merely regarding a particular logic--be it classical or nonclassical--as 
articulated introspection is not tantamount to upholding that logic as 
being in any sense superior to another as a model of natural human 
reasoning. A case in point is Boole's "laws of thought," which has 
hence been regarded as mistitled. What is intended by "introspection 
articulation" is rather only to emphasize that different logics have 
arisen in the effort to model different aspects of reasoning. Whether 
anyone logic gives a better fit to the natural reasoning is a separate 
matter. 
The prevailing' opinion regarding formal logics is therefore upheld, 
that these serve mainly as guides to thinking, and that no one logic 
should be sacrosanct. This opinion shall here be overlayed, however, 
with a less conventional view regarding, if not the sacredness, then at 
least the inherent fundamentality of bimodal reasoning, insofar as 
mathematical studies are concerned. This will be part and parcel with 
the discussion below. 
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§10.2. On Selecting One's Logics 
The physical sciences have clearly acknowledged that no one model 
of the universe is absolute. This was an irrevocable albeit unexpected 
consequence of the Einsteinian revolution in physics. Logical studies, 
developed mostly in isolation from physics, have nonetheless produced an 
analogous conclusion: neither is anyone mode of reasoning absolute. As 
articulated introspection, the various known forms of logic make it 
evident that a wide variety of modes of reasoning are viable; and inasmuch 
as these logics exist as formalized mathematical systems, it is evident 
that a wide variety of modes of reasoning also are available for use. 
Hence, in exactly the same way that science selects alternative ~eometries 
for modeling the universe, it can also select the logics by which it 
derives conclusions and organizes ideas. 
This in effect is a realization of the prophecy by Lukasiewicz 
(1930), that science eventually would make direct application of multi-
valued logics in its methods of research (cf. Gaines 1976). The freedom 
to select one's mode of reasoning, however, comes only at the expense of 
some new difficulties. 
Soon after science clarified the distinction between a system and 
a system model, it became evident that models are always problem speci-
fic and observer- (or user-) dependent; that is, they have meaningful-
ness only in a particular context as provided by a certain problem 
setting, and only to a certain collection of observers. But, in order 
for a model to be meaningful among a group of observers, it is necessary 
that it "make sense" in the manner of functioning effectively as a means 
of communication among that group's members. This in turn reflects back 
on the reasoning processes by which the model was constructed. Things 
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generally "make sense" to people only if they are expressed within those 
peoples' own logics. Such has been emphasized especially in a work by 
Maruyama (1974), which shows how basic epistemologies or "structures of 
reasoning" may differ from culture to culture, profession to profession, 
and so on. Consequently, it is important that, whenever a nonstandard 
logic is selected as the basis for a model, that logic must itself be 
described precisely in the context of some given, mutually comprehensible 
logic. 
But this raises the question of what logics are mutually compre-
hensible. In light of Maruyama's remarks it is clearly unreasonable to 
expect that anyone logic be comprehensible across all disciplines. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that there is at least one logic which is 
comprehensible among the mathematical disciplines. Specifically, the 
claim is that all mathematical discussions--inasmuch as they are indeed 
mathematical--always at some level revert back to the classical bimodal 
mode of reasoning. 
This view is supported in part by the Intuitionist philosophy of 
mathematics, which asserts that, even when studying a formal mathematics, 
the mathematician necessarily makes use of an informal, or "intuitive," 
mathematics which is not part of the formalism in question (cf. Kleene 
1952, pp. 46 ff). At the same time, this is a departure from Intuitionism 
inasmuch as the intuitionist logic, as proposed by Brouwer, is three-valued. 
Brouwer's view of the foundations of mathematics was that logical proposi-
tions only obtain their ultimate verity in the context of somewhat 
deeper conception of "constructibility" (or "finite computability"). 
Briefly stated (cf. Kleene 1967, p. 196), a proposition 3xP(x), which 
says that there exists a number x having a certain property P, can only 
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be asserted as "true" if one can show how to actually compute such an x 
in finitely many steps. Furthermore, logical negation is interpreted 
"positively," meaning that the proposition 3xP(x) can be asserted as 
"false" only if the proposition 3xP(x) leads to a contradiction in 
finitely many steps. This is tantamount to a denial of Excluded Middle 
in reference to infinite domains, since there are propositions P about 
the completed totality of natural numbers for which no such computation 
procedure is known. Thus the intuitionistic logic embodies the three 
values: "true," "false," and "undecided." 
But now let us consider this logic further. Brouwer strongly 
resisted all attempts to axiomatize his logic, since in his view, logic 
is grounded in mathematics, and not conversely, so that the possibil~ty 
of such an axiomatization would be largely irrelevant. Nevertheless, 
Kleene (cf. 1952) bothered to carry out this exercise, and the nature,of 
his accomplishment is an important case in point. Kleene's axiomatiza-
tion takes the form of a formal logical system in exactly the same sense 
as defined in this dissertation--i.e., as having its formulas be either 
derivable or nonderivable from its axioms--and it counts as a correct 
axiomatization of Brouwer's logic in that a proposition is so derivable 
if and only if it satisfies the intuitionistic criteria of constructi-
bility. Thus we obtain a clear illustration of the present view. 
Kleene's work implicitly demonstrates that, even though intuitionistic 
logic is three-valued, there remains another level at which it is two-
valued. Namely, Intuitionism is bimodal inasmuch as its propositions 
are either "constructible" or "nonconstructible." 
The claim that bimodality applies to all mathematics is of course much 
more broadscoped than a reference to selected classical or nonclassical 
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logics. Nevertheless, the general claim is also justifiable by the 
(introspective) observation that there is always a bimodal logic which 
the mathematician ultimately makes use of when he seeks to make sense to 
himself (which also parallels Intuitionism, cf. Heyting 1964, but on a 
different level). This fact of mathematical life admittedly cannot be 
proved in any conclusive fashion. Yet it is an observation which each 
individual mathematician may make as a personal assessment of the under-
lying basis of his own manners of reasoning. Granted this, it then 
follows that the classical logic is necessarily comprehensible among 
mathematicians and therefore provides a solid basis for intermathematical 
communication. 
Affirmation of the inherent bimodality of mathematics does not, 
however, deny that other modes of reasoning might be more "natural" or 
at least more appropriate for describing certain kinds of ideas. On the 
contrary, the foregoing analysis clearly supports the validity of apply-
ing the theory of formal logical systems in developing models based on 
nonstandard logics. For the theory of formal logics is itself expressed 
in the formal, bimodal, and hence mathematically communicable logic, 
while at the same time providing a precise context within which non-
standard logics can be described. 
Note furthermore that, as the foregoing discussion indicates, 
where formalized nonclassical logics are concerned, bimodality can 
usually be located at the metalevel, i.e., at the next higher level 
that the one which is occupied by the formalism itself. This is a 
fact that will be of especial use in §11.5, where we consider the 
empirical testability of models which are based on nonclassical modes of 
reasoning. 
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§10.3. Quality Representation 
Qualitative mathematics was described in Chapter 1 as that kind of 
mathematics which leaves numerical considerations in the background and 
focuses on general conceptual forms. Examples were cited from topology, 
abstract algebra, and logic. We may here expand this idea insofar as it 
pertains to the logical systems studied in this dissertation. 
The theory of approximate reasoning is especially suited for 
modeling qualitative aspects of complex systems. In contrast with 
traditional uses of formal logic for representing expressions in mathe-
matical languages (such as the language of arithmetic, or of algebraic 
groups), approximate reasoning is aimed at the reppresentation of ex-
pressions in natural languages (eg., English). The extent to which this 
has been achieved to date is shown in recent works (Zadeh 1978a and 
1978b) which lay down "translation rules" for translating a wide variety 
of more or less complex natural language expressions into a formalism of 
the kind studied in Part I. This means that one can use the theory of 
approximate reasoning for the direct formulation of verbal models of 
systems in an internally coherent, and machine implementable, mode of 
reasoning. 
Such an approach leads to somewhat more realistic models than do 
the standard modeling techniques. For, an analysis of a complex system 
can never be carried to the deepest level of detail. Indeed, practical 
experience shows that during the process of a real-world system's analysis, 
the complexity of the system even appears to grow before one's eyes. 
Hence, every model of the given system must inadvertently "blur" all 
details which lie beyond the point at which the analysis was stopped. 
This is emphasized also by Bunge (1973, cf. §11.2) who states that 
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models are always "approximations" of reality, and that mathematical 
models in particular are "idealizations" of the object it is intended to 
represent. The virtue of approximate reasoning is therefore that this 
vagueness which permeates our models of reality is formally taken into 
account. An example of this was given in Chapter 6. The theory of 
approximate reasoning allows for reasonably sophisticated system proper-
ties and situations to be described, and the formalized logic embodies 
the necessary principles for correct reasoning toward meaningful results. 
The Kleene-Varela systems studied in Part II illustrate another 
use of formal logic for quality representation: the modeling of para-
doxical, and hence traditionally unanalyzable, system properties. This 
highlights the significance of formal logic as providing the opport~ity 
to "select" alternative modes of reasoning. While there is nothing 
emperical which affirms the existence of paradoxical aspects of reality, 
there is also nothing emperical which denies that such aspects are-
possible. The traditional mathematics, however, forbids a priori that 
paradoxical qualities be discussed. Thus, for purposes of even formally 
"assuming" the existence of such qualities, shifting to a nonclassical 
mode of reasoning is absolutely required. 
The use of nonclassical logics for such purposes as these presents 
two important methodological questions which have yet to be addressed. 
These are (i) whether mathematical logic provides the "semantics for 
science" in the sense that formal systems can be interpreted as meaningful 
representations of the observable world, and (ii) whether models based 
on nonstandard modes of reasoning can have viability in the sense of 
satisfying the conventional criteria for emperical testability. The 
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foregoing has obviously assumed that both of these questions can be 
answered in the affirmative. The justification for this assumption is 
developed in the chapter to follow. 
§10.4. Formal Logical Systems And Their Semantics: 
A General Introduction 
An axiomatization of a body of mathematical knowledge lays down in 
concise terms exactly those ideas which that knowledge is thought to 
entail. In some cases, such as with Peano's axioms for elementary 
arithmetic (cf. §10.1), this isolates and condenses the essential ingre-
dients of a well-established collection of mathematical facts and 
principles. In other cases, such as with group theory, or the theory of 
two-person games, the axiomatization is a generic definition of a parti-
cular class of mathematical structures, e.g., the class of groups, or a 
class of games. In all such cases, however, the axiomatization serves 
as the foundation for a particular mathematical "theory," consisting of 
all propositions, or "theorems," that the given axioms logically imply. 
Formal logical systems go a step beyond such axiomatizations, by 
furthermore making explicit (i) a precise language within which all the 
propositions of the given theory may be expressed, and (ii) an axiomati-
zation of the underlying mode of reasoning, according to which proposi-
tions may be derived from the given axioms. By vi~tue of (i), formal 
logical systems exist on a level of abstraction in which the original 
mathematical structures (e.g., the arithmetic of natural numbers, the 
groups,'etc.) become "interpretations" of the languages of those systems. 
For example, the formal theory of groups has as two of its interpreta-
tions the positive integers under addition and the rotations of a 
square in the Euclidean plane. In different interpretations, one simply 
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takes the symbols of the fonnal language as standing for different kinds 
of mathematical entities. This, together with (ii), renders the fonnal 
logical system as a representation of the given theory in terms of which 
the theory may be examined as to its consistency, its completeness, its 
decidability, and other properties related to the kinds of propositions 
that the theory allows to be derived. Such a representation of a mathe-
matical theory is generally known as a "formalization" of that theory. 
Precise definitions of "formal logical system," "interpretation," 
etc., are given in §2.1. The following two subsections elucidate these 
same ideas in a manner which may be useful for the reader to whom these 
ideas are new. 
§10.4.1. Basic Ideas And Terminology 
A formal logical system is comprised of: (i) a formal language; 
(ii) a set of axioms, expressible in that language; (iii) a collection 
of inference rules (or rules of formal derivation); and (iv) a set of 
theorems, which consist of (a) the given axioms, and (b) all expressions 
of the given language that can be generated from those axioms by means 
of the given inference rules. The basic structure of a formal logical 
system is represented in the top half of Figure 2-1. The essential 
characteristics of the various components may be described as follows. 
A formal language is specified in two steps. First one selects a 
set of objects to serve as symbols. Strictly speaking, symbols are 
purely syntactical objects--that is, they are just abstract, indepen-
dently existing objects, having no preassigned meanings. At the same 
time, however, a particular choice of symbols is always guided by a 
predelection of the kind of ideas that one will want to use the language 
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to express. For example, if the language is to express the properties 
of "equality of numbers," one will want to have at least one symbol for 
use as an "equality symbol," in which case it would be customary to use 
the sign = as its denotation. But note especially that this sign, 
consisting of two parallel, horizontal dashes on the page, is merely a 
device for denoting that symbol, and strictly speaking is distinct from 
the equality symbol itself. Symbols as herein discussed can neither be 
seen nor written down; rather, they are purely conceptual entities which 
are taken as "given," as the members of some sufficiently large collection 
of abstract things (e.g., the ordinal numbers, cf. §2.1.1). 
Given a set of symbols, one then automatically has the collection 
of all finite sequences of those symbols, called strings. The second 
step in specifying a language is to select from this collection of 
strings some formulas (well-formed strings, etc., cf. §2.1), these being 
all those strings having one of various "forms." Deciding on appropriate 
forms is always guided by an intuition about what it takes for a formula 
to be meaningful, given some appropriate interpretations of the string's 
constituent symbols. For example, in a language for a formal system of 
arithmetic, a string of the form a=+ would probably not be selected as 
a formula, whereas a string of the form a=b might be, since the latter 
string becomes meaningful if one makes the natural interpretation of = 
as representing "equality of numbers," and of a and b as standing 
for particular numbers, e.g., a pair of non-negative integers. The 
formal language is then the above set of symbols together with this 
resultant set of formulas. 
Axioms are taken from the set of formulas, and inference rules are 
definable as mappings from the set of formulas into itself. Inference 
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rules are so-called because they show how certain "conclusions" may be 
"inferred" from certain "hypotheses." By the definition of a formal 
logical system, the set of theorems is uniquely determined by the given 
language, axioms, and rules of formal derivation. Hence, the choice of 
axioms and inference rules for a particular formalization is always 
guided by a consideration of the kinds of theorems that one will want 
the system to allow. Continuing the above example, to formalize a 
theory of "equality of numbers," one will want enough axioms and 
inference rules to ensure that the theorems include all, and only, the 
usual properties of equality. 
Now whereas the components of a formal logical system are purely 
syntactical entities--i.e., are symbols, strings of symbols, and rules 
for operating on strings of symbols--these components may obtain meanings 
by virtue of a semantic interpretation (alternatively, a semantic 
structure) for the language of that system. This consists of: (i) a 
universe of discourse, (ii) assignments from within that universe of 
specific meanings (or referents) for the symbols in the given language, 
and (iii) a precise definition of the sense in which the meaning of a 
formula, as determined by the meanings of the constituent symbols, is 
"valid" or "true." 
The principal components of a semantic interpretation are repre-
sented in the bottom half of Figure 2-1. A universe of discourse is a 
set of objects, the members of which are called individuals. Strictly 
speaking, individuals are purely mathematical entities, e.g. numbers or 
sets of numbers. They may, however (cf. §11.2), sometimes be taken as 
representing concrete things, e.g., people, automobiles, or atoms. 
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The specific characteristics of meaning assignments depend on the 
linguistic roles that the symbols of the language are intended to play. 
For example, if the language contains some "individual constants" 
(cf. §3.1.1), then these symbols would be assigned as their meanings 
some specific individuals in the given universe, and if the language 
contains some "relation symbols" or "function symbols" (also cf. §3 .1.1), 
these would be assigned as their meanings certain relations of indi-
viduals, or functions on individuals, in the given universe. 
To illustrate: suppose that the language being considered is for a 
formal system of arithmetic, and that it contains individual constants, 
denoted by Q and 1, an equality symbol, denoted by =, and an addition 
symbol, denoted by +. Then a natural interpretation would be one whose 
universe of discourse is the set of non-negative integers, and whose 
meaning assignments are: the numbers zero and one serve as the referents 
of the symbols 2 and !, the referent of = is the equality relation on 
the nonnegative integers, and the referent of + is addition of nonnega-
tive integers. 
But note furthermore an important aspect of the relation between a 
formal language and its semantic interpretations. There is nothing here 
which requires that the domain of interpretation necessarily consist of 
numbers. On the contrary, an alternative interpretation could have as 
its universe of discourse a collection of sets, in which case Q might be 
interpreted as the empty set, 1 as some maximal set, = as equality of 
sets, and + as set intersection. This reitterates a fact mentioned 
earlier, that a given formal language will in general have many different 
semantic interpretations, and it shows that the alternative interpretations 
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may in fact be quite different from the one (or several) which served 
initially as the intuitive guide for that language's formal definition. 
A notion of validity, or truth, is defined in terms of some truth 
values and some truth valuations. Truth values can be any objects, 
e.g., the letters T and F, or the numerals 1 and 0 for a bivalent inter-
pretation, or the set of reals in the interval [0,1] for a multivalent 
interpretation, and so on. Truth valuations are mappings of formulas of 
the given language into the set of truth values. These mappings may 
sometimes be functions of the meanings of the formulas. 
For example, if = is interpreted as the equality relation in the fore-
going illustration, then the valuations would be defined in such a way 
that, for arbitrary individual constants a and b, a formula of the form 
a=b is mapped to the value T (or 1) if and only if the given interpreta-
tion assigns the same individual as a meaning for both a and b. On the 
other hand, truth valuations are the means by which the referents of 
certain symbols are assigned. Specifically, these are the logical 
connectives, such as , (not, negation), V (or, disjunction), & (and, 
conjunction), ~(implies, logical implication), and = (is equivalent 
with; logical equivalence), which always have as their referents certain 
functions from the set of truth values into itself. For example, in a 
bivalent interpretation the meaning of & may be defined by: for any 
formulas A and B, the formula of the form A&B receives the value T 
under a valuation V--i.e., V(A&B)=T--if and only if both V(A)=T and 
V(B)=T. By agreeing that all valuations in a given interpretation act 
similarly on formulas built up with the symbol &, one thus captures the 
sense in which, in classical logics, & is taken as representing the 
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English "and." In multivalent interpretations, of course, the meanings 
of the logical connectives are assigned differently. 
A convention which has evolved for dealing with languages that 
contain individual constants and individual variables is to reserve the 
appellations "true" and "false" for only those formulas which make 
assertions about specific individuals in some universe (i.e., contain no 
individual variables which range freely over the universes of its inter-
pretations). This convention is captured mathematically by having only 
such formulas be included within the domain of the truth-valuations. 
For example, the valuations would map the above formula a=b to the set 
of truth values, but not a formula of the form x=x. The latter type 
of formula is referred to as being "valid" or "invalid," where validity 
means that all possible substitutions of individual constants (which 
"name" the elements of a given universe, cf. §3.1 and §3.2) for the 
individual variables yield formulas in the domain of the valuations that 
are mapped to "true." If the formula is already in the domain of the 
valuations, then "true" and "valid" are used synonomously. 
A semantics for a specific formal language is a class of interpre-
tations for that language. Typically, a semantics is defined in terms 
of an arbitrary member of that class, in which case it is automatic that 
all the interpretations in that class have certain features in common. 
For example, they might all be bivalent, all assign the equality relation 
to the equality symbol (if indeed there is one in the given language), 
and all interpret the logical connectives in exactly the same way. A 
semantics for a class of formal languages is defined similarly. In this 
case it is customary for the languages in the class to have been defined 
generically--i.e., in terms of an arbitrary member of that class--and 
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hence to have a certain minimal set of symbols (sometimes called logical 
symbols) in common. Then an arbitrary semantic interpretation in the 
semantics for that class of languages may be defined in terms of the 
manner in which it assigns meanings to the logical symbols. The net 
effect is analagous with the situation of one language; the common 
symbols, which typically include a set of logical connectives, are 
interpreted in the same way by all interpretations for all the languages 
in 'the given class. 
A formal logic consists of a formal language, or class of languages, 
together with a semantics for that language or class. In light of the 
above, this says that a formal logic is essentially determined by some 
specific meaning assignments for a specific set of symbols, in which 
case, use of the term "logic" signifies that this set includes some 
logical connectives. Hence this corresponds to the sense in which a 
logic is sometimes defined by some "truth tables" for logical connectives. 
Examples of logics appearing in this dissertation include the classical 
propositional calculus (§7.1), Kleene's three-valued logic for partial 
recursion (§8.2), and the logic of approximate reasoning C§3.1 and 
§3.2), which is a hybrid, having both bivalent and multivalent components. 
Given the foregoing, a semantics for a class of formal logical 
systems is naturally defined as a semantics for the languages of these 
systems. In dealing with formal systems, however, it is generally the 
case that the systems in a particular class are defined analagously as a 
class of formal languages--i.e., in terms of an arbitrary member of the 
class--in which case the systems will have in common, not only a speci-
fic set of symbols, but also certain forms of axioms and inference 
rules, called logical axioms and logical rules. Then a semantics for 
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that class of systems will not only interpret logical symbols uniformly, 
but normally will also have it that the logical axioms are always valid 
(or true) and that the logical rules are validity- (or truth-) preserving 
in that they always yield valid conclusions from valid hypotheses. This 
in turn ensures that certain forms of theorems are always valid. For 
example, if a class of formal logical systems is to be based on the 
classical logic, then a semantics for that class would naturally be 
defined in such a way that all the tautologies of classical logic are 
semantically valid. 
A semantic model of a formal logical system is a semantic inter-
pretation for the language of that system in which all theorems of the 
system are valid. Evidently, by the-definition of a formal logical 
system, in order for a semantic interpretation of its language to be a 
model of the system, it is sufficient that this be an interpretation in 
which all axioms of the system are valid, and all inference rules are 
validity preserving, since this will ensure that all formal derivations 
within the system lead only to valid theorems. Furthermore, it may 
happen that many interpretations for a formal system, even from within 
the same semantics, will not be models of that system. For example, a 
semantics for a formal system of arithmetic may have an interpretation 
for that system which assigns the meaning "one" to the symbol 1, "zero" 
to the symbol Q, and multiplication to the symbol +, in which case the 
theorem 1+0=1 would not be valid. Finally, while it is immediate by the 
"" "" "" 
definition of model that the theorems of a formal logical system are 
always valid in every model of the system, the converse proposition need 
not be true--i.e., it is not necessarily true that a formula which is 
valid in every model of a formal system need be a theorem of that system. 
This leads to the following important idea from the theory of formal 
systems. 
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Let F be a formal logical system, and let ~ be a semantics for F. 
Then F is said to be complete with respect to ~ if it turns out that a 
formula P in the language of F is valid in all models of F (in ~) only 
if P is a theorem of F--i.e, if the abovementioned converse holds true. 
Accordingly, a class e of formal logical systems is complete with 
respect to a semantics ..& for e. if each formal system in c:, is complete 
with respect to its interpretations in .d • 
The concept of semantic completeness makes precise the sense in 
which a class of formal logical systems is said to formalize a certain 
mathematical theory, or to characterize a certain collection of mathe-
matical structures (i.e., the structures in the concern of that theory). 
If the formal systems are defined correctly, i.e., have the appropriate 
languages, axioms, and rules of inference, then the given mathematical 
structures will simply be the models in a properly defined class of 
semantic interpretations, in which case semantic completeness ensures 
that the axioms allow enough proof-theoretic strength to derive formally 
as theorems all formulas that express true propositions in the theory of 
those structures. 
To avoid possible confusion with other works, here let us note 
also that a second usage of the word "complete" is sometimes employed. 
When expressed for systems whose languages include the standard logical 
connectives, a formal logical system F is proof-theoretically complete 
if, for every formula P of the language of F (or for every formula P of 
a certain form in that language) we have either that P is a theorem of F 
or that P is a theorem of F. It is known, for example, that every 
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axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus is complete in 
this sense. This proof-theoretic notion of completeness happens to not 
be used in this dissertation. 
§10.4.2. Game Theory: An Example 
At this point it will be convenient to illustrate the foregoing 
with an example that will also serve a purpose in the sections to follow. 
Suppose that it is desired to formalize the mathematical theory of 
games. (To date, no one appears to have carried out this exercise, but 
it is certainly reasonable to suppose that this could be accomplished 
with little difficulty). Here, "game" means any "two-person game" as 
studied by Rapoport (1966). Then it is implicit that the semantics of 
interest should include the entire class of two-person games; that is, 
these will be the "natural" interpretations of the formal systems we 
want to define. 
To start out, therefore, we must select a symbol set having suffi-
cient richness to express all the basic ideas of game theory. In parti-
cular, the symbol set should include the logical connectives denoted by, 
" V, etc., the equality symbol denoted by =, some symbols to represent 
players, such as A and B, and so on, leading up to enough linguistic 
strength to describe strategy/outcome (or game) matrices and any functions 
which would represent each player's responses to the other player's 
moves. Among these would be a certain minimal set of logical symbols 
that are common to all the systems in the class being defined. Then, 
special ideas, unique to a specific system in the class, would be 
expressed by adding further symbols to this basic set. 
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Axioms and inference rules are chosen similarly. The axioms (or 
axiom "forms") and inference rules common to all the systems in the 
class should include (i) the axioms and rules for classical propositional 
calculus, (ii) the axioms for equality (i.e., standard axioms such as 
(a=b&b=c) a=c, which expresses transitivity of equality), together with 
(iii) enough further axioms and rules to describe the interrelations of 
players, strategies, rewards, etc. that must be present in any game. 
This provides us with a basic, or minimal, formal theory of games. 
Further systems in the class may then be obtained by adding new 
symbols to the language, and by adding new axioms and/or inference rules 
defining how these new symbols interrelate with the basic symbols and 
with one another. For example, starting with the basic formal theory of 
games, one obtains the formal theory of zero-sum games by adding some 
axioms which require that the net outcome of any game be zero. On the 
other hand, starting with the same basic formal theory of games, one 
obtains the formal theory of nonzero-sum games by adding some axioms 
which explicitly state that the net outcome of any game should not equal 
zero. Furthermore, given the theory of nonzero-sum games, one may 
adjoin additional axioms which state that a game ultimately leads to the 
"prisoner's dilemma." 
Note: A simple game matrix exhibiting the prisoner's dilemma is 
shown in Figure 10-1 (taken from Rapoport 1966, p. 128). This depicts a 
game wherein: (i) if the two contestants trust one another, they can 
cooperate and mutually choose strategies by which they mutually gain, 
while (ii) in a context of mutual distrust, and a desire on the part of 
each contestant to minimize his losses, the game becomes non-cooperative, 
and the contestants choose strategies by which they both lose. 
Player A 
Statagies 
Player B Stratagies 
Al 5,5 -10,10 
A2 10,-10 -5,-5 
1st number is payoff to player A 
2nd number is payoff to player B 
Figure 10-1. Prisoner's dilemma game matrix. 
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The above remarks illustrate a process of obtaining formal systems 
of more and more specialized kinds of games by adding more symbols, 
axioms, and/or inference rules. But the fact of such specialization 
taking place is ensured only by virtue of a completeness result, i.e., 
by establishing that the class of all formal theories of games is complete 
with respect to the given semantics. As an illustration of this, let G 
stand for the minimal formal theory of games, let ZG stand for the 
extension of G which gives the formal theory of zero-sum games, let NZG 
be the analogous extension of G for nonzero-sum games, and let NZG+PD be 
the extension of NZG which furthermore contains axioms expressing the 
prisoner's diler::ma (see Figure 10-2). Then a completeness result for 
the class of formal systems thus defined, with respect to a semantics 
which includes all possible games, would ensure all of the following: 
(i) a formula of the language of G is a theorem ~f G if and only if it 
is true for every game, (ii) a formula is a theorem of NZG if and only 
if it is true for every nonzero-sum game, (iii) a formula is a theorem 
of NZG+PD if and only if it is "true" for every game which leads to the 
prisoner's dilemma, and so on for ZG and any other systems based on G 
that one might want to define. 
It follows that additional axioms for a logical system constrain 
the set of interpretations which can be models of that system. Models 
of NZG+PD are models of NZG, which in turn are models of G; models of 
NZG, however, need not be models of NZG+PD, and models of G need not be 
models of NZG. The latter· models of G may instead be models of ZG. 
Thus the most general formal system--which may itself be called "game 
theory"--has the most models, while the less general systems have fewer 
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G 
ZG NZG 
.' . 
• NZG+PD • 
• 
• 
• 
Figure 10-2; Adding new axioms to a formal system. 
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models. Today there is an extensive literature on techniques for deter-
mining the exact number of models of a given formal system. 
§10.4.3. Further Terminology 
Formal systems which have essentially only one model--i.e., all of 
whose models are "isomorphic"--are sometimes called categorical systems. 
A slightly weaker but sometimes more useful condition is that the system 
have essentially only one model of each finite or infinite cardinality--
i.e., for each finite or infinite cardinal number c, all the models 
whose universes have cardinality c are isomorphic. This property for a 
particular c is sometimes referred to as categoricity in c. For a brief 
discussion of these ideas, see §5.6. 
A formal logical system is said to be consistent if its set of 
theorems does not include a contradiction (or an "inconsistency," 
cf. §2.1.5.2). In standard languages, i.e., languages which employ the 
usual logical connectives, a contradiction will be a formula of the form 
P&,P, while in nonstandard languages, contradictions will normally have 
different forms (as in §7.3). 
A formal logical system is coherent if there is at least one 
formula in the language of that system which is not a theorem of the 
system. The property of coherence leads to a broad division of all 
formal logical systems into two categories: Aristotelean systems, in 
which inconsistency always implies incoherence, and non-Aristotelean 
systems, which can be simultaneously inconsistent and coherent. A 
discussion of these ideas, and of how they relate to the literature, is 
given in §2.1.5.2 and §2.1.5.4. Examples of their use appear in §8.4. 
CHAPTER 11 
THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAME 
Chapter 10 discussed the foundational aspects of using nonclassical 
logics as alternative guides to thinking. The present chapter continues 
this discussion in an investigation of methodological issues surrounding 
the use of formal logical systems and, particularly, nonclassical modes 
of reasoning for constructing models of real-world systems. 
In §11.1 we review M. Bunge's work on the theory of modeling in 
the natural sciences, recounting basic definitions and explaining the 
concept of empirical testability. 
§11.2 then takes up the views of Bunge and Suppes regarding the 
role of formal systems in providing the semantics for science, with the 
aim of clarifying certain points for purposes of the discussion at hand. 
§11.3, makes use of §11.2 to show how Bunge's basic definitions 
(§11.1) can be rendered within the theory of formal systems. 
§11.4 carries this one step further, by recalling the discussion 
of Chapter 10 and laying down the manner in which formal systems can 
enter into the relation of the observer to the observed. 
§11.5 examines the question of empirical testability as it applies 
to models based on nonstandard modes of reasoning. It is concluded that 
Bunge's criteria apply, although in a more or less qualified fashion 
depending on the particular logic employed. 
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§11.1. Review Of Bunge's Theory Of Modeling 
This section recounts the central ideas of Bunge (1973) on the use 
of mathematical models in the natural sciences, insofar as these pertain 
to the questions mentioned in the final paragraph of §10.3. Namely, 
these concern the status of the theory of formal logical systems in 
providing the "semantics for science," and the empirical testability of 
models that are based on nonstandard modes of reasoning. 
We begin with a summary of basic definitions. A model here is any 
entity which performs "a partial representation of a chunk of reality" 
(Bunge, p. 19). A model object is a model which serves as "a schematic 
representation of a thing or of a situation assumed to be actual or 
possible" (p. 97). A theoretical model (or specific theory) is a mo~el 
which is a "hypothetico-deductive system concerning a model object" 
(p. 97) and which is obtained by "grafting" a model object onto a general 
theory--where a general theory is a body of laws, or a "generic frame-
work" which is "concerned with the gross structure and behavior of 
systems of almost any kind, regardless of their physical and chemical 
constitution" (pp. 33-34). The interrelation of these ideas is 
illustrated in Figure 11-1. 
As examples of general theories Bunge cites "information theory, 
game theory, systems theory (in particular cybernetics), automata theory, 
and other extremely general black box theories, as well as nonspecific 
mechanism theories such as general field theory, both classical and 
quantal" (p. 33). Such theories are regarded as "generic sets" of 
general descriptions and laws which describe the structure and behavior 
of a very large (usually infinite) collection of set-theoretical struc-
tures (eg., game matrices). Alternatively, general theories may be 
Specific 
Theory 
General Theory 
(Non-Zero-Surn Two-Person Games) 
concrete 
Referent 
Model Object 
(Prisoner's Dilemma) 
Real-World 
System 
(Actual Game) 
Figure 11-1. Structure of a theoretical model (specific theory) • 
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regarded as containing the collection of set-theoretical structures 
themselves, in which case the general descriptions are taken only as 
technical devices by which the collection of mathematical structures is 
defined. The laws of course remain separate from the structures. 
In either case, general theories are "stuff free" in the sense 
that their set-theoretic structures are not assumed to have any specific 
referents in the real world. They are merely uninterpreted abstract 
mathematical entities. It follows that general theories are not com-
pletely testable, since they do not have the requirement desc~ibed by 
Popper of being refutable. According to this conception, a model is 
refutable only if it says something about a real-world system, in terms 
of which the model can be determined as true or false. But, general. 
theories are neither "true" nor "false." Rather, a set-theoretic struc-
ture only either "applies" to a real-world situation, or it does not, 
according as that situation does or does not satisfy the definitions of 
the kinds of situations which are under that general theory's concern. 
For example, a real-world situation is either a two-person game, or it 
is not, depending on whether it satisfies the definition of a two-person 
game; and if it does not, then the general theory of two-person games 
remains unchallenged--one simply has here a situation in which two-person 
game theory is inapplicable as an analytical tool. 
At the same time, however, general theories are partially testable 
in that they are confirmable, where confirmation is enacted through the 
testing of theoretical models (or specific theories) obtained by embedding 
specific model objects within that general theory's framework. As 
greater numbers of specific theories are verified within such a framework, 
the framework itself becomes increasingly more confirmed as a useful and 
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hence viable scientific theory. Complete confirmation, of course, is 
normally not possible since this would entail the testing of a usually 
infinite variety of specific theories. 
A typical example of a model object would be a set-theoretic 
description of the prisoner's dilemma game matrix given in §10.4.2, 
applied to a real-world two-person game. In contrast with general 
theories, model objects are always assumed to have specific real-world 
referents. In Bunge's work, where M is a model object and R is a real-
world referent, this modeling relation is denoted by the 
expression M=R, and is referred to as an interpretative axiom or a 
semantic assumption (p. 96). Semantic assumptions are always implicit 
in informal scientific discourse, but must be made explicit in the 
foundations of science and in particular in the axiomatization of a 
scientific theory. Such explication is important since any given model 
object might be involved in multiple semantic assumptions. For example, 
(i) a pair of competing corporations who have the option of choosing 
between continued competition or a merger, and (ii) a pair of countries 
who have adopted a mutual status of detente, might constitute two 
referents of the same set-theoretic description of the prisoners dilemma. 
Expression of a semantic assumption thus makes clear which real-world 
referents are in concern. 
A characteristic of model objects is that they are "idealizations" 
of their referents (p. 92). As such, model objects always omit certain 
details that are deemed to be irrelevant to the discussion at hand. 
Quoting Bunge (p. 92), "all the individuals of a given mice strain may 
be taken to be indiscernable and all ways of pressing a bar for food 
pellets may be assumed to be eqUivalent as well. In other words, the 
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real population, made up of different individuals, is modeled as a homo-
geneous set (an equivalence class), and likewise the set of all possible 
events is partitioned into homogeneous (equivalence) classes". It is in 
this sense that model objects are always "conceptual" or "abstract." 
As with general theories, model objects are untestable in the 
sense of being irrefutable, but for a different reason. Although they 
are always assumed to have at least one real-world referent, model 
objects in themselves make no predictions. But predictions are necessary 
for refutability, since it is only in terms of a model's pred~ctions 
that one ultimately determines whether that model is true or false. 
Model objects do make predictions, however, when they are embedded 
within (or grafted onto) the framework provided by a general theory. ° In 
this manner the model object inherits a set of general laws according to 
which predictions can be inferredoas logical implications of the model 
object. This in fact is what one tests in actual practice--i.e., a 
theoretical model, or specific theory, of the model object. 
This highlights the major conclusion of Bunge's analysis: for a 
model to be completely testable it is necessary and sufficient that it 
be both refutable and confirmable. Hence only theoretical models are 
fully testable. The confirmability of theoretical models stems from 
their having specific real-world referents, and their refutability stems 
from their capacity to make specific predictions regarding their referents' 
behavior. Insofar as standard approaches to mathematical modeling are 
concerned, it may therefore be said that the criteria of empirical 
testability are fairly well secured. 
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§11.2. The Semantics Of Science 
Let us now turn to a comparison of the scientific notion of "theo-
retical model" with the purely mathematical notion of "model of a formal 
logical system." The import of Bunge's remarks (pp. 110-113) is that an 
earlier view set forth by Suppes (1961) makes too strong of a case for 
the potential role of mathematical logic in scientific studies. Speci-
fically, Bunge qualifies Suppes's view with the observation that the 
theory of formal logical systems and their semantics is not in itself 
enough to fully constitute the "semantics of science." Although Bunge 
does not provide an explicit definition of this phrase, it is clear from 
the context of his discussion that this semantics should include all of 
the linguistic and semantic apparatus necessary for the formulation and 
testing of specific theories. In this section we shall ultimately 
concur with Bunge on this point and then (in this and later sections) 
proceed to build on Bunge's analysis so as to better pinpoint the use of 
formal systems at least in serving the semantics of science even though 
not comprising its entirety. 
It will be instructive to start with a brief summary of Suppes's 
contribution. The paper begins with a series of quotations, the first 
being Tarski's definition of a semantic model of a formal theory (i.e., 
of a formal system in the sense of this dissertation), and the remaining 
five quotes being descriptions of models used in the empirical sciences. 
The crux of his argument is then given as follows (pp. 165-166): 
I claim that the concept of model in the sense of Tarski may be 
used without distortion and as a fundamental concept in all of 
the disciplines from which the above quotations are drawn. In 
this sense I would assert that the meaning of the concept of 
model is the same in mathematics and the empirical sciences. 
The difference to be found in these disciplines is to be found 
in their use of the concept. In drawing this comparison between 
constancy of meaning and difference of use, the sometimes diffi-
cult semantic question of how one is to explain the meaning of a 
concept without referring to its use does not actually arise. 
When I speak of the meaning of the concept of a model I shall 
always be speaking in well-defined technical contexts and what I 
shall be claiming is that, given this technical meaning of the 
concept of model, mathematicians ask a certain kind of question 
about models and empirical scientists tend to ask another kind 
of question. 
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The support for this claim stems from some observations about the 
nature of set-theoretical models of formal systems and their connection 
with physical systems. These observations are illustrated by an example 
as follows (pp. 166-167): 
It is true that many physicists want to think of a model of 
the orbital theory of the atom as being more than a certain kind 
of set-theoretical entity. They envisage it as a very concrete 
physical thing built on the analogy of the solar system. I 
think it is important to point out that there is no real incom-
patibility in these two viewpoints. To define formally a model 
as a set-theoretical entity which is a certain kind of ordered 
tuple consisting of a set of objects and relations and operations 
on these objects is not to rule out the physical model of the 
kind which is appealing to physicists, for the physical model 
may be simply taken to define the set of objects in the set-
theoretical model. . . . 
It is simple enough to see how an actual physical model in the 
physicist's sense of classical particle mechanics is related to 
this set-theoretical sense of models. We simply can take the 
set of particles to be in the case of the solar system the set 
of planetary bodies. Another slightly more abstract possibility 
is to take the set of particles to be the set of centers of mass 
of the planetary bodies. This generally exemplifies the situa-
tion. The abstract set-theoretical model of a theory will have 
among its parts a basic set which will consist of the objects 
ordinarily thought to constitute the physical model .... 
A summarization of these remarks is represented pictorially in 
Figure 11-2. That this figure is implicit, although somewhat obscurely, 
in Suppes's remarks is evidenced by (i) the statement that "the physical 
model may be taken to define the set of objects in the set-theoretical 
model," (ii) the statement that one can "take the set of particles to be 
the centers of mass of the planetary bodies," and particularly (iii) the 
Set-Theoretic 
Model 
Real-World 
System 
(Concrete 
Referent) 
-< 
Formalization 
of Set-Theoretic 
r'1odel 
Hathematical 
(Semantic) 
~ Interpretation 
. ------of Formal System 
and 
!·1athematical Hodel 
of Real-World System 
Factual 
~ ___ .. _ Interpretation 
of Set-Theoretic 
Model 
Figure 11-2. Suppes's view of the modeling relations. 
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statement that the "basic set. . . will consist of the objects ordinarily 
thought to constitute the physical mode1." In the context of §11.1, it 
is here evident that Suppes is referring to the fact that the elements 
of a model are "idealizations" of the elements of the physical system. 
As it stands, this may be regarded as a fairly accurate description 
of the actual state of affairs. Yet, as Bunge points out, it lacks a 
small, but nonetheless important, matter of detail; namely, there is 
nothing inherent in formal systems or their semantic interpretations 
which connects them with the empirical world. While the upper half of 
Figure 11-2 is always an essential ingredient of the mathematics of the 
model, the lower half represents something which is "extramathematical," 
i.e., something which must be added to the set-theoretical structure in 
order that it become a bona fide theoretical model of a concrete (or 
supposedly existing) real-world system. 
Observing this, Bunge proceeds to cast an alternate view in terms 
of some further examples. These shall be given here in detail, since 
they will serve a purpose also in later sections. 
Consider the following system of symbols and axioms (Bunge, p. 111): 
1. S~cp. 
2. (a)F:S-+R. (b)G:sxS-+R. (c)H:sxS-+R. 
3. s,s'eS => H(s,s')=heR. 
4. (a)O:RXR-+R. (b)O:RxR-+R. 
5. s,s'eS => G(s,s')=hO[F(s')OF(s)] 
In the following this system will be referred to as a "formal system" 
even though, strictly speaking, is only the proper part of a formal logical 
system which would furthermore embody some axioms characterizing an 
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underlying logic, together with some axioms which lay down the formal 
interrelations of $, =, x, 0, 0, etc. 
Bunge notes first of all that this system is "nonsignificant" 
since we may assign the symbols as many different meanings as we please. 
A specific semantics (as in §10.4.1) is provided, however, by an agreement 
that under all interpretations we shall have that R stands for the real 
line, 0 for the arithmetic product, 0 for subtraction, and that the 
remaining symbols and punctuation marks receive their conventional 
interpretations. It follows that all the interpretations in this seman~ 
tics will have the properties (Bunge, p. 111): 
1. S is a non-empty set. 
2. (a) F is a real valued function on S. (b) G and H are real valu~d 
functions on the set of pairs of members of S. 
3. H is the constant function with value h. 
4. For every sand S' in S, G(s,s')=h[F(s')-F(s)]. 
Different interpretations thus are obtainable by assigning different 
sets to S, different functions to F, and different real values to h. 
Given an assignment for S,F and h, the meanings of G and H are determined. 
Any such set-theoretic structure, Bunge refers to as a set-
theoretical "formalism." His argument then proceeds (p. 112): 
This is a formalism interpreted within pure mathematics. It 
makes no sense outside mathematics. In particular, it is not a 
theoretical model in any metascientific sense of the term, for 
it does not concern anything extramathematical: the basic set S 
is an arbitrary (abstract) set and therefore the functions F, G, 
and H cannot represent any concrete properties. Precisely this 
renders the formalism valuable from a scientific point of view, 
for it is a read-made dummy that can be clothed in a number of 
ways. 
Such "clothings" of the set-theoretic formalism are called "factual 
interpretations," two examples of which are given as follows: 
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1. A "physical interpretation," wherein 
a. the individuals s of the universe of discourse are thought of 
as points on a d.c. electric circuit, 
b. F(s) is electrical potential at the point s, 
c. G(s,s') is intensity of current between sand s', 
d. H(s,s') is conductivity between sand s', 
2. A "sociological interpretation," wherein 
a. the individuals s of the universe of discourse are thought of 
as countries, 
b. F(s) is enticement offered by s (eg., standard of living), 
c. G(s,s') is migratory pressure from s to s', 
d. H(s,s') is permeability of the border between sand s'. 
This set of examples calls to mind a slightly different image than 
Suppes's, as shown in Figure 11-3. Here we have a formal system inter-
preted within mathematics as a certain set-theoretical structure, which 
is then further provided with "clothes" by which it becomes simultaneously 
a factual interpretation of the set-theoretical "formalism" and a theo-
retical model of a real-world system. 
Yet, Bunge continues, "this is just a first approximation." 
Mathematical models of formal systems are always, by definition 
(cf. §10.4.1), required to be "true" for all the theorems of the system, 
while theoretical models are at best only "approximately true" of their 
designated real-world systems (since they are always "idealizations"). 
Consequently every theoretical model is, in the best of cases, a 
quasimodel in the sense that its formulas are (at best) satisfied 
only approximately by reality. Therefore the model-theoretic 
concept of a model does not coincide with either of the two 
metascientific notions of model. Which shows that model theory 
is not enough to consitute the semantics of science, and suggests 
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Figure 11-3. Bunge's view of the modeling relations. 
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that the very term 'theoretical model' (and also 'mathematical 
model') would be advantageously replaced by 'specific theory.' 
Now on these points Bunge's position evidently stands firm. In 
238 
fact, it is likely that this would gain the concurrence of Suppes himself. 
Indeed Bunge's rebuttal of Suppes may be somewhat strongly stated, since 
Bunge merely extends the analysis in a way which augments but does not 
necessarily contradict Suppes. That Suppes overlooked the above distinc-
tion between the "exactness" and "inexactness" of the separate modeling 
relations apparently stems from his focusing on the set-theoretical 
entity itself, rather than on the nature of the implicit semantic assump-
tions. Nevertheless, Bunge's point that development a specific theory 
out of set-theoretical structure always requires something "extramathe-
matical" is significant. 
Regarding the nature of theoretical models thus construed, however, 
it is worth noting also that there is a further difference between the 
relations of factual interpretation to set-~heoretical structure and of 
set-theoretical interpretation to formal system. This may be unraveled 
as follows. In the latter relation, the set-theoretical structure is an 
entity which is completely separate from the system which it interprets--
i.e., it contains no symbols or symbolic elements, but only set-theoretical 
objects together with some interpretative mappings (cf. §10.4.1) from 
symbolic elements into set-theoretical entities. In the former relation, 
on the other hand, the set theoretical structure (or some fragment 
thereof) is properly contained within the factual interpretation--i.e., 
correctly envisioned, the theoretical model consists of at least a part 
of the set-theoretical structure together with some further mappings 
which link set-theoretical entities with objects in the real world. On 
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this count, it may be argued that one could with no loss revert back to 
a three-leveled diagram such as Figure 11-2, as long as one keeps in 
mind that it is the lower part, i.e., the semantic assumption, which 
indeed qualifies the semantic model of the formal system as a representa-
tive of some real-world system. This three-leveled image will be used 
in the work below. 
Last, while Bunge's work clearly does not deny the usefulness of 
formal systems to science, his rendering of "theoretical model" obscures 
a point that is central to all that follows here. Namely, that the 
presence of such a system, either implicitly understood or explicitly 
formalized, is essential to the model for providing both the linguistic 
and the logico-deductive mechanism. That this is so stems from there 
being no symbolic or logical apparatus at the level of the set-theoretical 
model. These features, by which the factual model obtains "formulas" 
and implies "predictions." exists only at the level which is represented 
by the formal system. To practicing scientists, of course, this distinc-
tion is seldom relevant, since first, the underlying logic is usually 
the classical logic, whose verity is normally unquestioned (cf. §10.2), 
and second, even in standard mathematical theories the possibility of 
separating symbols from their meanings is unimportant. 
Nevertheless, as a further step toward making the notion of theo-
retical model complete in this context, it is worth observing in addition 
to the above that not only do such models properly contain a part of 
their set-theoretical "formalism," but they also contain at least a 
fragment of some formal system, namely that part which expresses the 
properties and behaviors of the given set-theoretical model. This 
understanding will be tacit in the sections to follow. 
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§11.3. A Formalization Of The Basic Modeling Itleas 
Now that we have clarified the role of formal logical systems with 
respect to the semantics of science, we are in a position to lend further 
detail to this role by reinterpreting the analysis of Bunge (§11.1) 
within this frame. Here it will be shown that the theory of formal 
logical systems contributes a new level of precision to the concepts of 
model object, theoretical model and general theory, and, more importantly, 
that the "exactness" of the relation of formal system to its semantic 
models is precisely what lends theoretical models their prope~ty of 
refutability. 
In §11.1 it was seen that the idea of a general theory is exempli-
fied by the theory of two-person games, and that this theory may be . 
regarded as the collection of all possible set-theoretical structures 
that satisfy a generic set of definitions and laws. Furthermore, it was 
seen that the idea of a model object is exemplified by a set-theoretical 
structure which represents a prisoner's dilemma situation in the real 
world, whereas a specific theory of that model object is obtained by 
"grafting" that structure onto the general theory of two-person games. 
As part of the following, we make this notion of "grafting" formally 
explict. It will be convenient to take as our theory the theory of 
nonzero-sum two-person games which, although somewhat less general than 
the full theory of two-person games, nonetheless qualifies as an example 
of a general theory. 
We may proceed to translate Bunge's definitions into the termi-
nology of formal systems in the following manner. Consider the formal 
system NZG of §10.4.2, and let the collection of all possible semantic 
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interpretations of NZG be the semantics I(NZG). Then the general theory 
of nonzero-sum two person games may be defined as NZG together with the 
collection of all interpretations in I(NZG) which are models of NZG (in 
the "exact" model-theoretic sense). Note that this merely formalizes 
the generic set of descriptions and laws which (§11.1) normally comprise 
the informal general theory, and all of the set-theoretical entities 
thus described are correctly characterized, i.e., it is assumed that NZG 
is semantically complete with respect to I(NZG). The sense in which a 
general theory is "stuff free" is here represented by the fact that the 
semantic interpretations in I(NZG) are not assumed to have any particular 
referents in the real world. 
The manner in which a general theory obtains its connection with 
the real world, through the use of a model object, can be elucidated by 
similarly translating the definitions of model object and specific 
theory. A model object of a real-world system which exhibits the 
prisoner's dilemma may be defined as the axioms PD (described in §10.4.2), 
together with any part of a semantic model in I(NZG) that satisfies 
those axioms, and furthermore together with any semantic assumption 
which maps that part of the semantic model into the real world. Note 
that here the model object per se usually does not utilize the full 
semantic interpretation, but only a certain subcollection of functions 
and relations on the universe of that interpretation. Furthermore note 
that there might well be more than one model in I(NZG) that satisfy the 
axioms PD (Le., in which PD is "true" thereby possibly giving rise to 
more than one model object. Such model objects mayor may not be equiva-
lent, either from the standpoints of the axioms PD or that of and the 
concrete referent. 
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A specific theory of a prisoner's dilemma model object may then be 
defined as the formal theory NZG+PD together with the smaller semantics 
~(NZG+PD), and furthermore including any semantic assumptions in which 
the interpretations in I(NZG+PD) might be involved (i.e., as containing 
model objects). This illustrates that the process of "grafting" a model 
object onto a general theory may be represented formally as a process of 
"adjoining" some additional axioms to a formal logical system. In case 
there is only one such model in ~(NZG+PD)--i.e., if NZG+PD is categorical 
in the sense of §10.4.3--then the specific theory is just tha~ model; 
otherwise the specific theory consists of a collection of more or less 
similar models. 
This collection of definitions has been summarized schematical~y 
in Figure 11-4. Here is illustrated the formation of the theory NZG+PD 
as the composition of NZG and PD. Further it is indicated that the 
semantics for NZG will in general be larger than the semantics for 
NZG+PD (as was discussed in §10.4.2) and that the set-theoretical part 
of the model object is normally a part of a particular interpretation, 
here denoted by 14 , within the semantics I(NZG+PD). The presence of 13 
in the diagram covers the possibility that there might be similar but 
nonisomorphic models of NZG+PD--i.e., that NZG+PD might not be categorical. 
The lower part of the diagram shows the semantic assumption which links 
the set-theoretical part of the model object with the real world, and 
furthermore suggests that the specific theory of that model object will 
normally pertain to some larger system within which the concrete referent 
is embedded. Thus we see that all the essential aspects of Bunge's 
definitions are taken into account. 
t(NZG) = 
NZG+PD 
Formal System 
)(' NZG )'" 
I -----.... " 
E) 
\ 
I 
\ Real-~'J()rld System 
''''~,­----------------
Semantics 
Pigure 11-4. Formal representation of modeling ideas. 
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Next let us consider the concept of refutability in this context. 
Recall from §11.1 that the requirements for a model to be refutable are 
(i) that the model have a specific referent in the real-world, and 
(ii) that it allow for making predictions about its referent. Then the 
fact that a specific theory of a model object has an empirical referent 
will always be--as we have seen--"extramathematical," since the intro-
duction of a referent is based only on a choice by the modeler. The 
nature of a prediction, on the other hand, is intrinsically mathematical 
and is based on the characteristics of the general theory. W~ may 
therefore define this concept in a continuation of the above example as 
follows. 
By a prediction of the above specific theory (of the prisoner'~ 
dilemma) is meant the semantic interpretation (i.e., the meaning) of any 
theorem of NZG+PD in the semantic model of NZG+PD which contains the 
given model object. In other words, a prediction is simply a logical 
consequence of axioms of the formalized general theory, interpreted 
within that theory's semantics. This clearly makes precise the signi-
ficance of general theories in providing logico-deductive systems. And 
the concept of a refutable model thus becomes precise via a precise 
rendering of the concept of prediction. 
Actual verification or refutation of a given specific theory is, 
of course, always a matter of scientific investigation. One tests the 
predictions of the theory against the behavior of the concrete referent 
and thereby determines whether the predictions are "true," "false," 
"approximately true," and so on. Clearly, these predictions will normally 
be only approximately true of the real-world system. However, the 
"exactness" in the relation of the semantics of ~(NZG+PD) to the formal 
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system NZG+PD is' mandatory for the investigative procedure to be correct. 
For it is only because a prediction is the "meaning" of a theorem in 
NZG+PD that one is assured that that prediction is indeed a valid logical 
inference from the given model object. Without the presence (either 
implicitly or explicitly) of a formal logical system, no such correctness 
can be ensured. 
Semantic completeness of the formal logical system is also an 
implicit necessity, in order to ensure that the formal system indeed 
characterizes the given general theory. Categoricity, on the other 
hand, might or might not playa role. If the formal system is cate-
gorical, then one knows that the specific theory utilizes the only 
semantic model which satisfies the axioms of the given model object, in 
which case a formula of the language of the system is derivable from the 
axioms of the system if and only if it is true for that particular 
specific theory. But even if the formal system is not categorical, we 
still have that all derivable formulas are true for the specific theory, 
by the definition of semantic model; only we do not have the conve=se. 
In terms of testability, this means that simply because a formula is 
semantically valid, we do not know if it qualifies as a prediction, 
since only the formally derivable formulas are bona fide logical 
inferences within the context of the general theory. In actual practice 
however, this fact of mathematical life is of no real consequence, since 
scientific testing is always restricted to only those predictions which 
are indeed formally derivable. Thus, categoricity is not generally 
needed for testability, even though it might be useful in some situations. 
Finally, it is true that in practice the underlying logical system 
is rarely made formally explicit; and in most cases this explication 
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serves no useful purpose. The usual approach in scientific work is to 
simply assume a given, commonly known, body of knowledge and to 
explicitly present only the "proper axioms" which describe the specific 
theory in concern. This is what was done, for example, in Bunge's 
description of a formal system in terms of the axioms 1 through 5 C§11.2). 
But, this does not negate the fact that there is always some formal 
logic, indeed usually the classical logic, permeating the entire 
investigation. 
§11.4. The Use Of Formal Systems 
With these ideas in hand we may now bring forward the discussion 
of §lO.1 and §10.2 and bear more carefully on the manner in which formal 
systems may enter into the relation between the observer and the observed. 
Let us begin with a brief review of the way in which models are formed. 
We have seen that the use of a general theory is always necessary 
for the modeling exercise, for it is 'only when a model object is grafted 
onto a general theory, thereby forming a theoretical model, that it 
becomes fully testable. At the same time, however, general theories 
enter into the modeling procedure in another way. For when undertaking 
to study a given real-world system, some general theory is needed a 
priori as a guide in prescribing the kinds of data and measurements one 
is to obtain. For example, the kind of research conducted will be quite 
different if one regards the system as an instance of information theory 
as opposed to the theory of games. Oftentimes, of course, the charac-
teristics of interest are not adequately representable with the existing 
theories, in which case there develops an interest in formulating a new 
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theory. But in any case, the existence of some general theory, either 
actual or possible, is implied. 
Given a general theory, the main steps toward model construction 
may be outlined as follows. First, observational data is gleaned from 
the real-world system, by some appropriate means--visual observation, 
electron scattering, and so forth. This data is perceived by the observer 
in terms of measurements, interrelations of behaviors, and so on. 
Second, these perceptions are formulated within the language of the 
general theory, thereby creating the abstract (i.e., set-theoretic) 
component of a model object. Third, this formulation is hypothesized as 
having the given real-world system as its referent, thereby becoming a 
full-fledged model object. Fourth, this model object is taken together 
with the general theory so as to constitute a testable theoretical model 
of the system in concern. 
Now, as discussed in the foregoing, when adopting a general theory, 
there is always implicit an underlying mode of reasoning. This mode of 
reasoning is usually not made explicit, since it is almost always the 
classical bimodal mode with which all mathematicians are assumed to be 
familiar (cf. §10.2). If the logic is made explicit, however, then one 
winds up having the general theory being represented by a formal logical 
system, complete with axioms and rules of formal derivation in the 
manner described in §11.3. Accordingly, the model object becomes repre-
sented by special symbols and axioms within this formal system, and the 
theoretic model itself takes the form of a semantic model of this system, 
which, in the manner of §11.2, has the real-world system as a factual 
interpretation. 
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This state of affairs is summarized in Figure 11-5. Here is 
illustrated the observer's perceptions being developed into a model 
object by the process of "formulated observation" (cf. §10.1), and the 
observer's mode of reasoning (for now, assumed to be bimodal) first 
being used internally as an organizing principle for thinking about his 
perceptions, and second being developed into an axiomatized formal logic 
through the process of "introspection articulation" (also cf. §10.1). 
Thus formalized, the logic then becomes an external organizing tool and 
a mechanism for drawing inferences. 
It is furthermore indicated in Figure 11-5 that (i) the same 
formal logical system might have different semantic models whose referents 
are the same real-world system (although typically representing diff~rent 
aspects or parts of that system), and (ii) that the same semantic model 
might simultaneously serve as a representation of more than one real-world 
system (i.e., be involved in different semantic assumptions). Each of 
these situations may be exemplified as follows. 
Consider the latter case first. Assume that our formal system is 
Bunge's axiom system as described in §11.2, i.e., we take the five axiom 
schemes as being formalized in the explicit context of an axiomatized 
logic, together with all the necessary axioms for multiplication, sub-
traction, equality, and so on. Now consider Bunge's two factual inter-
pretations: the physical system consisting of a dc circuit, and the 
social system consisting of a collection of countries. As was shown in 
§11.2, each of these concrete systems may be modeled with semantic 
models of our formal system. Here we may make the further observation 
that, if it is assumed that these two semantic models are such that 
their universes of discourse have exactly the same number of elements, 
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then these models are for all practical purposes identical. Thus we 
here have one semantic model serving simultaneously as a theoretical 
model of two distinct real-world systems. 
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To exemplify the situation of two distinct theoretical models of 
the same real-world system, we can make use of a tongue-in-cheek example 
provided by Bunge (p. 112). In this case, the real-world system consists 
of all persons currently employed in academe. Then the symbol S is 
assigned as its semantic meaning a universe of discourse consisting of 
one abstract representative of each professional academic; F is assigned 
as its meaning the function which gives each person's number of publica-
tions; and H is assigned a real-number measure of "natural hatred." 
Then G respresents a function which gives the amount of "professional 
jealousy" between the individual academics. 
To develop a second semantic model, of the same formal system, and 
having the same body of academics as its referent, consider the collec-
tion of all professional societies within academe. Let S represent the 
collection of subsets of the previous universe of discourse, each of 
which subsets has its members being the representatives of all the 
members of a particular professional society; let F be assigned the 
function which gives the number of elements in each such subset, thereby 
having as its real-world referent a membership count of each professional 
society; and let H represent a measure of the average pairwise overlap 
in interests among the societies. Then G represents a function which 
gives a pairwise measure of the total amount of fruitful collaboration 
that can be expected to occur among academics which simultaneously 
belong to both societies in that pair. As a semantic interpretation of 
the formal system, this is obviously distinct from, and not isomorphic 
with the one which models "professional jealousy." Nevertheless it 
qualifies as a theoretical model of the same real world system. 
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Now, while we have thus far assumed that the underlying logic of 
our formal system is bimodal, Figure 11-5 makes it obvious that alterna-
tive modes of reasoning can be chosen. In this case, the arrow labeled 
A/I represents the selecting of an alternative mode of reasoning, in the 
form of an explicitly defined formal logic. Here note furthermore, that 
this alternative logic need not be consciously present within the think-
ing processes of the observer. Rather, it is here im~licit that the 
alternative logic is being implemented merely as a tool for model con-
struction, while the actual mode of reasoning of the system observer may 
remain bimodal, but now in the slightly more sophisticated sense of . 
being operative at the metalevel, for thinking about the nonstandard 
logic (cf. §10.2). By the same token, this also includes the possi-
bility that part of the metalanguage even be made formally e~licit, as 
in the theory of approximate reasoning studied in Part I. In any case, 
the explicitly defined logical system thus becomes available to the 
observer for ensuring that he obeys the laws of his chosen mode of 
reasoning. 
Thus we have at least the possibility of using the theory of 
formal systems for developing real-world system models based on non-
classical modes of reasoning. In turn, this raises a question regarding 
their ultimate usefulness for producing testable models of real-world 
systems. This question is taken up below. 
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§11.5. Empirical Testability Of Nonstandard Models 
The two criteria of testability, as discussed in §11.1, are the 
Popperian critereon of refutability and Bunge's critereon of confirma-
bility. It has been shown that only theoretical models satisfy both 
criteria. Moreover, it was seen that the relation of a model to its 
factual referent is at best one of approximation, so that Bunge's semantic 
assumption M=R is always at best only approximately true. 
As such, this analysis opens a pathway for the application of the . 
logic of approximate reasoning, which has as its main objectiye the 
formulation of a concept of approximate truth. Indeed, an illustration 
of this idea is given in Chapter 6, where the "certainty" of predictions 
is linked directly to a measure of the "imprecision" in the model. 
Yet at the same time, it must be asked to what extent such models 
are testable, especially insofar as this concerns refutability. Are we 
to allow here that models be acceptable even if they are "not very 
true"? Surely, merely down-grading the certainty of the predictions is 
no substitute for discarding a poor model and striving for a model which 
is "more true." 
And the question of refutability becomes even more exacerbating 
when we consider applications of Kleene-Varela logics to formulation of 
empirically untestable properties, as in §9.4.1. Here, by our very 
interpretation of the logic, we appear to automatically rule out the 
possibility of Popperian refutation. 
These questions become tractable, however, if we look more care-
fully at refutability in light of an earlier discussion. First, the 
Popperian notion of refutability only apparently rests on an assumption 
of semantic bimodality. This is true because, in semantically complete 
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classical systems, a proposition is derivable from the axioms if and 
only if it is semantically true. Thus, saying that a prediction is true 
is here equivalent to saying that the proposition which expresses that 
prediction is formally derivable from the axioms. However, on closer 
scrutiny, we can see that it is actually the condition of "derivability" 
and not "semantic truth" which is of primary significance. For it is 
only insofar as the proposition is a valid logical consequence of the 
axioms (describing the model in question) that that proposition may be 
regarded as a prediction. Propositions which do not follow from the 
model are of no concern, regardless of their truth value. 
Second, even though bimodality is not essential for refutability, 
it is clearly necessary at some level of analysis. For the criteria of 
testability itself is meant to serve for deciding whether a model should 
or should not be accepted. This problem is ultimately resolved by the 
discussion of §lO.2. There it was argued that, even when dealing with 
nonstandard logics, the mathematician's intuitive reasoning about those 
logics is always bimodal at some, perhaps higher than the formal, level. 
In terms of refutability, this means that one need only seek out this 
particular level as the one at which the criteria of testability are to 
be applied. Furthermore, since in all formal systems (as defined in 
this dissertation) a proposition is either derivable or nonderivable 
from the system's axioms, it turns out that the appropriate level is 
easily isolated. This may be illustrated by some examples. 
The theory of approximate reasoning allows for the formulation of 
such propositions as 
"JOHN is young," 
wherein the truth value of the proposition is determined as the degree 
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of compatibility of JOHN with the fuzzy set of ages of young persons. 
Suppose that this truth value is 0.5, indicating a degree of equivocation 
between "young" and "not young." Certainly one would not discard this 
proposition as a correct representation of reality simply because it is 
not even approximately true. This would be to miss the point of approxi-
mate reasoning. In effect, we here have a situation in which the truth 
value itself has become a part of the model, and having its own factual 
interpretation, i.e., as a degree of compatibility. The concept of 
refutability applies, therefore, not to the proposition as st~ted, but 
to the higher-level, and somewhat more complex, proposition 
"'JOHN is Young' is 0.5 true." 
Such a proposition is in fact refutable in the same sense as classic~l 
models, since its correctness as a statement about the factual world 
depends only on a particular measurement, i.e., the measurement of 
compatibility, and it is certainly reasonable to suppose that appropri-
ate compatibility measures can be crafted for whatever objects are in 
concern. 
A consideration of refutability for Kleene-Varela systems leads to' 
a similar conclusion. Consider again Wienberg's "perfect system" 
(§9.2.4.1) and suppose that the proposition P in the formula 
P~'P 
asserts the property of "perfectness." Suppose further the same seman-
tics as before, with truth values taken as representing "verifiable," 
"refutable," and "neither verifiable nor refutable." Then once again, 
Popperian refutability does not apply to the proposition as stated, 
since it is again implicit that the truth values themselves are a part 
of the model. What one must consider is the proposition 
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IIp is neither verifiable nor refutable," 
which can at least in principle be either a correct or incorrect state-
ment about the factual world. 
Thus we conclude that models based on nonstandard modes of reason-
ing can indeed provide usable perspectives on the observable world. It 
is simply a matter of locating the appropriate semantic level at which 
the criteria of testability are to be applied. Moreover, as the above 
examples suggest, this appears to be exactly that level at which the 
truth values themselves become a part of the model. 
Underlying all of this is of course the assumption that the logics 
employed be at least coherent logics, if they are inconsistent. Although 
this has nothing to do with the question of refutability, it is an 
important requirement in order that the formal system which uses that 
logic have meaningful semantic interpretations. Incoherent system will 
in general have no semantic models in the sense defined in this disserta-
tion. Given a coherent general theory, however, one always has essentially 
the same situation as in traditional science, where consistency of the 
general theory is ensured by the nature of its mathematical formulation. 
Logical coherence will be the minimum condition under which rational 
viabilty is ensured. 
CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have evinced a small but rapidly growing interest in 
using nonclassical logics for the analysis of complex systems. This 
dissertation has succeeded in bearing this idea a few more steps out of 
the realm of mere conjecture and into the realm of pragmatic ~ctuality. 
On the whole, the farest reaching result is the demonstration that 
nonclassical logics can indeed be used as a basis for modeling. Since 
this settles the relevant issue of empirical testability, it shows tpat 
in principle any logically "coherent" mode of reasoning qualifies for 
the formation of usable perspectives on the world. Thus a solid 
methodological foundation is established for implementing an immense 
variety of multivalent logics, modal logics, temporal logics, and so 
on. It is simply a matter of furthering the development of such 
logics to a sufficient linguistic richness that they can express the 
system properties in concern. 
In this sense, the Kleene-Varela logic discussed in Part II shows 
promise for modeling paradoxical, and hence classically intractable, 
system properties. That many systems do exhibit logically anomalous 
behavior is nowdays patent, and the prospect that certain systems bear 
paradoxical attributes per se has recently surfaced in the literature. 
An internally coherent formal context is therefore needed in order that 
such behaviors and attributes can be discussed in a meaningful way. In 
this case the explicitly defined formal logic serves as a guide for 
correct reasoning where ordinary mathematical intuition no longer 
applies. 
257 
A similar purpose is served by the semantically complete axiomati-
zation of approximate reasoning, developed in Part I. In light of the 
rather extensive literature on this topic, and the plethora of known 
applications, this particular result is likely to be of widespread 
theoretical significance. The present axiomatization lays down in 
concise terms most of the principles of reasoning which any application 
of fuzzy logic must obey. 
Hand in hand with its providing answers to a small collection of 
questions, however, this work also points to several other issues which 
have yet to be explored. A major theoretical problem left untouched. by 
Part I is the extension of the concept of linguistic theory to accommo-
date fuzzy-logical quantifiers, i.e., generalizations of the classical 
"for all" and "for some" to expressions like "for many" and "for few." 
By analogy with the corresponding problem for classical systems, this 
presents a challenge of considerably greater difficulty than the seman-
tic completeness results established here. In addition is the issue of 
linguistic approximation which, although requiring a more sophisticated 
formal language, could conceivably also be provided with a concise 
formalism. 
It is also evident that the full range of potential applications 
of approximate reasoning has hardly begun to be explored. The example 
developed in Chapter 6 represents only one of many directions that could 
be undertaken, i.e., the use of dynamic models for forecasting. Overall, 
the cutting edge of fuzzy set theory is its power as a model of natural 
languages, together with its ultimate implementability on the modern 
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computer. Based on this conception it is likely that fuzzy sets will 
play an important role in data base management, interactive question-answering 
systems, computer aided instruction, business decision analysis, mechanized . ,~ 
control systems, and pattern recognition, as well as in higher level 
systems applications, such as semantic modeling and complexity approximation. 
The discussion in Chapter 6 concerning the use of fuzzy logic for 
establishing a direct link between model imprecision and certainty of 
predictions illustrates a more general class of problems for which fuzzy 
sets may also become a vital tool. In particular is the proposed exten-
sion to full implementation of fuzzy logic for incorporating a concept 
of linguistic "Certainty." And this may in part involve, or even require, 
an explicit fomalization of Zadeh's generalized modus ponens for fuzzy 
sets of type 2 C§5.5.3). Further, the present formalization of approxi-
mate reasoning is implicitly an extension of the Kleene-Varela logic to 
a logic having a substantially richer linguistic structure, which means 
that the linguistic theories developed in Part I may well provide exactly 
what is needed for exp~essing paradoxical notions which go beyond the 
capacity of the languages studied in Part II. 
On a higher level is a more broads coped project of the kind mentioned 
in the preface. Given a certain body of known laws and principles 
regarding an aspect of reality, if one formalizes those into a semantically 
complete formal system, that system will normally have a large collection 
of semantic models other than the ones which initially served as the 
intuitive guide for developing the formalization. Such models will then 
represent alternative "worlds" in which the given principles and laws 
hold true, and therefore may conceivably stimulate new avenues of emperical 
investigations. 
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Last, while there nowdays exist a wide variety of nonclassical 
logics which scientists might choose to employ in model construction, it 
is also clear that emperical research may inspire the development of 
totally new modes of reasoning. On this count, the present work may be 
deemed a success if it has only planted the idea that such an approach 
is both feasible and in fact promising of a deeper understanding of the 
world. 
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